Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
For users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect.
For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for .example.com
, the intention is that subdomains of example.com
are allowed.
Instead, example.com
and badexample.com
could also match.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain.
Original Issue Posted by @semoac:
Whitelist Domain feature is not working as expected because is not matching a dot to ensure the redirect is a subdomain.
Expected Behavior
If whitelist domain is set to .example.com
, then hack.alienexample.com
should be rejected as a valid redirect.
Current Behavior
The code is removing the dot
from .example.com
and only checking if the redirect string end with example.com
Possible Solution
Here
https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/blob/c377466411f2aee180a732187edb638f2f7e57fb/oauthproxy.go#L661
Include the dot when checking the string:
strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, "." + domainHostname)
Steps to Reproduce (for bugs)
package main
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
)
func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {
if port == "" || port == ":*" {
return true
}
if port[0] != ':' {
return false
}
for _, b := range port[1:] {
if b < '0' || b > '9' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) {
host = hostport
colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':')
if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) {
host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:]
}
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
}
return
}
func main() {
domain := ".example.com"
domainHostname, _ := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, "."))
redirectHostname := "https://hack.alienexample.com"
if (strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) { fmt.Println("This should not have happen.")}
}
Users of github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy
are advised to update to github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7
References
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
For users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect.
For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for
.example.com
, the intention is that subdomains ofexample.com
are allowed.Instead,
example.com
andbadexample.com
could also match.Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain.
Original Issue Posted by @semoac:
Whitelist Domain feature is not working as expected because is not matching a dot to ensure the redirect is a subdomain.
Expected Behavior
If whitelist domain is set to
.example.com
, thenhack.alienexample.com
should be rejected as a valid redirect.Current Behavior
The code is removing the
dot
from.example.com
and only checking if the redirect string end withexample.com
Possible Solution
Here
https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/blob/c377466411f2aee180a732187edb638f2f7e57fb/oauthproxy.go#L661
Include the dot when checking the string:
Steps to Reproduce (for bugs)
Users of
github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy
are advised to update togithub.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7
References