To check test coverage you can run:
yarn coverage
You can see the coverage status at mainnet deployment here.
There’s also a pull request to increase the coverage, but it hasn’t been merged yet because it modifies some smart contracts (mostly removing unnecessary checks).
The following is the output of a complete test run, made on commit
a1824dd8,
from April 16th, 2021.
yarn run v1.22.11
$ hardhat test
Contract: Access Control: Liquity functions with the caller restricted to Liquity contract(s)
BorrowerOperations
✓ moveETHGainToVessel(): reverts when called by an account that is not StabilityPool
VesselManager
✓ applyPendingRewards(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ updateRewardSnapshots(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ removeStake(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ updateStakeAndTotalStakes(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ closeVessel(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ addVesselOwnerToArray(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ setVesselStatus(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ increaseVesselColl(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ decreaseVesselColl(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ increaseVesselDebt(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ decreaseVesselDebt(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
ActivePool
✓ sendETH(): reverts when called by an account that is not BO nor VesselM nor SP
✓ increaseVUSDDebt(): reverts when called by an account that is not BO nor VesselM
✓ decreaseVUSDDebt(): reverts when called by an account that is not BO nor VesselM nor SP
✓ fallback(): reverts when called by an account that is not Borrower Operations nor Default Pool
DefaultPool
✓ sendETHToActivePool(): reverts when called by an account that is not VesselManager
✓ increaseVUSDDebt(): reverts when called by an account that is not VesselManager
✓ decreaseUSDV(): reverts when called by an account that is not VesselManager
✓ fallback(): reverts when called by an account that is not the Active Pool
StabilityPool
✓ offset(): reverts when called by an account that is not VesselManager
✓ fallback(): reverts when called by an account that is not the Active Pool
VUSDToken
✓ mint(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOperations
✓ burn(): reverts when called by an account that is not BO nor VesselM nor SP
✓ sendToPool(): reverts when called by an account that is not StabilityPool
✓ returnFromPool(): reverts when called by an account that is not VesselManager nor StabilityPool
SortedVessels
✓ insert(): reverts when called by an account that is not BorrowerOps or VesselM
✓ remove(): reverts when called by an account that is not VesselManager
✓ reinsert(): reverts when called by an account that is neither BorrowerOps nor VesselManager
LockupContract
✓ withdrawGRVT(): reverts when caller is not beneficiary (68ms)
GRVTStaking
✓ increaseF_VUSD(): reverts when caller is not VesselManager
GRVTToken
✓ sendToGRVTStaking(): reverts when caller is not the GRVTSstaking (49ms)
CommunityIssuance
✓ sendGRVT(): reverts when caller is not the StabilityPool
✓ issueGRVT(): reverts when caller is not the StabilityPool
Contract: BorrowerOperations
Without proxy
✓ addColl(): reverts when top-up would leave vessel with ICR < MCR (278ms)
✓ addColl(): Increases the activePool ETH and raw ether balance by correct amount (203ms)
✓ addColl(), active Vessel: adds the correct collateral amount to the Vessel (194ms)
✓ addColl(), active Vessel: Vessel is in sortedList before and after (213ms)
✓ addColl(), active Vessel: updates the stake and updates the total stakes (225ms)
✓ addColl(), active Vessel: applies pending rewards and updates user's L_ETH, L_VUSDDebt snapshots (736ms)
✓ addColl(), reverts if vessel is non-existent or closed (831ms)
✓ addColl(): can add collateral in Recovery Mode (252ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): reverts when withdrawal would leave vessel with ICR < MCR (349ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): reverts when calling address does not have active vessel (328ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): reverts when system is in Recovery Mode (420ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): reverts when requested ETH withdrawal is > the vessel's collateral (508ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): reverts when withdrawal would bring the user's ICR < MCR (313ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): reverts if system is in Recovery Mode (323ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): doesn’t allow a user to completely withdraw all collateral from their Vessel (due to gas compensation) (352ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): leaves the Vessel active when the user withdraws less than all the collateral (263ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): reduces the Vessel's collateral by the correct amount (316ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): reduces ActivePool ETH and raw ether by correct amount (291ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): updates the stake and updates the total stakes (342ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): sends the correct amount of ETH to the user (289ms)
✓ withdrawColl(): applies pending rewards and updates user's L_ETH, L_VUSDDebt snapshots (1205ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts when withdrawal would leave vessel with ICR < MCR (516ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): decays a non-zero base rate (1192ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts if max fee > 100% (668ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts if max fee < 0.5% in Normal mode (639ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts if fee exceeds max fee percentage (938ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): succeeds when fee is less than max fee percentage (1272ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): doesn't change base rate if it is already zero (1044ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): lastFeeOpTime doesn't update if less time than decay interval has passed since the last fee operation (899ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): borrower can't grief the baseRate and stop it decaying by issuing debt at higher frequency than the decay granularity (852ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): borrowing at non-zero base rate sends VUSD fee to GRVT staking contract (1004ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): borrowing at non-zero base records the (drawn debt + fee) on the Vessel struct (923ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): Borrowing at non-zero base rate increases the GRVT staking contract VUSD fees-per-unit-staked (986ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): Borrowing at non-zero base rate sends requested amount to the user (1562ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): Borrowing at zero base rate changes VUSD fees-per-unit-staked (839ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): Borrowing at zero base rate sends debt request to user (790ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts when calling address does not have active vessel (370ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts when requested withdrawal amount is zero VUSD (459ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts when system is in Recovery Mode (649ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts when withdrawal would bring the vessel's ICR < MCR (347ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts when a withdrawal would cause the TCR of the system to fall below the CCR (439ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts if system is in Recovery Mode (312ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): increases the Vessel's VUSD debt by the correct amount (208ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): increases VUSD debt in ActivePool by correct amount (230ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): increases user VUSDToken balance by correct amount (243ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts when repayment would leave vessel with ICR < MCR (392ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): Succeeds when it would leave vessel with net debt >= minimum net debt (435ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts when it would leave vessel with net debt < minimum net debt (256ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts when calling address does not have active vessel (431ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reverts when attempted repayment is > the debt of the vessel (418ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): reduces the Vessel's VUSD debt by the correct amount (403ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): decreases VUSD debt in ActivePool by correct amount (406ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): decreases user VUSDToken balance by correct amount (404ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): can repay debt in Recovery Mode (557ms)
✓ withdrawVUSD(): Reverts if borrower has insufficient VUSD balance to cover his debt repayment (1122ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): reverts when adjustment would leave vessel with ICR < MCR (572ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): reverts if max fee < 0.5% in Normal mode (313ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): allows max fee < 0.5% in Recovery mode (577ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): decays a non-zero base rate (1218ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): doesn't decay a non-zero base rate when user issues 0 debt (935ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): doesn't change base rate if it is already zero (545ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): lastFeeOpTime doesn't update if less time than decay interval has passed since the last fee operation (819ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): borrower can't grief the baseRate and stop it decaying by issuing debt at higher frequency than the decay granularity (866ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): borrowing at non-zero base rate sends VUSD fee to GRVT staking contract (889ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): borrowing at non-zero base records the (drawn debt + fee) on the Vessel struct (1013ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Borrowing at non-zero base rate increases the GRVT staking contract VUSD fees-per-unit-staked (837ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Borrowing at non-zero base rate sends requested amount to the user (895ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Borrowing at zero base rate changes VUSD balance of GRVT staking contract (783ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Borrowing at zero base rate changes GRVT staking contract VUSD fees-per-unit-staked (881ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Borrowing at zero base rate sends total requested VUSD to the user (783ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): reverts when calling address has no active vessel (416ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): reverts in Recovery Mode when the adjustment would reduce the TCR (654ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): collateral withdrawal reverts in Recovery Mode (370ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): debt increase that would leave ICR < 150% reverts in Recovery Mode (497ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): debt increase that would reduce the ICR reverts in Recovery Mode (596ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): A vessel with ICR < CCR in Recovery Mode can adjust their vessel to ICR > CCR (599ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): A vessel with ICR > CCR in Recovery Mode can improve their ICR (524ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): debt increase in Recovery Mode charges no fee (543ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): reverts when change would cause the TCR of the system to fall below the CCR (587ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): reverts when VUSD repaid is > debt of the vessel (451ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): reverts when attempted ETH withdrawal is >= the vessel's collateral (683ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): reverts when change would cause the ICR of the vessel to fall below the MCR (521ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): With 0 coll change, doesnt change borrower's coll or ActivePool coll (289ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): With 0 debt change, doesnt change borrower's debt or ActivePool debt (354ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): updates borrower's debt and coll with an increase in both (558ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): updates borrower's debt and coll with a decrease in both (553ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): updates borrower's debt and coll with coll increase, debt decrease (375ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): updates borrower's debt and coll with coll decrease, debt increase (346ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): updates borrower's stake and totalStakes with a coll increase (385ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): updates borrower's stake and totalStakes with a coll decrease (553ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): changes VUSDToken balance by the requested decrease (529ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): changes VUSDToken balance by the requested increase (577ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Changes the activePool ETH and raw ether balance by the requested decrease (1371ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Changes the activePool ETH and raw ether balance by the amount of ETH sent (548ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Changes the VUSD debt in ActivePool by requested decrease (541ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Changes the VUSD debt in ActivePool by requested increase (397ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): new coll = 0 and new debt = 0 is not allowed, as gas compensation still counts toward ICR (385ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Reverts if requested debt increase and amount is zero (292ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Reverts if requested coll withdrawal and ether is sent (288ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Reverts if it’s zero adjustment (137ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Reverts if requested coll withdrawal is greater than vessel's collateral (402ms)
