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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been...

High severity Unreviewed Published Jun 20, 2024 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Sep 12, 2024

Package

No package listedSuggest a package

Affected versions

Unknown

Patched versions

Unknown

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: fix use-after-free after failure to create a snapshot

At ioctl.c:create_snapshot(), we allocate a pending snapshot structure and
then attach it to the transaction's list of pending snapshots. After that
we call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and if that returns an error we jump
to 'fail' label, where we kfree() the pending snapshot structure. This can
result in a later use-after-free of the pending snapshot:

  1. We allocated the pending snapshot and added it to the transaction's
    list of pending snapshots;

  2. We call btrfs_commit_transaction(), and it fails either at the first
    call to btrfs_run_delayed_refs() or btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups().
    In both cases, we don't abort the transaction and we release our
    transaction handle. We jump to the 'fail' label and free the pending
    snapshot structure. We return with the pending snapshot still in the
    transaction's list;

  3. Another task commits the transaction. This time there's no error at
    all, and then during the transaction commit it accesses a pointer
    to the pending snapshot structure that the snapshot creation task
    has already freed, resulting in a user-after-free.

This issue could actually be detected by smatch, which produced the
following warning:

fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:843 create_snapshot() warn: '&pending_snapshot->list' not removed from list

So fix this by not having the snapshot creation ioctl directly add the
pending snapshot to the transaction's list. Instead add the pending
snapshot to the transaction handle, and then at btrfs_commit_transaction()
we add the snapshot to the list only when we can guarantee that any error
returned after that point will result in a transaction abort, in which
case the ioctl code can safely free the pending snapshot and no one can
access it anymore.

References

Published by the National Vulnerability Database Jun 20, 2024
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Jun 20, 2024
Last updated Sep 12, 2024

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS score

0.042%
(5th percentile)

Weaknesses

CVE ID

CVE-2022-48733

GHSA ID

GHSA-grhv-62hf-9jg3

Source code

No known source code

Dependabot alerts are not supported on this advisory because it does not have a package from a supported ecosystem with an affected and fixed version.

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