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title: Deprecating Obsolete Key Exchange Methods in TLS 1.2 abbrev: Deprecating RSA and FFDH(E) docname: draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-latest date: category: std

ipr: trust200902 keyword: Internet-Draft

stand_alone: yes pi: [toc, sortrefs, symrefs]

informative: Raccoon: title: "Raccoon Attack: Finding and Exploiting Most-Significant-Bit-Oracles in TLS-DH(E)" target: https://raccoon-attack.com/RacoonAttack.pdf date: 2020-09-09 author: - ins: R. Merget - ins: M. Brinkmann - ins: N. Aviram - ins: J. Somorovsky - ins: J. Mittmann - ins: J. Schwenk ICA: title: "Practical invalid curve attacks on TLS-ECDH" target: https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.704.7932&rep=rep1&type=pdf date: 2015-09-21 author: - ins: T. Jager - ins: J. Schwenk - ins: J. Somorovsky weak-dh: title: "Weak Diffie-Hellman and the Logjam Attack" target: https://weakdh.org/ date: 2015-10 author: - ins: D. Adrian - ins: K. Bhargavan - ins: Z. Durumeric - ins: P. Gaudry - ins: M. Green - ins: J. A. Halderman - ins: N. Heninger - ins: D. Springall - ins: E. Thomé - ins: L. Valenta - ins: B. VanderSloot - ins: E. Wustrow - ins: S. Zanella-Béguelin - ins: P. Zimmermann subgroups: title: "Measuring small subgroup attacks against Diffie-Hellman" target: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/995/20161017:193515 date: 2016-10-15 author: - ins: L. Valenta - ins: D. Adrian - ins: A. Sanso - ins: S. Cohney - ins: J. Fried - ins: M. Hastings - ins: J. A. Halderman - ins: N. Heninger BLEI: title: "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks against Protocols Based on RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1" author: - ins: D. Bleichenbacher seriesinfo: "Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'98, LNCS vol. 1462, pages: 1-12" date: 1998 ROBOT: title: "Return Of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)" author: - ins: H. Boeck - ins: J. Somorovsky - ins: C. Young seriesinfo: "27th USENIX Security Symposium" date: 2018 NEW-BLEI: title: "Revisiting SSL/TLS Implementations: New Bleichenbacher Side Channels and Attacks" target: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-meyer.pdf date: 2014-08 author: - ins: C. Meyer - ins: J. Somorovsky - ins: E. Weiss - ins: J. Schwenk - ins: S. Schinzel - ins: E. Tews DROWN: title: "DROWN: Breaking TLS using SSLv2" target: https://drownattack.com/drown-attack-paper.pdf date: 2016-08 author: - ins: N. Aviram - ins: S. Schinzel - ins: J. Somorovsky - ins: N. Heninger - ins: M. Dankel - ins: J. Steube - ins: L. Valenta - ins: D. Adrian - ins: J. A. Halderman - ins: V. Dukhovni - ins: E. Käsper - ins: S. Cohney - ins: S. Engels - ins: C. Paar - ins: Y. Shavitt XPROT: title: "On the Security of TLS 1.3 and QUIC Against Weaknesses in PKCS#1 v1.5 Encryption" author: - ins: T. Jager - ins: J. Schwenk - ins: J. Somorovsky seriesinfo: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security date: 2015 SC-tls-des-idea-ciphers-to-historic: title: "Moving single-DES and IDEA TLS ciphersuites to Historic" target: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/status-change-tls-des-idea-ciphers-to-historic/ author: -ins: Benjamin Kaduk date: 2021-01-25 DLOG795: title: "Comparing the difficulty of factorization and discrete logarithm: a 240-digit experiment" target: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/697 author: - ins: F. Boudot - ins: P. Gaudry - ins: A. Guillevic - ins: N. Heninger - ins: E. Thomé - ins: P. Zimmermann date: 2020-08-17 server_side_tls: title: "Server Side TLS" target: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS author: - ins: A. King date: 2020-07 MAY4: title: "May the fourth be with you: A microarchitectural side channel attack on several real-world applications of curve25519" target: https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3133956.3134029 author: - ins: D. Genkin - ins: L. Valenta - ins: Y. Yarom PARIS256: title: "The PARIS256 Attack" target: https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Wed-August-8/us-18-Valsorda-Squeezing-A-Key-Through-A-Carry-Bit-wp.pdf author: - ins: S. Devlin - ins: F. Valsorda author:

  ins: C. Bartle
  name: Carrick Bartle
  organization: Roblox
  email: cbartle@roblox.com

  • ins: N. Aviram
name: Nimrod Aviram
organization:
email: nimrod.aviram@gmail.com

--- abstract

This document makes several prescriptions regarding the following key exchange methods in TLS, most of which have been superseded by better options:

  1. This document deprecates the use of RSA key exchange.

  2. It limits the use of Diffie Hellman key exchange over a finite field to avoid, to the fullest extent possible, known vulnerabilities and improper security properties.

  3. It discourages the use of static elliptic curve Diffie Hellman cipher suites.

Note that these prescriptions apply only to TLS 1.2 since TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by {{!RFC8996}} and TLS 1.3 either does not use the affected algorithm or does not share the relevant configuration options.