✓ adjustVessel(): Reverts if borrower has insufficient VUSD balance to cover his debt repayment (496ms)
✓ Internal _adjustVessel(): reverts when op is a withdrawal and _borrower param is not the msg.sender (475ms)
✓ closeVessel(): reverts when it would lower the TCR below CCR (471ms)
✓ closeVessel(): reverts when calling address does not have active vessel (221ms)
✓ closeVessel(): reverts when system is in Recovery Mode (746ms)
✓ closeVessel(): reverts when vessel is the only one in the system (497ms)
✓ closeVessel(): reduces a Vessel's collateral to zero (582ms)
✓ closeVessel(): reduces a Vessel's debt to zero (398ms)
✓ closeVessel(): sets Vessel's stake to zero (504ms)
✓ closeVessel(): zero's the vessels reward snapshots (1002ms)
✓ closeVessel(): sets vessel's status to closed and removes it from sorted vessels list (526ms)
✓ closeVessel(): reduces ActivePool ETH and raw ether by correct amount (466ms)
✓ closeVessel(): reduces ActivePool debt by correct amount (522ms)
✓ closeVessel(): updates the the total stakes (790ms)
✓ closeVessel(): sends the correct amount of ETH to the user (390ms)
✓ closeVessel(): subtracts the debt of the closed Vessel from the Borrower's VUSDToken balance (405ms)
✓ closeVessel(): applies pending rewards (1267ms)
✓ closeVessel(): reverts if borrower has insufficient VUSD balance to repay his entire debt (347ms)
✓ openVessel(): emits a VesselUpdated event with the correct collateral and debt (820ms)
✓ openVessel(): Opens a vessel with net debt >= minimum net debt (235ms)
✓ openVessel(): reverts if net debt < minimum net debt (294ms)
✓ openVessel(): decays a non-zero base rate (959ms)
✓ openVessel(): doesn't change base rate if it is already zero (911ms)
✓ openVessel(): lastFeeOpTime doesn't update if less time than decay interval has passed since the last fee operation (953ms)
✓ openVessel(): reverts if max fee > 100% (56ms)
✓ openVessel(): reverts if max fee < 0.5% in Normal mode (85ms)
✓ openVessel(): allows max fee < 0.5% in Recovery Mode (409ms)
✓ openVessel(): reverts if fee exceeds max fee percentage (747ms)
✓ openVessel(): succeeds when fee is less than max fee percentage (930ms)
✓ openVessel(): borrower can't grief the baseRate and stop it decaying by issuing debt at higher frequency than the decay granularity (965ms)
✓ openVessel(): borrowing at non-zero base rate sends VUSD fee to GRVT staking contract (923ms)
✓ openVessel(): borrowing at non-zero base records the (drawn debt + fee + liq. reserve) on the Vessel struct (865ms)
✓ openVessel(): Borrowing at non-zero base rate increases the GRVT staking contract VUSD fees-per-unit-staked (794ms)
✓ openVessel(): Borrowing at non-zero base rate sends requested amount to the user (832ms)
✓ openVessel(): Borrowing at zero base rate changes the GRVT staking contract VUSD fees-per-unit-staked (602ms)
✓ openVessel(): Borrowing at zero base rate charges minimum fee (316ms)
✓ openVessel(): reverts when system is in Recovery Mode and ICR < CCR (320ms)
✓ openVessel(): reverts when vessel ICR < MCR (536ms)
✓ openVessel(): reverts when opening the vessel would cause the TCR of the system to fall below the CCR (367ms)
✓ openVessel(): reverts if vessel is already active (679ms)
✓ openVessel(): Can open a vessel with ICR >= CCR when system is in Recovery Mode (499ms)
✓ openVessel(): Reverts opening a vessel with min debt when system is in Recovery Mode (324ms)
✓ openVessel(): creates a new Vessel and assigns the correct collateral and debt amount (127ms)
✓ openVessel(): adds Vessel owner to VesselOwners array (136ms)
✓ openVessel(): creates a stake and adds it to total stakes (281ms)
✓ openVessel(): inserts Vessel to Sorted Vessels list (370ms)
✓ openVessel(): Increases the activePool ETH and raw ether balance by correct amount (294ms)
✓ openVessel(): records up-to-date initial snapshots of L_ETH and L_VUSDDebt (639ms)
✓ openVessel(): allows a user to open a Vessel, then close it, then re-open it (687ms)
✓ openVessel(): increases the Vessel's VUSD debt by the correct amount (129ms)
✓ openVessel(): increases VUSD debt in ActivePool by the debt of the vessel (162ms)
✓ openVessel(): increases user VUSDToken balance by correct amount (85ms)
✓ getCompositeDebt(): returns debt + gas comp
✓ closeVessel(): fails if owner cannot receive ETH (440ms)
getNewICRFromVesselChange() returns the correct ICR
✓ collChange = 0, debtChange = 0
✓ collChange = 0, debtChange is positive
✓ collChange = 0, debtChange is negative
✓ collChange is positive, debtChange is 0
✓ collChange is negative, debtChange is 0
✓ collChange is negative, debtChange is negative
✓ collChange is positive, debtChange is positive
✓ collChange is positive, debtChange is negative
✓ collChange is negative, debtChange is positive
getNewTCRFromVesselChange() returns the correct TCR
✓ collChange = 0, debtChange = 0 (248ms)
✓ collChange = 0, debtChange is positive (630ms)
✓ collChange = 0, debtChange is negative (327ms)
✓ collChange is positive, debtChange is 0 (328ms)
✓ collChange is negative, debtChange is 0 (407ms)
✓ collChange is negative, debtChange is negative (605ms)
✓ collChange is positive, debtChange is positive (601ms)
✓ collChange is positive, debtChange is negative (609ms)
✓ collChange is negative, debtChange is positive (381ms)
Contract: CollSurplusPool
✓ CollSurplusPool::getETH(): Returns the ETH balance of the CollSurplusPool after redemption (2203ms)
✓ CollSurplusPool: claimColl(): Reverts if caller is not Borrower Operations
✓ CollSurplusPool: claimColl(): Reverts if nothing to claim
✓ CollSurplusPool: claimColl(): Reverts if owner cannot receive ETH surplus (723ms)
✓ CollSurplusPool: reverts trying to send ETH to it
✓ CollSurplusPool: accountSurplus: reverts if caller is not Vessel Manager
Contract: Deployment script - Sets correct contract addresses dependencies after deployment
✓ Sets the correct PriceFeed address in VesselManager
✓ Sets the correct VUSDToken address in VesselManager
✓ Sets the correct SortedVessels address in VesselManager
✓ Sets the correct BorrowerOperations address in VesselManager
✓ Sets the correct ActivePool address in VesselManager
✓ Sets the correct DefaultPool address in VesselManager
✓ Sets the correct StabilityPool address in VesselManager
✓ Sets the correct GRVTStaking address in VesselManager
✓ Sets the correct StabilityPool address in ActivePool
✓ Sets the correct DefaultPool address in ActivePool (133ms)
✓ Sets the correct BorrowerOperations address in ActivePool
✓ Sets the correct VesselManager address in ActivePool
✓ Sets the correct ActivePool address in StabilityPool
✓ Sets the correct BorrowerOperations address in StabilityPool
✓ Sets the correct VUSDToken address in StabilityPool
✓ Sets the correct VesselManager address in StabilityPool
✓ Sets the correct VesselManager address in DefaultPool
✓ Sets the correct ActivePool address in DefaultPool
✓ Sets the correct VesselManager address in SortedVessels
✓ Sets the correct BorrowerOperations address in SortedVessels
✓ Sets the correct VesselManager address in BorrowerOperations
✓ Sets the correct PriceFeed address in BorrowerOperations
✓ Sets the correct SortedVessels address in BorrowerOperations
✓ Sets the correct ActivePool address in BorrowerOperations
✓ Sets the correct DefaultPool address in BorrowerOperations
✓ Sets the correct GRVTStaking address in BorrowerOperations
✓ Sets the correct GRVTToken address in GRVTStaking
✓ Sets the correct ActivePool address in GRVTStaking
✓ Sets the correct ActivePool address in GRVTStaking
✓ Sets the correct ActivePool address in GRVTStaking
✓ Sets the correct BorrowerOperations address in GRVTStaking
✓ Sets the correct CommunityIssuance address in GRVTToken
✓ Sets the correct GRVTStaking address in GRVTToken
✓ Sets the correct LockupContractFactory address in GRVTToken
✓ Sets the correct GRVTToken address in LockupContractFactory
✓ Sets the correct GRVTToken address in CommunityIssuance
✓ Sets the correct StabilityPool address in CommunityIssuance
Contract: DefaultPool
✓ sendETHToActivePool(): fails if receiver cannot receive ETH
Contract: Fee arithmetic tests
✓ minutesPassedSinceLastFeeOp(): returns minutes passed for no time increase (197ms)
✓ minutesPassedSinceLastFeeOp(): returns minutes passed between time of last fee operation and current block.timestamp, rounded down to nearest minutes (982ms)
✓ decayBaseRateFromBorrowing(): returns the initial base rate for no time increase
✓ decayBaseRateFromBorrowing(): returns the initial base rate for less than one minute passed (386ms)
✓ decayBaseRateFromBorrowing(): returns correctly decayed base rate, for various durations. Initial baseRate = 0.01 (2908ms)
✓ decayBaseRateFromBorrowing(): returns correctly decayed base rate, for various durations. Initial baseRate = 0.1 (3951ms)
✓ decayBaseRateFromBorrowing(): returns correctly decayed base rate, for various durations. Initial baseRate = 0.34539284 (3651ms)
✓ decayBaseRateFromBorrowing(): returns correctly decayed base rate, for various durations. Initial baseRate = 0.9976 (4377ms)
Basic exponentiation
✓ decPow(): for exponent = 0, returns 1, regardless of base (42ms)
✓ decPow(): for exponent = 1, returns base, regardless of base (86ms)
✓ decPow(): for base = 0, returns 0 for any exponent other than 0 (238ms)
✓ decPow(): for base = 1, returns 1 for any exponent (179ms)
✓ decPow(): for exponent = 2, returns the square of the base (86ms)
✓ decPow(): correct output for various bases and exponents (2032ms)
✓ decPow(): abs. error < 1e-9 for exponent = 7776000 (seconds in three months) (8459ms)
✓ decPow(): abs. error < 1e-9 for exponent = 2592000 (seconds in one month) (4815ms)
✓ decPow(): abs. error < 1e-9 for exponent = 43200 (minutes in one month) (4387ms)
✓ decPow(): abs. error < 1e-9 for exponent = 525600 (minutes in one year) (4454ms)
✓ decPow(): abs. error < 1e-9 for exponent = 2628000 (minutes in five years) (4724ms)
✓ decPow(): abs. error < 1e-9 for exponent = minutes in ten years (3847ms)
✓ decPow(): abs. error < 1e-9 for exponent = minutes in one hundred years (5802ms)
- decPow(): overflow test: doesn't overflow for exponent = minutes in 1000 years
Contract: Gas compensation tests
✓ _getCollGasCompensation(): returns the 0.5% of collaterall if it is < $10 in value
✓ _getCollGasCompensation(): returns 0.5% of collaterall when 0.5% of collateral < $10 in value
✓ getCollGasCompensation(): returns 0.5% of collaterall when 0.5% of collateral = $10 in value
✓ getCollGasCompensation(): returns 0.5% of collaterall when 0.5% of collateral = $10 in value (72ms)
✓ _getCompositeDebt(): returns (debt + 50) when collateral < $10 in value
✓ getCompositeDebt(): returns (debt + 50) collateral = $10 in value
✓ getCompositeDebt(): returns (debt + 50) when 0.5% of collateral > $10 in value (52ms)
✓ getCurrentICR(): Incorporates virtual debt, and returns the correct ICR for new vessels (1147ms)
✓ Gas compensation from pool-offset liquidations. All collateral paid as compensation (1340ms)
✓ gas compensation from pool-offset liquidations: 0.5% collateral < $10 in value. Compensates $10 worth of collateral, liquidates the remainder (1199ms)
✓ gas compensation from pool-offset liquidations: 0.5% collateral > $10 in value. Compensates 0.5% of collateral, liquidates the remainder (1333ms)
TCR: 238.086389539884110295
TCR: 11.892415157517211309
✓ Gas compensation from pool-offset liquidations. Liquidation event emits the correct gas compensation and total liquidated coll and debt (1541ms)
✓ gas compensation from pool-offset liquidations. Liquidation event emits the correct gas compensation and total liquidated coll and debt (1498ms)
