M-02 MitigationConfirmed

[c4-bot-1]

The original finding, Broken assumptions can lead to the inability to seize RSR, described how an invariant broken during the minting process of StRSR could cause calls from the BackingManager to seizeRSR() to revert. This could in turn prevent rebalance operations from succeeding.

As pointed out by the sponsor, the issue would only appear/be exploitable under very specific conditions.

The finding was addressed in PR reserve-protocol/protocol#1198, which implements a fix to avoid the path in seizeRSR() that led to the revert.

This change successfully mitigates the specific attack path presented in the finding, but it is worth pointing out that the invariant described in the inline comments:

if totalStakes == 0, then stakeRSR == 0

...can still be broken as described in the finding and it would be advisable to either thoroughly document this behaviour or remove mentions of such invariant.

[c4-judge]

thereksfour marked the issue as satisfactory