V2x Legacy Product Deprecation (#1897)

* initial commit

* Delete sccp-2096.md

* Update sccp-2095.md

* Update sccp-2095.md

* Update sip-2059.md

* Update sccp-2095.md

content/sccp/sccp-2093.md

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+---
+sccp: 2093
+network: Ethereum & Optimism
+title: Update of sETH Exchange Fees
+author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny)
+status: Draft
+created: 2024-03-20
+type: Governance
+---
+
+# Simple Summary
+
+This SCCP proposes to lower the exchange fee on sETH/sUSD on L1 and and L2 temporarily to zero, in coordination with the Treasury Council on `date-to-be-specified`, in order to facilitate full unwind of the [sETH wrapper](https://etherscan.io/address/0xcea392596f1ab7f1d6f8f241967094ca519e6129) on the ethereum network:
+- swap enough sUSD to sETH to unwind the sETH wrapper on L1
+- unwrap the sETH on L1 by burning the sETH
+- send the wETH to L2
+- wrap the wETH to mint sETH
+- swap the sETH back to sUSD
+- send sUSD back to L1 (with 7 day delay)
+
+# Abstract
+
+The fee levers that need to be updated are as follows:
+- on ethereum, `setAtomicExchangeFeeRate` would be used on `sETH` to update the fee to zero
+- on optimism `setExchangeFeeRate` would be used on `sETH` to update the fee to zero
+- on optimism `setExchangeDynamicFeeRounds` would be used on `sETH` to lower the number of rounds to 1 (effectively disabling dynamic fees)
+
+# Motivation
+
+The proposed changes in this SCCP is part of a suite of pre-requisite changes done, in order to facilitate migration of spot synths on L1 as specified in [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/) and unwinding of the debt pool skew.
+
+Important to note that all parameters are restored back to previous levels following the full unwind of the sETH wrapper on L1.
+
+# Copyright
+
+Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
+
+

content/sccp/sccp-2094.md

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+---
+sccp: 2094
+network: Optimism
+title: Increase wETH Wrapper maxTokenAmount
+author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny)
+status: Draft
+created: 2024-03-20
+type: Governance
+---
+
+# Simple Summary
+
+This SCCP proposes to increase the `maxTokenAmount` to 6k `sETH` from 2k `sETH` 
+
+# Abstract
+
+The `maxTokenAmount` is the maximum possible amount of tokens that can be minted from a given wrapper by depositing the underlying, `wETH`.
+
+# Motivation
+
+The proposed changes in this SCCP is part of a suite of pre-requisite changes done, in order to facilitate migration of spot synths on L1 as specified in [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/) and unwinding of the debt pool skew.
+
+# Copyright
+
+Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
+
+

content/sccp/sccp-2095.md

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+---
+sccp: 2095
+network: Ethereum
+title: Deprecate V2 Legacy Loans / Wrappers
+author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny)
+status: Draft
+created: 2024-03-20
+type: Governance
+---
+
+# Simple Summary
+
+This SCCP proposes to deprecate loans and wrappers on the ethereum network. 
+
+# Abstract
+
+Deprecation would take place by setting up a module that would increase the `minCratio` to a level that leads to the loans being liquidated and executing the liquidation and restoring `minCratio` back to previous levels. The additional ETH obtained from executing this transaction (around 280 ETH) would be sent to the Treasury Council until the time when users claim those funds.
+
+ETH backed loans, ERC backed loans, shorts and the ETH Legacy Wrapper would then be removed from the calculation of the debt pool and deprecated.
+
+# Motivation
+
+The proposed changes in this SCCP is part of a suite of pre-requisite changes done, in order to facilitate migration of spot synths on L1 as specified in [SIP-2059](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-2059/) and unwinding of the debt pool skew.
+
+# Copyright
+
+Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
+
+

content/sips/sip-2059.md

@@ -1,34 +1,40 @@
 ---
 sip: 2059
 title: Legacy Spot Synth Migration
-network:  Ethereum & Optimism
+network:  Ethereum
 status: Draft
 type: Governance
 author: Kaleb (@kaleb-keny)
 ---
 
 ## Simple Summary
 
-The sip proposes a mechanism to balance the debt pool skew on L1 and prepare for the transition of spot synths to V3. This mechanism works by levying a funding rate on spot synths that track volatile assets. The funding rate is imposed via a rebasing system, whereby a discount factor is updated automatically every week during the weekly fee closing snapshot. The funding rate is set by governance. In future iterations, the funding rate may be set automatically based on the skew with respect to the size of the debt pool via a funding rate curve similar to the one specified in [SIP-354](https://sips.synthetix.io/sips/sip-354/). 
+The sip proposes to deprecate classic exchanges (and atomic exchanges) of `sETHBTC`, `sETH` and `sBTC` with a new redeemer contract that redeems users at the chainlink price multiplied by a `discountRate`. This `discountRate` would start at 1 and decrease gradually as per a pre-approved schedule that can be voted on by governance with an SCCP.
 
 ## Abstract
 
 <!--A short (~200 word) description of the proposed change, the abstract should clearly describe the proposed change. This is what *will* be done if the SIP is implemented, not *why* it should be done or *how* it will be done. If the SIP proposes deploying a new contract, write, "we propose to deploy a new contract that will do x".-->
 
-The funding rate - rebase mechanism aims to reduce the notional value of volatile synths, this will incentivise holders of volatile spot synths to exchange into stable synths that track fiat assets like USD and EURO. This will also reduce the debt pool skew and provide governance with the necessary levies to discourage future skew based on the state of the protocol. Rebasing takes place via an update to the `discountFactor` which is applied on `volatileSynth.totalSupply()` and `volatileSynth.balanceOf()`, therefore reducing the overall skeweness of the debt pool gradually. Funding is automatically disbursed to snx stakers as per the weekly debt reduction. The mechanism does not require migration of existing volatile synths, and funding is applied automatically.
+After this sip is implemented, users holding `sETH`, `sBTC`   or `sETHBTC` can only redeem their synths to `sUSD` at the chainlink price multiplied by the specified discount factor.
 
 ## Motivation
 
 The legacy spot synths are overutilsed relative to their value to stakers, they produce minimal revenue and incur significant hedging costs for stakers. Spot synths in V3 have been redesigned to be more aligned with the interests of stakers, this proposal will immediately begin to reduce the debt pool skew, and the costs associated with stakers managing their debt hedging due to changes in the composition of outstanding synths. It also prepares for the migration of debt to V3 later in the year as new products are launched, including the upcoming L1 ETH perp.
 
 ## Specification
 
-The `discountFactor` starts in week 0 at 1. Should the system be configured to levy a funding rate of 30% per year for example, at the weekly fee period close, the keeper bot would update the discountFactor to `0.99423076923` which is computed as per `prevailing_discount_factor*(1-funding_rate_per_year*weeks_since_last_update/weeks_per_year)`.
+Pending.
 
 ### Test Cases
 
 Pending
 
+### Configurable Values (Via SCCP)
+
+<!--Please list all values configurable via SCCP under this implementation.-->
+
+The `discountFactor` that allows configuration of the funding rate imposed on holding volatile synths on L1.
+
 
 ## Copyright