✓ gas compensation from pool-offset liquidations: 0.5% collateral > $10 in value. Liquidation event emits the correct gas compensation and total liquidated coll and debt (1547ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): full offset. Compensates the correct amount, and liquidates the remainder (1810ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): full redistribution. Compensates the correct amount, and liquidates the remainder (1312ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): full offset. Liquidation event emits the correct gas compensation and total liquidated coll and debt (1551ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): full redistribution. Liquidation event emits the correct gas compensation and total liquidated coll and debt (1790ms)
✓ Vessel ordering: same collateral, decreasing debt. Price successively increases. Vessels should maintain ordering by ICR (1647ms)
✓ Vessel ordering: increasing collateral, constant debt. Price successively increases. Vessels should maintain ordering by ICR (3885ms)
✓ Vessel ordering: Constant raw collateral ratio (excluding virtual debt). Price successively increases. Vessels should maintain ordering by ICR (2042ms)
Contract: GRVT Token
✓ balanceOf(): gets the balance of the account (43ms)
✓ totalSupply(): gets the total supply
✓ name(): returns the token's name
✓ symbol(): returns the token's symbol
✓ version(): returns the token contract's version
✓ decimal(): returns the number of decimal digits used
✓ allowance(): returns an account's spending allowance for another account's balance (48ms)
✓ approve(): approves an account to spend the specified ammount (47ms)
✓ approve(): reverts when spender param is address(0) (52ms)
✓ approve(): reverts when owner param is address(0) (60ms)
✓ transferFrom(): successfully transfers from an account which it is approved to transfer from (123ms)
✓ transfer(): increases the recipient's balance by the correct amount (42ms)
✓ transfer(): reverts when amount exceeds sender's balance (56ms)
✓ transfer(): transfer to a blacklisted address reverts (204ms)
✓ transfer(): transfer to or from the zero-address reverts (49ms)
✓ mint(): issues correct amount of tokens to the given address
✓ mint(): reverts when beneficiary is address(0)
✓ increaseAllowance(): increases an account's allowance by the correct amount
✓ decreaseAllowance(): decreases an account's allowance by the correct amount
✓ sendToGRVTStaking(): changes balances of GRVTStaking and calling account by the correct amounts (48ms)
✓ Initializes PERMIT_TYPEHASH correctly
✓ Initializes DOMAIN_SEPARATOR correctly
✓ Initial nonce for a given address is 0
✓ permit(): permits and emits an Approval event (replay protected) (88ms)
✓ permit(): fails with expired deadline
✓ permit(): fails with the wrong signature (46ms)
Contract: HintHelpers
✓ setup: makes accounts with nominal ICRs increasing by 1% consecutively (76ms)
✓ getApproxHint(): returns the address of a Vessel within sqrt(length) positions of the correct insert position (1441ms)
✓ getApproxHint(): returns the head of the list if the CR is the max uint256 value (270ms)
✓ getApproxHint(): returns the tail of the list if the CR is lower than ICR of any Vessel (321ms)
✓ computeNominalCR()
Contract: Deploying and funding One Year Lockup Contracts
Deploying LCs
✓ GRVT Deployer can deploy LCs through the Factory (121ms)
✓ Anyone can deploy LCs through the Factory (71ms)
✓ GRVT Deployer can deploy LCs directly (43ms)
✓ Anyone can deploy LCs directly (43ms)
✓ LC deployment stores the beneficiary's address in the LC (1806ms)
✓ LC deployment through the Factory registers the LC in the Factory (99ms)
✓ LC deployment through the Factory records the LC contract address and deployer as a k-v pair in the Factory (90ms)
✓ LC deployment through the Factory sets the unlockTime in the LC (52ms)
✓ Direct deployment of LC sets the unlockTime in the LC (55ms)
✓ LC deployment through the Factory reverts when the unlockTime is < 1 year from system deployment (50ms)
✓ Direct deployment of LC reverts when the unlockTime is < 1 year from system deployment (54ms)
Funding LCs
✓ GRVT transfer from GRVT deployer to their deployed LC increases the GRVT balance of the LC (397ms)
✓ GRVT Multisig can transfer GRVT to LCs deployed through the factory by anyone (168ms)
Withdrawal attempts on funded, inactive LCs immediately after funding
✓ Beneficiary can't withdraw from their funded LC (346ms)
✓ GRVT multisig can't withraw from a LC which it funded (271ms)
✓ No one can withraw from a LC (78ms)
Contract: Deploying the GRVT contracts: LCF, CI, GRVTStaking, and GRVTToken
CommunityIssuance deployment
✓ Stores the deployer's address
GRVTStaking deployment
✓ Stores the deployer's address
GRVTToken deployment
✓ Stores the multisig's address
✓ Stores the CommunityIssuance address
✓ Stores the LockupContractFactory address
✓ Mints the correct GRVT amount to the multisig's address: (64.66 million)
✓ Mints the correct GRVT amount to the CommunityIssuance contract address: 32 million
✓ Mints the correct GRVT amount to the bountyAddress EOA: 2 million
✓ Mints the correct GRVT amount to the lpRewardsAddress EOA: 1.33 million
Community Issuance deployment
✓ Stores the deployer's address
✓ Has a supply cap of 32 million
✓ Liquity AG can set addresses if CI's GRVT balance is equal or greater than 32 million (393ms)
✓ Liquity AG can't set addresses if CI's GRVT balance is < 32 million (367ms)
Connecting GRVTToken to LCF, CI and GRVTStaking
✓ sets the correct GRVTToken address in GRVTStaking (1866ms)
✓ sets the correct GRVTToken address in LockupContractFactory
✓ sets the correct GRVTToken address in CommunityIssuance (203ms)
Contract: During the initial lockup period
GRVT transfer during first year after GRVT deployment
✓ Liquity multisig can not transfer GRVT to a LC that was deployed directly (105ms)
✓ Liquity multisig can not transfer to an EOA or Liquity system contracts (302ms)
✓ Liquity multisig can not approve any EOA or Liquity system contract to spend their GRVT (546ms)
✓ Liquity multisig can not increaseAllowance for any EOA or Liquity contract (285ms)
✓ Liquity multisig can not decreaseAllowance for any EOA or Liquity contract (338ms)
✓ Liquity multisig can not be the sender in a transferFrom() call
✓ Liquity multisig can not stake their GRVT in the staking contract
✓ Anyone (other than Liquity multisig) can transfer GRVT to LCs deployed by anyone through the Factory (359ms)
✓ Anyone (other than Liquity multisig) can transfer GRVT to LCs deployed by anyone directly (141ms)
✓ Anyone (other than liquity multisig) can transfer to an EOA (106ms)
✓ Anyone (other than liquity multisig) can approve any EOA or to spend their GRVT
✓ Anyone (other than liquity multisig) can increaseAllowance for any EOA or Liquity contract (244ms)
✓ Anyone (other than liquity multisig) can decreaseAllowance for any EOA or Liquity contract (693ms)
✓ Anyone (other than liquity multisig) can be the sender in a transferFrom() call (62ms)
✓ Anyone (other than liquity AG) can stake their GRVT in the staking contract
Lockup Contract Factory negative tests
✓ deployLockupContract(): reverts when GRVT token address is not set (197ms)
Transferring GRVT to LCs
✓ Liquity multisig can transfer GRVT (vesting) to lockup contracts they deployed (198ms)
✓ Liquity multisig can transfer GRVT to lockup contracts deployed by anyone (1798ms)
Deploying new LCs
✓ GRVT Deployer can deploy LCs through the Factory (46ms)
✓ Liquity multisig can deploy LCs through the Factory
✓ Anyone can deploy LCs through the Factory (80ms)
✓ GRVT Deployer can deploy LCs directly (44ms)
✓ Liquity multisig can deploy LCs directly (45ms)
✓ Anyone can deploy LCs directly (46ms)
✓ Anyone can deploy LCs with unlockTime = one year from deployment, directly and through factory (102ms)
✓ Anyone can deploy LCs with unlockTime > one year from deployment, directly and through factory (187ms)
✓ No one can deploy LCs with unlockTime < one year from deployment, directly or through factory (100ms)
Withdrawal Attempts on LCs before unlockTime has passed
✓ Liquity multisig can't withdraw from a funded LC they deployed for another beneficiary through the Factory before the unlockTime
✓ Liquity multisig can't withdraw from a funded LC that someone else deployed before the unlockTime (52ms)
✓ Beneficiary can't withdraw from their funded LC before the unlockTime (219ms)
✓ No one can withdraw from a beneficiary's funded LC before the unlockTime (475ms)
Contract: After the initial lockup period has passed
Deploying new LCs
✓ GRVT Deployer can deploy new LCs
✓ Anyone can deploy new LCs (42ms)
✓ Anyone can deploy new LCs with unlockTime in the past (65ms)
✓ Anyone can deploy new LCs with unlockTime in the future (46ms)
Beneficiary withdrawal from initial LC
✓ A beneficiary can withdraw their full entitlement from their LC (256ms)
✓ A beneficiary on a vesting schedule can withdraw their total vested amount from their LC (155ms)
✓ Beneficiaries can withraw full GRVT balance of LC if it has increased since lockup period ended (234ms)
Withdrawal attempts from LCs by non-beneficiaries
✓ GRVT Multisig can't withdraw from a LC they deployed through the Factory
✓ GRVT Multisig can't withdraw from a LC that someone else deployed
✓ Non-beneficiaries cannot withdraw from a LC (189ms)
Transferring GRVT
✓ GRVT multisig can transfer GRVT to LCs they deployed (176ms)
✓ GRVT multisig can transfer tokens to LCs deployed by anyone (104ms)
✓ GRVT multisig can transfer GRVT directly to any externally owned account (141ms)
✓ Anyone can transfer GRVT to LCs deployed by anyone (179ms)
✓ Anyone can transfer to an EOA (421ms)
✓ Anyone can approve any EOA to spend their GRVT
✓ Anyone can increaseAllowance for any EOA or Liquity contract (2441ms)
✓ Anyone can decreaseAllowance for any EOA or Liquity contract (1034ms)
✓ Anyone can be the sender in a transferFrom() call (101ms)
✓ Anyone can stake their GRVT in the staking contract (55ms)
Withdrawal Attempts on new LCs before unlockTime has passed
✓ GRVT Deployer can't withdraw from a funded LC they deployed for another beneficiary through the Factory, before the unlockTime (44ms)
✓ GRVT Deployer can't withdraw from a funded LC that someone else deployed, before the unlockTime (448ms)
✓ Beneficiary can't withdraw from their funded LC, before the unlockTime (284ms)
✓ No one can withdraw from a beneficiary's funded LC, before the unlockTime (443ms)
Withdrawals from new LCs after unlockTime has passed
✓ GRVT Deployer can't withdraw from a funded LC they deployed for another beneficiary through the Factory, after the unlockTime (100ms)
✓ GRVT multisig can't withdraw from a funded LC when they are not the beneficiary, after the unlockTime (529ms)
✓ Beneficiary can withdraw from their funded LC, after the unlockTime (97ms)
✓ Non-beneficiaries can't withdraw from a beneficiary's funded LC, after the unlockTime (226ms)
Contract: LiquityMath
✓ max works if a > b
✓ max works if a = b
✓ max works if a < b
Contract: GravitySafeMath128Tester
✓ add(): reverts if overflows
✓ sub(): reverts if underflows
Contract: GRVT community issuance arithmetic tests
issuance fraction before: 949066037374286
issuance fraction after: 949066037374286
✓ getCumulativeIssuanceFraction(): fraction doesn't increase if less than a minute has passed (45ms)
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.0000013 after a minute
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.000079 after an hour
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.0019 after a day
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.013 after a week (283ms)
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.055 after a month (38ms)
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.16 after 3 months
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.29 after 6 months (38ms)
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.5 after a year
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.75 after 2 years
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.875 after 3 years (44ms)
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.9375 after 4 years (50ms)
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.999 after 10 years
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.999999 after 20 years (78ms)
✓ Cumulative issuance fraction is 0.999999999 after 30 years (55ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 42.20 after a minute (38ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 2,531.94 after an hour (41ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 60,711.40 after a day (136ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 422,568.60 after a week (331ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 1,772,113.21 after a month
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 5,027,363.22 after 3 months (40ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 9,264,902.04 after 6 months (47ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 16,000,000 after a year (47ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 24,000,000 after 2 years (47ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 28,000,000 after 3 years (75ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 30,000,000 after 4 years (40ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 31,968,750 after 10 years (69ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 31,999,969.48 after 20 years (68ms)
✓ Total GRVT tokens issued is 31,999,999.97 after 30 years (87ms)
