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Permissive regex leads to domain filter bypass

Low
includesec-kris published GHSA-jgh8-vchw-q3g7 Jan 26, 2023

Package

pip safeurl-python (pip)

Affected versions

1.0

Patched versions

None

Description

Description

In SafeURL it is possible to specify a list of domains that should be matched before a request is sent out. The regex used to compare domains did not work as intended.

Impact

The regex used was:

re.match("(?i)^%s" % domain, value)

This has two problems, first that only the beginning and not the end of the string is anchored. Second, that a dot in the domain matches any character as part of regex syntax.

Therefore, an allowlist of ["victim.com"] could allow the domain "victimacomattacker.com" to be requested.

This has lower impact since the usual attacker aim in an SSRF is to request internal resources such as private IP addresses rather than an attacker's own domain. But, in a case where SafeURL had specifically been used to try to limit requests to a particular allowlist, say for example a PDF renderer, the finding would be more severe.

Patches

Fixed in #5

References

Server-side request forgery (SSRF)

Severity

Low

CVE ID

CVE-2023-24622

Weaknesses

No CWEs

Credits