correction

_posts/2024-08-12-qualia-temporal-naturalism-puzzles.md

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ By virtue of temporal qualia being ‘quiddities’ i.e. non-relational properti
 
 In a Leibnizian relationalism, distinct events have distinct configurations of causal profile + internal properties. In Russellian monism, these internal properties can categorize causal systems with the fundamental substrate being psychophysical; this is a form of dual-aspect monism where physical systems are categorized based on their mentality.
 
-In temporal naturalism, a weak form of this argument is that at the descriptive, i.e. extrinsic level [^3], Mary does not know how colour perception events are correlated to unprecedented events in the physical substrate. However, knowledge of such intrinsic properties can be demanded by modifying the knowledge argument, shifting the problem of capture in the causal net of physicalist knowledge to *internal* properties. In response, a stronger but more speculative temporal naturalistic argument could be that either qualia are only *effectively* macro-internal but do have causal efficacy over long periods of time, i.e., only approximately epiphenomena ([as argued in the previous post]({% post_url 2024-08-05-qualia-temporal-naturalism %}##self-organization-of-cmr-structures)); or, even if they are *fundamentally* intrinsic, it is not *a priori* contradictory to suppose that Mary finds some way to access the intrinsic categorization of dispositional systems with colour perception, so that she can somehow induce in herself a phenomenal state that at the physical substrate corresponds to the novel character of the events experiencing said state internally. 
+In temporal naturalism, a weak form of this argument is that at the descriptive, i.e. extrinsic level [^3], Mary does not know how colour perception events are correlated to unprecedented events in the physical substrate. However, knowledge of such intrinsic properties can be demanded by modifying the knowledge argument, shifting the problem of capture in the causal net of physicalist knowledge to *internal* properties. In response, a stronger but more speculative temporal naturalistic argument could be that either qualia are only *effectively* macro-internal but do have causal efficacy over long periods of time, i.e., only approximately epiphenomena ([as argued in the previous post]({% post_url 2024-08-05-qualia-temporal-naturalism %}#self-organization-of-cmr-structures)); or, even if they are *fundamentally* intrinsic, it is not *a priori* contradictory to suppose that Mary finds some way to access the intrinsic categorization of dispositional systems with colour perception, so that she can somehow induce in herself a phenomenal state that at the physical substrate corresponds to the novel character of the events experiencing said state internally. 
 
 [^3]: I.e., a level of description at which we can access relational and intrinsic properties i.e. those with causal efficacy, without knowing what it is like to be the event/events with the property, in the sense of Nagel, 1974.