- Frequent token issuance: issuance event every year, for 30 years
- Frequent token issuance: issuance event every day, for 30 years
- Frequent token issuance: issuance event every minute, for 1 month
- Frequent token issuance: issuance event every minute, for 1 year
Contract: GRVTStaking revenue share tests
✓ stake(): reverts if amount is zero (74ms)
✓ ETH fee per GRVT staked increases when a redemption fee is triggered and totalStakes > 0 (1562ms)
✓ ETH fee per GRVT staked doesn't change when a redemption fee is triggered and totalStakes == 0 (3540ms)
✓ VUSD fee per GRVT staked increases when a redemption fee is triggered and totalStakes > 0 (1757ms)
✓ VUSD fee per GRVT staked doesn't change when a redemption fee is triggered and totalStakes == 0 (1705ms)
✓ GRVT Staking: A single staker earns all ETH and GRVT fees that occur (2143ms)
✓ stake(): Top-up sends out all accumulated ETH and VUSD gains to the staker (2138ms)
✓ getPendingETHGain(): Returns the staker's correct pending ETH gain (1856ms)
✓ getPendingVUSDGain(): Returns the staker's correct pending VUSD gain (1965ms)
✓ GRVT Staking: Multiple stakers earn the correct share of all ETH and GRVT fees, based on their stake size (3133ms)
✓ unstake(): reverts if caller has ETH gains and can't receive ETH (1149ms)
✓ receive(): reverts when it receives ETH from an address that is not the Active Pool
✓ unstake(): reverts if user has no stake
✓ Test requireCallerIsVesselManager
Contract: VUSDToken
Basic token functions, without Proxy
✓ balanceOf(): gets the balance of the account
✓ totalSupply(): gets the total supply
✓ name(): returns the token's name
✓ symbol(): returns the token's symbol
✓ decimal(): returns the number of decimal digits used
✓ allowance(): returns an account's spending allowance for another account's balance (77ms)
✓ approve(): approves an account to spend the specified amount
✓ approve(): reverts when spender param is address(0)
✓ approve(): reverts when owner param is address(0)
✓ transferFrom(): successfully transfers from an account which is it approved to transfer from (272ms)
✓ transfer(): increases the recipient's balance by the correct amount
✓ transfer(): reverts if amount exceeds sender's balance
✓ transfer(): transferring to a blacklisted address reverts (79ms)
✓ increaseAllowance(): increases an account's allowance by the correct amount (94ms)
✓ mint(): issues correct amount of tokens to the given address
✓ burn(): burns correct amount of tokens from the given address
✓ sendToPool(): changes balances of Stability pool and user by the correct amounts
✓ returnFromPool(): changes balances of Stability pool and user by the correct amounts (39ms)
✓ transfer(): transferring to a blacklisted address reverts (76ms)
✓ decreaseAllowance(): decreases allowance by the expected amount (38ms)
✓ decreaseAllowance(): fails trying to decrease more than previously allowed (39ms)
✓ version(): returns the token contract's version
✓ Initializes PERMIT_TYPEHASH correctly
✓ Initializes DOMAIN_SEPARATOR correctly
✓ Initial nonce for a given address is 0
✓ permits and emits an Approval event (replay protected) (69ms)
✓ permits(): fails with expired deadline (59ms)
✓ permits(): fails with the wrong signature (51ms)
Basic token functions, with Proxy
✓ balanceOf(): gets the balance of the account (92ms)
✓ totalSupply(): gets the total supply (51ms)
✓ name(): returns the token's name
✓ symbol(): returns the token's symbol
✓ decimal(): returns the number of decimal digits used
✓ allowance(): returns an account's spending allowance for another account's balance
✓ approve(): approves an account to spend the specified amount
✓ transferFrom(): successfully transfers from an account which is it approved to transfer from (90ms)
✓ transfer(): increases the recipient's balance by the correct amount
✓ transfer(): reverts if amount exceeds sender's balance
✓ transfer(): transferring to a blacklisted address reverts (213ms)
✓ increaseAllowance(): increases an account's allowance by the correct amount (39ms)
✓ transfer(): transferring to a blacklisted address reverts (112ms)
✓ decreaseAllowance(): decreases allowance by the expected amount
✓ decreaseAllowance(): fails trying to decrease more than previously allowed (49ms)
Contract: All Liquity functions with onlyOwner modifier
VesselManager
✓ setAddresses(): reverts when called by non-owner, with wrong addresses, or twice (857ms)
BorrowerOperations
✓ setAddresses(): reverts when called by non-owner, with wrong addresses, or twice (765ms)
DefaultPool
✓ setAddresses(): reverts when called by non-owner, with wrong addresses, or twice (154ms)
StabilityPool
✓ setAddresses(): reverts when called by non-owner, with wrong addresses, or twice (441ms)
ActivePool
✓ setAddresses(): reverts when called by non-owner, with wrong addresses, or twice (468ms)
SortedVessels
✓ setParams(): reverts when called by non-owner, with wrong addresses, or twice (157ms)
CommunityIssuance
✓ setAddresses(): reverts when called by non-owner, with wrong addresses, or twice (136ms)
GRVTStaking
✓ setAddresses(): reverts when called by non-owner, with wrong addresses, or twice (261ms)
LockupContractFactory
✓ setGRVTAddress(): reverts when called by non-owner, with wrong address, or twice (216ms)
Contract: StabilityPool
✓ getETH(): gets the recorded ETH balance
✓ getTotalVUSDDeposits(): gets the recorded VUSD balance
Contract: ActivePool
✓ getETH(): gets the recorded ETH balance
✓ getVUSDDebt(): gets the recorded VUSD balance
✓ increaseUSDV(): increases the recorded VUSD balance by the correct amount
✓ decreaseUSDV(): decreases the recorded VUSD balance by the correct amount
✓ sendETH(): decreases the recorded ETH balance by the correct amount
Contract: DefaultPool
✓ getETH(): gets the recorded VUSD balance
✓ getVUSDDebt(): gets the recorded VUSD balance
✓ increaseUSDV(): increases the recorded VUSD balance by the correct amount
✓ decreaseUSDV(): decreases the recorded VUSD balance by the correct amount (57ms)
✓ sendETHToActivePool(): decreases the recorded ETH balance by the correct amount (50ms)
Contract: PriceFeed
✓ C1 Chainlink working: fetchPrice should return the correct price, taking into account the number of decimal digits on the aggregator (286ms)
✓ C1 Chainlink breaks, Tellor working: fetchPrice should return the correct Tellor price, taking into account Tellor's 6-digit granularity (2595ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken by zero latest roundId, Tellor working: switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (87ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken by zero latest roundId, Tellor working: use Tellor price (93ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken by zero timestamp, Tellor working, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (97ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken by zero timestamp, Tellor working, return Tellor price (97ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken by future timestamp, Tellor working, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (94ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken by future timestamp, Tellor working, return Tellor price (99ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken by negative price, Tellor working, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (85ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken by negative price, Tellor working, return Tellor price (82ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken - decimals call reverted, Tellor working, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (117ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken - decimals call reverted, Tellor working, return Tellor price (99ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink broken - latest round call reverted, Tellor working, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (92ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: latest round call reverted, Tellor working, return the Tellor price (100ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: previous round call reverted, Tellor working, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (101ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: previous round call reverted, Tellor working, return Tellor Price (102ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink frozen, Tellor working: switch to usingTellorChainlinkFrozen (112ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink frozen, Tellor working: return Tellor price (123ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink frozen, Tellor frozen: switch to usingTellorChainlinkFrozen (119ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink frozen, Tellor frozen: return last good price (127ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink times out, Tellor broken by 0 price: switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (320ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink times out, Tellor broken by 0 price: return last good price (146ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink is out of date by <3hrs: remain chainlinkWorking (92ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink is out of date by <3hrs: return Chainklink price (132ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50%, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (117ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50%, return the Tellor price (132ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of 50%, remain chainlinkWorking (83ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of 50%, return the Chainlink price (376ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of <50%, remain chainlinkWorking (89ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of <50%, return Chainlink price (99ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price increase of >100%, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (473ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price increase of >100%, return Tellor price (117ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price increase of 100%, remain chainlinkWorking (82ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price increase of 100%, return Chainlink price (350ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price increase of <100%, remain chainlinkWorking (136ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price increase of <100%, return Chainlink price (87ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor price matches: remain chainlinkWorking (154ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor price matches: return Chainlink price (135ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor price within 5% of Chainlink: remain chainlinkWorking (109ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor price within 5% of Chainlink: return Chainlink price (101ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor live but not within 5% of Chainlink: switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (116ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor live but not within 5% of Chainlink: return Tellor price (276ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor frozen: switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (145ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor frozen: return last good price (2730ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor is broken by 0 price: switch to bothOracleSuspect (68ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor is broken by 0 price: return last good price (451ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor is broken by 0 timestamp: switch to bothOracleSuspect (121ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor is broken by 0 timestamp: return last good price (87ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor is broken by future timestamp: Pricefeed switches to bothOracleSuspect (81ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink price drop of >50% and Tellor is broken by future timestamp: return last good price (119ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink is working and Tellor is working - remain on chainlinkWorking (77ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink is working and Tellor is working - return Chainlink price (168ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink is working and Tellor freezes - remain on chainlinkWorking (469ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink is working and Tellor freezes - return Chainlink price (167ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink is working and Tellor breaks: switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (206ms)
✓ C1 chainlinkWorking: Chainlink is working and Tellor breaks: return Chainlink price (105ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: Tellor breaks by zero price: switch to bothOraclesSuspect (202ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: Tellor breaks by zero price: return last good price (107ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: Tellor breaks by call reverted: switch to bothOraclesSuspect (296ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: Tellor breaks by call reverted: return last good price (112ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: Tellor breaks by zero timestamp: switch to bothOraclesSuspect (2577ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: Tellor breaks by zero timestamp: return last good price (82ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: Tellor freezes - remain usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (534ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: Tellor freezes - return last good price (123ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: both Tellor and Chainlink are live and <= 5% price difference - switch to chainlinkWorking (68ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: both Tellor and Chainlink are live and <= 5% price difference - return Chainlink price (65ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: both Tellor and Chainlink are live and > 5% price difference - remain usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (86ms)
✓ C2 usingTellorChainlinkUntrusted: both Tellor and Chainlink are live and > 5% price difference - return Tellor price (569ms)
✓ C3 bothOraclesUntrusted: both Tellor and Chainlink are live and > 5% price difference remain bothOraclesSuspect (56ms)
✓ C3 bothOraclesUntrusted: both Tellor and Chainlink are live and > 5% price difference, return last good price (82ms)
✓ C3 bothOraclesUntrusted: both Tellor and Chainlink are live and <= 5% price difference, switch to chainlinkWorking (72ms)
✓ C3 bothOraclesUntrusted: both Tellor and Chainlink are live and <= 5% price difference, return Chainlink price (84ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when both Chainlink and Tellor break, switch to bothOraclesSuspect (459ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when both Chainlink and Tellor break, return last good price (112ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink breaks and Tellor freezes, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (112ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink breaks and Tellor freezes, return last good price (99ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink breaks and Tellor live, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (106ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink breaks and Tellor live, return Tellor price (102ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink is live and Tellor is live with <5% price difference, switch back to chainlinkWorking (113ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink is live and Tellor is live with <5% price difference, return Chainlink current price (138ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink is live and Tellor is live with >5% price difference, switch back to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (2467ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink is live and Tellor is live with >5% price difference, return Chainlink current price (85ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink is live and Tellor is live with similar price, switch back to chainlinkWorking (537ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink is live and Tellor is live with similar price, return Chainlink current price (82ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink is live and Tellor breaks, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (187ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink is live and Tellor breaks, return Chainlink current price (81ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink still frozen and Tellor breaks, switch to usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (176ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink still frozen and Tellor broken, return last good price (213ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink still frozen and Tellor live, remain usingTellorChainlinkFrozen (140ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink still frozen and Tellor live, return Tellor price (236ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink still frozen and Tellor freezes, remain usingTellorChainlinkFrozen (107ms)
✓ C4 usingTellorChainlinkFrozen: when Chainlink still frozen and Tellor freezes, return last good price (261ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live and Tellor price >5% - no status change (109ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live and Tellor price >5% - return Chainlink price (96ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live and Tellor price within <5%, switch to chainlinkWorking (171ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live, Tellor price not within 5%, return Chainlink price (111ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live, <50% price deviation from previous, Tellor price not within 5%, remain on usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (161ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live, <50% price deviation from previous, Tellor price not within 5%, return Chainlink price (223ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live, >50% price deviation from previous, Tellor price not within 5%, remain on usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (124ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live, >50% price deviation from previous, Tellor price not within 5%, return Chainlink price (182ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live, <50% price deviation from previous, and Tellor is frozen, remain on usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (552ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live, <50% price deviation from previous, Tellor is frozen, return Chainlink price (103ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live, >50% price deviation from previous, Tellor is frozen, remain on usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (121ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink is live, >50% price deviation from previous, Tellor is frozen, return Chainlink price (105ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink frozen, remain on usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted (107ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink frozen, return last good price (531ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: when Chainlink breaks too, switch to bothOraclesSuspect (87ms)
✓ C5 usingChainlinkTellorUntrusted: Chainlink breaks too, return last good price (99ms)
PriceFeed internal testing contract
✓ fetchPrice before setPrice should return the default price
✓ should be able to fetchPrice after setPrice, output of former matching input of latter
Mainnet PriceFeed setup
✓ fetchPrice should fail on contract with no chainlink address set
✓ fetchPrice should fail on contract with no tellor address set
✓ setAddresses should fail whe called by nonOwner
✓ setAddresses should fail after address has already been set (42ms)
Contract: BorrowerWrappers
✓ proxy owner can recover ETH (85ms)
✓ non proxy owner cannot recover ETH
✓ claimCollateralAndOpenVessel(): reverts if nothing to claim (388ms)
✓ claimCollateralAndOpenVessel(): without sending any value (1227ms)
✓ claimCollateralAndOpenVessel(): sending value in the transaction (3969ms)
✓ claimSPRewardsAndRecycle(): only owner can call it (598ms)
✓ claimSPRewardsAndRecycle(): (1272ms)
✓ claimStakingGainsAndRecycle(): only owner can call it (1384ms)
✓ claimStakingGainsAndRecycle(): reverts if user has no vessel (1253ms)
✓ claimStakingGainsAndRecycle(): with only ETH gain (1595ms)
✓ claimStakingGainsAndRecycle(): with only VUSD gain (821ms)
✓ claimStakingGainsAndRecycle(): with both ETH and VUSD gains (1593ms)
Contract: SortedVessels
SortedVessels
✓ contains(): returns true for addresses that have opened vessels (552ms)
✓ contains(): returns false for addresses that have not opened vessels (518ms)
✓ contains(): returns false for addresses that opened and then closed a vessel (1009ms)
✓ contains(): returns true for addresses that opened, closed and then re-opened a vessel (1399ms)
✓ contains(): returns false when there are no vessels in the system
✓ contains(): true when list size is 1 and the vessel the only one in system (208ms)
✓ contains(): false when list size is 1 and vessel is not in the system (158ms)
✓ getMaxSize(): Returns the maximum list size
✓ Finds the correct insert position given two addresses that loosely bound the correct position (1135ms)
- stays ordered after vessels with 'infinite' ICR receive a redistribution
SortedVessels with mock dependencies
when params are wrongly set
✓ setParams(): reverts if size is zero
when params are properly set
✓ insert(): fails if list is full (131ms)
✓ insert(): fails if list already contains the node (54ms)
✓ insert(): fails if id is zero
✓ insert(): fails if NICR is zero
✓ remove(): fails if id is not in the list
✓ reInsert(): fails if list doesn’t contain the node
✓ reInsert(): fails if new NICR is zero (43ms)
✓ findInsertPosition(): No prevId for hint - ascend list starting from nextId, result is after the tail
Contract: StabilityPool - GRVT Rewards
GRVT Rewards
totalGRVTIssued_1: 30370113195977152000000
totalGRVTIssued_2: 30370113195977152000000
✓ liquidation < 1 minute after a deposit does not change totalGRVTIssued (743ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): reward term G does not update when no GRVT is issued (634ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct GRVT gain. No liquidations. No front end. (1479ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with varying initial deposit withdraw correct GRVT gain. No liquidations. No front end. (1345ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with varying initial deposit withdraw correct GRVT gain. No liquidations. No front end. (1925ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositor withdraws correct GRVT gain after serial pool-emptying liquidations. No front-ends. (5752ms)
✓ GRVT issuance for a given period is not obtainable if the SP was empty during the period (551ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Several deposits of 100 VUSD span one scale factor change. Depositors withdraw correct GRVT gains (6075ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct GRVT gain. No liquidations. Front ends and kickback rates. (1660ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with varying initial deposit withdraw correct GRVT gain. Front ends and kickback rates (2813ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Several deposits of 10k VUSD span one scale factor change. Depositors withdraw correct GRVT gains (4788ms)
Contract: Pool Manager: Sum-Product rounding errors
- Rounding errors: 100 deposits of 100USDV into SP, then 200 liquidations of 49USDV
Contract: StabilityPool - Withdrawal of stability deposit - Reward calculations
Stability Pool Withdrawal
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (757ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after two identical liquidations (868ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after three identical liquidations (1051ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after two liquidations of increasing VUSD (965ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after three liquidations of increasing VUSD (1152ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with varying deposits withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after two identical liquidations (934ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with varying deposits withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after three identical liquidations (1130ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors with varying deposits withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after three varying liquidations (1193ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): A, B, C Deposit -> 2 liquidations -> D deposits -> 1 liquidation. All deposits and liquidations = 100 VUSD. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (1512ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): A, B, C Deposit -> 2 liquidations -> D deposits -> 2 liquidations. All deposits and liquidations = 100 VUSD. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (1637ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): A, B, C Deposit -> 2 liquidations -> D deposits -> 2 liquidations. Various deposit and liquidation vals. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (1645ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): A, B, C, D deposit -> 2 liquidations -> D withdraws -> 2 liquidations. All deposits and liquidations = 100 VUSD. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (1704ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): A, B, C, D deposit -> 2 liquidations -> D withdraws -> 2 liquidations. Various deposit and liquidation vals. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (1753ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): A, B, D deposit -> 2 liquidations -> C makes deposit -> 1 liquidation -> D withdraws -> 1 liquidation. All deposits: 100 VUSD. Liquidations: 100,100,100,50. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (1537ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositor withdraws correct compounded deposit after liquidation empties the pool (3424ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Pool-emptying liquidation increases epoch by one, resets scaleFactor to 0, and resets P to 1e18 (1678ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositors withdraw correct compounded deposit after liquidation empties the pool (1100ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): single deposit fully offset. After subsequent liquidations, depositor withdraws 0 deposit and *only* the ETH Gain from one liquidation (1049ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositor withdraws correct compounded deposit after liquidation empties the pool (4540ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): deposit spans one scale factor change: Single depositor withdraws correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (918ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Several deposits of varying amounts span one scale factor change. Depositors withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (1187ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): deposit spans one scale factor change: Single depositor withdraws correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (778ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Several deposits of varying amounts span one scale factor change. Depositors withdraws correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (3494ms)
alice deposit: 0
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Deposit that decreases to less than 1e-9 of it's original value is reduced to 0 (365ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Several deposits of 10000 VUSD span one scale factor change. Depositors withdraws correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (1676ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): 2 depositors can withdraw after each receiving half of a pool-emptying liquidation (1848ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Depositor's ETH gain stops increasing after two scale changes (4134ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Large liquidated coll/debt, deposits and ETH price (932ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Small liquidated coll/debt, large deposits and ETH price (832ms)
Contract: StabilityPool - Withdrawal of stability deposit - Reward calculations
Stability Pool Withdrawal
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (1227ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after two identical liquidations (1400ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after three identical liquidations (1827ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after two liquidations of increasing VUSD (1597ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositors with equal initial deposit withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after three liquidations of increasing VUSD (1711ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositors with varying deposits withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after two identical liquidations (1782ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositors with varying deposits withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after three identical liquidations (1798ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositors with varying deposits withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after three varying liquidations (4488ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): A, B, C Deposit -> 2 liquidations -> D deposits -> 1 liquidation. All deposits and liquidations = 100 VUSD. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (2168ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): A, B, C Deposit -> 2 liquidations -> D deposits -> 2 liquidations. All deposits and liquidations = 100 VUSD. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (5085ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): A, B, C Deposit -> 2 liquidations -> D deposits -> 2 liquidations. Various deposit and liquidation vals. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (2304ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): A, B, C, D deposit -> 2 liquidations -> D withdraws -> 2 liquidations. All deposits and liquidations = 100 VUSD. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (2335ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): A, B, C, D deposit -> 2 liquidations -> D withdraws -> 2 liquidations. Various deposit and liquidation vals. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (2145ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): A, B, D deposit -> 2 liquidations -> C makes deposit -> 1 liquidation -> D withdraws -> 1 liquidation. All deposits: 100 VUSD. Liquidations: 100,100,100,50. A, B, C, D withdraw correct VUSD deposit and ETH Gain (2543ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositor withdraws correct compounded deposit after liquidation empties the pool (1889ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Pool-emptying liquidation increases epoch by one, resets scaleFactor to 0, and resets P to 1e18 (1891ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositors withdraw correct compounded deposit after liquidation empties the pool (2324ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): single deposit fully offset. After subsequent liquidations, depositor withdraws 0 deposit and *only* the ETH Gain from one liquidation (1719ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Depositor withdraws correct compounded deposit after liquidation empties the pool (3958ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): deposit spans one scale factor change: Single depositor withdraws correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (1276ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Several deposits of varying amounts span one scale factor change. Depositors withdraw correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (4690ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): deposit spans one scale factor change: Single depositor withdraws correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (1460ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Several deposits of varying amounts span one scale factor change. Depositors withdraws correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (1986ms)
alice deposit: 0
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Deposit that decreases to less than 1e-9 of it's original value is reduced to 0 (3725ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Several deposits of 10000 VUSD span one scale factor change. Depositors withdraws correct compounded deposit and ETH Gain after one liquidation (2361ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): 2 depositors can withdraw after each receiving half of a pool-emptying liquidation (3814ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Large liquidated coll/debt, deposits and ETH price (959ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Small liquidated coll/debt, large deposits and ETH price (784ms)
Contract: StabilityPool
Stability Pool Mechanisms
✓ provideToSP(): increases the Stability Pool VUSD balance (354ms)
✓ provideToSP(): updates the user's deposit record in StabilityPool (355ms)
✓ provideToSP(): reduces the user's VUSD balance by the correct amount (321ms)
✓ provideToSP(): increases totalVUSDDeposits by correct amount (283ms)
✓ provideToSP(): Correctly updates user snapshots of accumulated rewards per unit staked (4003ms)
✓ provideToSP(), multiple deposits: updates user's deposit and snapshots (2543ms)
✓ provideToSP(): reverts if user tries to provide more than their VUSD balance (1030ms)
✓ provideToSP(): reverts if user tries to provide 2^256-1 VUSD, which exceeds their balance (508ms)
✓ provideToSP(): reverts if cannot receive ETH Gain (1073ms)
✓ provideToSP(): doesn't impact other users' deposits or ETH gains (1906ms)
✓ provideToSP(): doesn't impact system debt, collateral or TCR (2287ms)
✓ provideToSP(): doesn't impact any vessels, including the caller's vessel (1810ms)
✓ provideToSP(): doesn't protect the depositor's vessel from liquidation (1082ms)
✓ provideToSP(): providing 0 VUSD reverts (1091ms)
✓ provideToSP(), new deposit: when SP > 0, triggers GRVT reward event - increases the sum G (1072ms)
✓ provideToSP(), new deposit: when SP is empty, doesn't update G (4734ms)
✓ provideToSP(), new deposit: sets the correct front end tag (1128ms)
✓ provideToSP(), new deposit: depositor does not receive any GRVT rewards (671ms)
✓ provideToSP(), new deposit after past full withdrawal: depositor does not receive any GRVT rewards (1679ms)
✓ provideToSP(), new eligible deposit: tagged front end receives GRVT rewards (1605ms)
✓ provideToSP(), new eligible deposit: tagged front end's stake increases (848ms)
✓ provideToSP(), new eligible deposit: tagged front end's snapshots update (1913ms)
✓ provideToSP(), new deposit: depositor does not receive ETH gains (957ms)
✓ provideToSP(), new deposit after past full withdrawal: depositor does not receive ETH gains (1928ms)
✓ provideToSP(), topup: triggers GRVT reward event - increases the sum G (1007ms)
✓ provideToSP(), topup from different front end: doesn't change the front end tag (1511ms)
✓ provideToSP(), topup: depositor receives GRVT rewards (1487ms)
✓ provideToSP(), topup: tagged front end receives GRVT rewards (1036ms)
✓ provideToSP(), topup: tagged front end's stake increases (1816ms)
✓ provideToSP(), topup: tagged front end's snapshots update (1816ms)
✓ provideToSP(): reverts when amount is zero (686ms)
✓ provideToSP(): reverts if user is a registered front end (802ms)
✓ provideToSP(): reverts if provided tag is not a registered front end (587ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): reverts when user has no active deposit (597ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): reverts when amount > 0 and system has an undercollateralized vessel (453ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): partial retrieval - retrieves correct VUSD amount and the entire ETH Gain, and updates deposit (1102ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): partial retrieval - leaves the correct amount of VUSD in the Stability Pool (1128ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): full retrieval - leaves the correct amount of VUSD in the Stability Pool (1091ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Subsequent deposit and withdrawal attempt from same account, with no intermediate liquidations, withdraws zero ETH (1494ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): it correctly updates the user's VUSD and ETH snapshots of entitled reward per unit staked (1049ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): decreases StabilityPool ETH (3952ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): All depositors are able to withdraw from the SP to their account (2393ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): increases depositor's VUSD token balance by the expected amount (2098ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): doesn't impact other users Stability deposits or ETH gains (4954ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): doesn't impact system debt, collateral or TCR (1500ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): doesn't impact any vessels, including the caller's vessel (1085ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): succeeds when amount is 0 and system has an undercollateralized vessel (933ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): withdrawing 0 VUSD doesn't alter the caller's deposit or the total VUSD in the Stability Pool (993ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): withdrawing 0 ETH Gain does not alter the caller's ETH balance, their vessel collateral, or the ETH in the Stability Pool (1139ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Request to withdraw > caller's deposit only withdraws the caller's compounded deposit (1260ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): Request to withdraw 2^256-1 VUSD only withdraws the caller's compounded deposit (1229ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): caller can withdraw full deposit and ETH gain during Recovery Mode (4371ms)
✓ getDepositorETHGain(): depositor does not earn further ETH gains from liquidations while their compounded deposit == 0: (1831ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(): triggers GRVT reward event - increases the sum G (982ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(), partial withdrawal: doesn't change the front end tag (1421ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(), partial withdrawal: depositor receives GRVT rewards (1155ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(), partial withdrawal: tagged front end receives GRVT rewards (1245ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(), partial withdrawal: tagged front end's stake decreases (1803ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(), partial withdrawal: tagged front end's snapshots update (1713ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(), full withdrawal: removes deposit's front end tag (970ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(), full withdrawal: zero's depositor's snapshots (1434ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(), full withdrawal that reduces front end stake to 0: zero’s the front end’s snapshots (1248ms)
✓ withdrawFromSP(), reverts when initial deposit value is 0 (1037ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): reverts when user has no active deposit (1043ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Applies VUSDLoss to user's deposit, and redirects ETH reward to user's Vessel (932ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): reverts if it would leave vessel with ICR < MCR (3920ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): Subsequent deposit and withdrawal attempt from same account, with no intermediate liquidations, withdraws zero ETH (976ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): decreases StabilityPool ETH and increases activePool ETH (976ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): All depositors are able to withdraw their ETH gain from the SP to their Vessel (5974ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): All depositors withdraw, each withdraw their correct ETH gain (2591ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): caller can withdraw full deposit and ETH gain to their vessel during Recovery Mode (1629ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): reverts if user has no vessel (967ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): triggers GRVT reward event - increases the sum G (1298ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(), partial withdrawal: doesn't change the front end tag (4778ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(), eligible deposit: depositor receives GRVT rewards (1607ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(), eligible deposit: tagged front end receives GRVT rewards (1701ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(), eligible deposit: tagged front end's stake decreases (5345ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(), eligible deposit: tagged front end's snapshots update (1984ms)
✓ withdrawETHGainToVessel(): reverts when depositor has no ETH gain (1172ms)
✓ registerFrontEnd(): registers the front end and chosen kickback rate (173ms)
✓ registerFrontEnd(): reverts if the front end is already registered (196ms)
✓ registerFrontEnd(): reverts if the kickback rate >1 (57ms)
✓ registerFrontEnd(): reverts if address has a non-zero deposit already (702ms)
Contract: VesselManager
totalStakesSnapshot after L1: 200000002000000000000000000000
totalCollateralSnapshot after L1: 399000002000000000000000000000
Snapshots ratio after L1: 501253135332064484
B pending ETH reward after L1: 39799999602000003960000000000
B stake after L1: 40000000000000000000000000000
B stake after A1: 39999999999999999989974957243
Snapshots ratio after A1: 501253135332064484
B stake after L2: 39999999999999999989974957243
Snapshots ratio after L2: 501253134833317619
B stake after A2: 39999999999999999983267686056
B stake after L3: 39999999999999999983267686056
Snapshots ratio after L3: 501253134334570755
B stake after A3: 39999999999999999978023472178
B stake after L4: 39999999999999999978023472178
Snapshots ratio after L4: 501253133835823890
B stake after A4: 39999999999999999993921497875
B stake after L5: 39999999999999999993921497875
Snapshots ratio after L5: 501253133337077025
B stake after A5: 39999999999999999994797348633
B stake after L6: 39999999999999999994797348633
Snapshots ratio after L6: 501253132838330161
B stake after A6: 39999999999999999993468266716
B stake after L7: 39999999999999999993468266716
Snapshots ratio after L7: 501253132339583296
B stake after A7: 39999999999999999992497700314
B stake after L8: 39999999999999999992497700314
Snapshots ratio after L8: 501253131840836431
B stake after A8: 39999999999999999992398338824
B stake after L9: 39999999999999999992398338824
Snapshots ratio after L9: 501253131342089567
B stake after A9: 39999999999999999993272719884
B stake after L10: 39999999999999999993272719884
Snapshots ratio after L10: 501253130843342702
B stake after A10: 39999999999999999995141350785
B stake after L11: 39999999999999999995141350785
Snapshots ratio after L11: 501253130344595837
B stake after A11: 39999999999999999998008332745
✓ A given vessel's stake decline is negligible with adjustments and tiny liquidations (4988ms)
Contract: VesselManager - Redistribution reward calculations
✓ redistribution: A, B Open. B Liquidated. C, D Open. D Liquidated. Distributes correct rewards (1514ms)
✓ redistribution: A, B, C Open. C Liquidated. D, E, F Open. F Liquidated. Distributes correct rewards (1537ms)
✓ redistribution: Sequence of alternate opening/liquidation: final surviving vessel has ETH from all previously liquidated vessels (1667ms)
✓ redistribution: A,B,C,D,E open. Liq(A). B adds coll. Liq(C). B and D have correct coll and debt (1915ms)
✓ redistribution: A,B,C,D open. Liq(A). B adds coll. Liq(C). B and D have correct coll and debt (1962ms)
✓ redistribution: A,B,C Open. Liq(C). B adds coll. Liq(A). B acquires all coll and debt (1102ms)
✓ redistribution: A,B,C Open. Liq(C). B tops up coll. D Opens. Liq(D). Distributes correct rewards. (1133ms)
✓ redistribution: Vessel with the majority stake tops up. A,B,C, D open. Liq(D). C tops up. E Enters, Liq(E). Distributes correct rewards (1217ms)
✓ redistribution: Vessel with the majority stake tops up. A,B,C, D open. Liq(D). A, B, C top up. E Enters, Liq(E). Distributes correct rewards (1627ms)
✓ redistribution: A,B,C Open. Liq(C). B withdraws coll. Liq(A). B acquires all coll and debt (1062ms)
✓ redistribution: A,B,C Open. Liq(C). B withdraws coll. D Opens. Liq(D). Distributes correct rewards. (1050ms)
✓ redistribution: Vessel with the majority stake withdraws. A,B,C,D open. Liq(D). C withdraws some coll. E Enters, Liq(E). Distributes correct rewards (1254ms)
✓ redistribution: Vessel with the majority stake withdraws. A,B,C,D open. Liq(D). A, B, C withdraw. E Enters, Liq(E). Distributes correct rewards (2218ms)
✓ redistribution, all operations: A,B,C open. Liq(A). D opens. B adds, C withdraws. Liq(B). E & F open. D adds. Liq(F). Distributes correct rewards (1990ms)
✓ redistribution, all operations: A,B,C open. Liq(A). D opens. B adds, C withdraws. Liq(B). E & F open. D adds. Liq(F). Varying coll. Distributes correct rewards (2513ms)
Contract: VesselManager - in Recovery Mode
✓ checkRecoveryMode(): Returns true if TCR falls below CCR (555ms)
✓ checkRecoveryMode(): Returns true if TCR stays less than CCR (783ms)
✓ checkRecoveryMode(): returns false if TCR stays above CCR (775ms)
✓ checkRecoveryMode(): returns false if TCR rises above CCR (517ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR < 100%: removes stake and updates totalStakes (958ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR < 100%: updates system snapshots correctly (1181ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR < 100%: closes the Vessel and removes it from the Vessel array (808ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR < 100%: only redistributes to active Vessels - no offset to Stability Pool (1527ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 100 < ICR < 110%: removes stake and updates totalStakes (969ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 100% < ICR < 110%: updates system snapshots correctly (1292ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 100% < ICR < 110%: closes the Vessel and removes it from the Vessel array (965ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 100% < ICR < 110%: offsets as much debt as possible with the Stability Pool, then redistributes the remainder coll and debt (1034ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR > 110%, vessel has lowest ICR, and StabilityPool is empty: does nothing (1245ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 110% < ICR < TCR, and StabilityPool VUSD > debt to liquidate: offsets the vessel entirely with the pool (1265ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR% = 110 < TCR, and StabilityPool VUSD > debt to liquidate: offsets the vessel entirely with the pool, there’s no collateral surplus (1382ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 110% < ICR < TCR, and StabilityPool VUSD > debt to liquidate: removes stake and updates totalStakes (1361ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 110% < ICR < TCR, and StabilityPool VUSD > debt to liquidate: updates system snapshots (1287ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 110% < ICR < TCR, and StabilityPool VUSD > debt to liquidate: closes the Vessel (6532ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 110% < ICR < TCR, and StabilityPool VUSD > debt to liquidate: can liquidate vessels out of order (2667ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR > 110%, and StabilityPool VUSD < liquidated debt: Vessel remains active (985ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR > 110%, and StabilityPool VUSD < liquidated debt: Vessel remains in VesselOwners array (1134ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR > 110%, and StabilityPool VUSD < liquidated debt: nothing happens (1146ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR > 110%, and StabilityPool VUSD < liquidated debt: updates system shapshots (1284ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR > 110%, and StabilityPool VUSD < liquidated debt: causes correct Pool offset and ETH gain, and doesn't redistribute to active vessels (1266ms)
✓ liquidate(), with ICR > 110%, and StabilityPool VUSD < liquidated debt: ICR of non liquidated vessel does not change (2161ms)
✓ liquidate() with ICR > 110%, and StabilityPool VUSD < liquidated debt: total liquidated coll and debt is correct (1912ms)
✓ liquidate(): Doesn't liquidate undercollateralized vessel if it is the only vessel in the system (652ms)
✓ liquidate(): Liquidates undercollateralized vessel if there are two vessels in the system (997ms)
✓ liquidate(): does nothing if vessel has >= 110% ICR and the Stability Pool is empty (1019ms)
✓ liquidate(): does nothing if vessel ICR >= TCR, and SP covers vessel's debt (1391ms)
✓ liquidate(): reverts if vessel is non-existent (815ms)
✓ liquidate(): reverts if vessel has been closed (1044ms)
✓ liquidate(): liquidates based on entire/collateral debt (including pending rewards), not raw collateral/debt (1878ms)
✓ liquidate(): does not affect the SP deposit or ETH gain when called on an SP depositor's address that has no vessel (708ms)
✓ liquidate(): does not alter the liquidated user's token balance (1312ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 110% < ICR < TCR, can claim collateral, re-open, be reedemed and claim again (2055ms)
✓ liquidate(), with 110% < ICR < TCR, can claim collateral, after another claim from a redemption (2300ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): With all ICRs > 110%, Liquidates Vessels until system leaves recovery mode (3129ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): Liquidates Vessels until 1) system has left recovery mode AND 2) it reaches a Vessel with ICR >= 110% (2467ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): liquidates only up to the requested number of undercollateralized vessels (7021ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): does nothing if n = 0 (952ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): closes every Vessel with ICR < MCR, when n > number of undercollateralized vessels (2065ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): a liquidation sequence containing Pool offsets increases the TCR (2024ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): A liquidation sequence of pure redistributions decreases the TCR, due to gas compensation, but up to 0.5% (6805ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): liquidates based on entire/collateral debt (including pending rewards), not raw collateral/debt (945ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): does nothing if all vessels have ICR > 110% and Stability Pool is empty (692ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): emits liquidation event with correct values when all vessels have ICR > 110% and Stability Pool covers a subset of vessels (1300ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): emits liquidation event with correct values when all vessels have ICR > 110% and Stability Pool covers a subset of vessels, including a partial (1362ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): does not affect the liquidated user's token balances (4805ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): Liquidating vessels at 100 < ICR < 110 with SP deposits correctly impacts their SP deposit and ETH gain (1556ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): Liquidating vessels at ICR <=100% with SP deposits does not alter their deposit or ETH gain (1391ms)
✓ liquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: non liquidated vessel remains active (1140ms)
✓ liquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: non liquidated vessel remains in VesselOwners Array (1378ms)
gasUsed: 609826
true
✓ liquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: still can liquidate further vessels after the non-liquidated, emptied pool (4864ms)
gasUsed: 609826
✓ liquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: still can liquidate further vessels after the non-liquidated, non emptied pool (1286ms)
✓ liquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: total liquidated coll and debt is correct (1175ms)
✓ liquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: emits correct liquidation event values (1364ms)
✓ liquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: ICR of non liquidated vessel does not change (1387ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): Liquidates all vessels with ICR < 110%, transitioning Normal -> Recovery Mode (4957ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): Liquidates all vessels with ICR < 110%, transitioning Recovery -> Normal Mode (1492ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): Liquidates all vessels with ICR < 110%, transitioning Normal -> Recovery Mode (1922ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: non liquidated vessel remains active (1286ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: non liquidated vessel remains in Vessel Owners array (1555ms)
gasUsed: 636956
✓ batchLiquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: still can liquidate further vessels after the non-liquidated, emptied pool (1465ms)
gasUsed: 636956
✓ batchLiquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: still can liquidate further vessels after the non-liquidated, non emptied pool (1521ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: total liquidated coll and debt is correct (1320ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: emits correct liquidation event values (1238ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels() with a non fullfilled liquidation: ICR of non liquidated vessel does not change (1416ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(), with 110% < ICR < TCR, and StabilityPool VUSD > debt to liquidate: can liquidate vessels out of order (1357ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(), with 110% < ICR < TCR, and StabilityPool empty: doesn't liquidate any vessels (1161ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): skips liquidation of vessels with ICR > TCR, regardless of Stability Pool size (2686ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): emits liquidation event with correct values when all vessels have ICR > 110% and Stability Pool covers a subset of vessels (1530ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): emits liquidation event with correct values when all vessels have ICR > 110% and Stability Pool covers a subset of vessels, including a partial (4965ms)
Contract: VesselManager
✓ liquidate(): closes a Vessel that has ICR < MCR (573ms)
✓ liquidate(): decreases ActivePool ETH and VUSDDebt by correct amounts (567ms)
✓ liquidate(): increases DefaultPool ETH and VUSD debt by correct amounts (553ms)
✓ liquidate(): removes the Vessel's stake from the total stakes (608ms)
✓ liquidate(): Removes the correct vessel from the VesselOwners array, and moves the last array element to the new empty slot (1276ms)
✓ liquidate(): updates the snapshots of total stakes and total collateral (422ms)
✓ liquidate(): updates the L_ETH and L_VUSDDebt reward-per-unit-staked totals (984ms)
✓ liquidate(): Liquidates undercollateralized vessel if there are two vessels in the system (503ms)
✓ liquidate(): reverts if vessel is non-existent (303ms)
✓ liquidate(): reverts if vessel has been closed (745ms)
✓ liquidate(): does nothing if vessel has >= 110% ICR (597ms)
✓ liquidate(): Given the same price and no other vessel changes, complete Pool offsets restore the TCR to its value prior to the defaulters opening vessels (2590ms)
✓ liquidate(): Pool offsets increase the TCR (6140ms)
✓ liquidate(): a pure redistribution reduces the TCR only as a result of compensation (2570ms)
✓ liquidate(): does not affect the SP deposit or ETH gain when called on an SP depositor's address that has no vessel (964ms)
✓ liquidate(): does not liquidate a SP depositor's vessel with ICR > 110%, and does not affect their SP deposit or ETH gain (892ms)
✓ liquidate(): liquidates a SP depositor's vessel with ICR < 110%, and the liquidation correctly impacts their SP deposit and ETH gain (1141ms)
✓ liquidate(): does not alter the liquidated user's token balance (1104ms)
✓ liquidate(): liquidates based on entire/collateral debt (including pending rewards), not raw collateral/debt (1573ms)
✓ liquidate(): when SP > 0, triggers GRVT reward event - increases the sum G (1081ms)
✓ liquidate(): when SP is empty, doesn't update G (1127ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): liquidates a Vessel that a) was skipped in a previous liquidation and b) has pending rewards (5574ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): closes every Vessel with ICR < MCR, when n > number of undercollateralized vessels (2003ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): liquidates up to the requested number of undercollateralized vessels (1230ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): does nothing if all vessels have ICR > 110% (1021ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): liquidates based on entire/collateral debt (including pending rewards), not raw collateral/debt (1246ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): reverts if n = 0 (764ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): liquidates vessels with ICR < MCR (1751ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): does not affect the liquidated user's token balances (999ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): A liquidation sequence containing Pool offsets increases the TCR (6204ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): A liquidation sequence of pure redistributions decreases the TCR, due to gas compensation, but up to 0.5% (1929ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): Liquidating vessels with SP deposits correctly impacts their SP deposit and ETH gain (1214ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): when SP > 0, triggers GRVT reward event - increases the sum G (5057ms)
✓ liquidateVessels(): when SP is empty, doesn't update G (1722ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): liquidates a Vessel that a) was skipped in a previous liquidation and b) has pending rewards (1912ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): closes every vessel with ICR < MCR in the given array (1351ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): does not liquidate vessels that are not in the given array (5228ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): does not close vessels with ICR >= MCR in the given array (1442ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): reverts if array is empty (978ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): skips if vessel is non-existent (1295ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): skips if a vessel has been closed (5183ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels: when SP > 0, triggers GRVT reward event - increases the sum G (1428ms)
✓ batchLiquidateVessels(): when SP is empty, doesn't update G (1655ms)
✓ getRedemptionHints(): gets the address of the first Vessel and the final ICR of the last Vessel involved in a redemption (621ms)
✓ getRedemptionHints(): returns 0 as partialRedemptionHintNICR when reaching _maxIterations (715ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): cancels the provided VUSD with debt from Vessels with the lowest ICRs and sends an equivalent amount of Ether (838ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): with invalid first hint, zero address (991ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): with invalid first hint, non-existent vessel (1003ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): with invalid first hint, vessel below MCR (1392ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): ends the redemption sequence when the token redemption request has been filled (1583ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): ends the redemption sequence when max iterations have been reached (1038ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): performs partial redemption if resultant debt is > minimum net debt (1411ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): doesn't perform partial redemption if resultant debt would be < minimum net debt (1487ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): doesnt perform the final partial redemption in the sequence if the hint is out-of-date (1583ms)
- redeemCollateral(): can redeem if there is zero active debt but non-zero debt in DefaultPool
✓ redeemCollateral(): doesn't touch Vessels with ICR < 110% (4743ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): finds the last Vessel with ICR == 110% even if there is more than one (1124ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): reverts when TCR < MCR (1238ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): reverts when argument _amount is 0 (1038ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): reverts if max fee > 100% (1918ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): reverts if max fee < 0.5% (2011ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): reverts if fee exceeds max fee percentage (2899ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): succeeds if fee is less than max fee percentage (3127ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): doesn't affect the Stability Pool deposits or ETH gain of redeemed-from vessels (2311ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): caller can redeem their entire VUSDToken balance (1086ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): reverts when requested redemption amount exceeds caller's VUSD token balance (1320ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): value of issued ETH == face value of redeemed VUSD (assuming 1 VUSD has value of $1) (1353ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): reverts if there is zero outstanding system debt (66ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): reverts if caller's tries to redeem more than the outstanding system debt (367ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): a redemption made when base rate is zero increases the base rate (1187ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): a redemption made when base rate is non-zero increases the base rate, for negligible time passed (1987ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): lastFeeOpTime doesn't update if less time than decay interval has passed since the last fee operation [ @skip-on-coverage ] (2515ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): a redemption made at zero base rate send a non-zero ETHFee to GRVT staking contract (5136ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): a redemption made at zero base increases the ETH-fees-per-GRVT-staked in GRVT Staking contract (1207ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): a redemption made at a non-zero base rate send a non-zero ETHFee to GRVT staking contract (1730ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): a redemption made at a non-zero base rate increases ETH-per-GRVT-staked in the staking contract (5971ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): a redemption sends the ETH remainder (ETHDrawn - ETHFee) to the redeemer (1113ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): a full redemption (leaving vessel with 0 debt), closes the vessel (1553ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): emits correct debt and coll values in each redeemed vessel's VesselUpdated event (1416ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): a redemption that closes a vessel leaves the vessel's ETH surplus (collateral - ETH drawn) available for the vessel owner to claim (5373ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): a redemption that closes a vessel leaves the vessel's ETH surplus (collateral - ETH drawn) available for the vessel owner after re-opening vessel (2154ms)
✓ redeemCollateral(): reverts if fee eats up all returned collateral (1412ms)
✓ getPendingVUSDDebtReward(): Returns 0 if there is no pending VUSDDebt reward (618ms)
✓ getPendingETHReward(): Returns 0 if there is no pending ETH reward (620ms)
✓ computeICR(): Returns 0 if vessel's coll is worth 0
✓ computeICR(): Returns 2^256-1 for ETH:USD = 100, coll = 1 ETH, debt = 100 VUSD
✓ computeICR(): returns correct ICR for ETH:USD = 100, coll = 200 ETH, debt = 30 VUSD
✓ computeICR(): returns correct ICR for ETH:USD = 250, coll = 1350 ETH, debt = 127 VUSD
✓ computeICR(): returns correct ICR for ETH:USD = 100, coll = 1 ETH, debt = 54321 VUSD
✓ computeICR(): Returns 2^256-1 if vessel has non-zero coll and zero debt
✓ checkRecoveryMode(): Returns true when TCR < 150% (351ms)
✓ checkRecoveryMode(): Returns false when TCR == 150% (366ms)
✓ checkRecoveryMode(): Returns false when TCR > 150% (365ms)
✓ checkRecoveryMode(): Returns false when TCR == 0 (604ms)
✓ getVesselStake(): Returns stake (511ms)
✓ getVesselColl(): Returns coll (494ms)
✓ getVesselDebt(): Returns debt (400ms)
✓ getVesselStatus(): Returns status (434ms)
✓ hasPendingRewards(): Returns false it vessel is not active
Contract: Unipool
Unipool
✓ Two stakers with the same stakes wait DURATION (112ms)
✓ Two stakers with the different (1:3) stakes wait DURATION (206ms)
✓ Two stakers with the different (1:3) stakes wait DURATION and DURATION/2 (93ms)
✓ Three stakers with the different (1:3:5) stakes wait different durations (392ms)
✓ Four stakers with gaps of zero total supply (516ms)
✓ Four stakers with gaps of zero total supply, with claims in between (430ms)
Unipool, before calling setAddresses
✓ Stake fails
✓ Withdraw falis
✓ Claim fails
✓ Exit fails
1019 passing (29m)
8 pending
Done in 1740.19s.