--- middle

Introduction

TLS 1.2 supports a variety of key exchange algorithms, including RSA, Diffie Hellman over a finite field, and elliptic curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH).

Diffie Hellman key exchange, over any group, comes in ephemeral and non-ephemeral varieties. Non-ephemeral DH algorithms use static DH public keys included in the authenticating peer's certificate; see {{?RFC4492}} for discussion. In contrast, ephemeral DH algorithms use ephemeral DH public keys sent in the handshake and authenticated by the peer's certificate. Ephemeral and non-ephemeral finite field DH algorithms are called DHE and DH (or FFDHE and FFDH), respectively, and ephemeral and non-ephemeral elliptic curve DH algorithms are called ECDHE and ECDH, respectively {{?RFC4492}}.

In general, non-ephemeral cipher suites are not recommended due to their lack of forward secrecy. However, as demonstrated by the {{Raccoon}} attack on finite-field DH, public key reuse, either via non-ephemeral cipher suites or reused keys with ephemeral cipher suites, can lead to timing side channels that may leak connection secrets. For elliptic curve DH, invalid curve attacks similarly exploit secret reuse in order to break security {{ICA}}, further demonstrating the risk of reusing public keys. While both side channels can be avoided in implementations, experience shows that in practice, implementations may fail to thwart such attacks due to the complexity and number of the required mitigations.

Additionally, RSA key exchange suffers from security problems that are independent of implementation choices as well as problems that stem purely from the difficulty of implementing security countermeasures correctly.

At a rough glance, the problems affecting FFDHE in TLS 1.2 are as follows:

  1. FFDHE suffers from interoperability problems because there is no mechanism for negotiating the group size, and some implementations only support small group sizes (see {{!RFC7919}}, Section 1).

  2. In practice, some operators use 1024-bit FFDHE groups since this is the maximum size that ensures wide support (see {{!RFC7919}}, Section 1). This size leaves only a small security margin vs. the current discrete log record, which stands at 795 bits {{DLOG795}}.

  3. Expanding on the previous point, just a handful of very large computations allow an attacker to cheaply decrypt a relatively large fraction of FFDHE traffic (namely, traffic encrypted using particular standardized groups) {{weak-dh}}.

  4. When secrets are not fully ephemeral, FFDHE suffers from the {{Raccoon}} side channel attack. (Note that FFDH is inherently vulnerable to the Raccoon attack unless constant-time mitigations are employed.)

  5. FFDHE groups may have small subgroups, which enables several attacks {{subgroups}}.

The problems affecting RSA key exchange in TLS 1.2 are as follows:

  1. RSA key exchange offers no forward secrecy, by construction.

  2. RSA key exchange may be vulnerable to Bleichenbacher's attack {{BLEI}}. Experience shows that variants of this attack arise every few years because implementing the relevant countermeasure correctly is difficult (see {{ROBOT}}, {{NEW-BLEI}}, {{DROWN}}).

  3. In addition to the above point, there is no convenient mechanism in TLS 1.2 for the domain separation of keys. Therefore, a single endpoint that is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher's attack would affect all endpoints sharing the same RSA key (see {{XPROT}}, {{DROWN}}).

Given these problems, this document updates {{!RFC4346}}, {{!RFC5246}}, {{!RFC4162}}, {{!RFC6347}}, {{!RFC5932}}, {{!RFC5288}}, {{!RFC6209}}, {{!RFC6367}}, {{!RFC8422}}, {{!RFC5289}}, and {{!RFC5469}} to remediate the above problems.

Requirements

{::boilerplate bcp14}

Non-Ephemeral Diffie Hellman {#non-ephemeral}

Clients MUST NOT offer non-ephemeral FFDH cipher suites in TLS 1.2 connections. (Note that TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by {{!RFC8996}} and TLS 1.3 does not support FFDH {{!RFC8446}}.) This includes all cipher suites listed in the table in {{appendix-dh}}.

Clients SHOULD NOT offer non-ephemeral ECDH cipher suites in TLS 1.2 connections. (Note that TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by {{!RFC8996}} and TLS 1.3 does not support ECDH {{!RFC8446}}.) This includes all cipher suites listed in the table in {{appendix-ecdh}}.

Ephemeral Finite Field Diffie Hellman {#dhe}

Clients and servers MAY offer fully ephemeral FFDHE cipher suites in TLS 1.2 connections under the following conditions:

  1. Clients and servers MUST NOT reuse ephemeral DHE public keys across TLS connections for all existing (and future) TLS versions. Doing so invalidates forward secrecy properties of these connections. For DHE, such reuse may also lead to vulnerabilities such as those used in the {{Raccoon}} attack. See {{sec-considerations}} for related discussion.

  2. The group size is at least 2048 bits.

(Note that TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by {{!RFC8996}}. TLS 1.3 satisfies the second point above {{!RFC8446}} and is not vulnerable to the {{Raccoon}} Attack.)

We note that, previously, supporting the broadest range of clients would have required supporting either RSA key exchange or 1024-bit FFDHE. This is no longer the case, and it is possible to support most clients released since circa 2015 using 2048-bit FFDHE or more modern key exchange methods, and without RSA key exchange {{server_side_tls}}.

All the cipher suites that do not meet the above requirements are listed in the table in {{appendix-dhe}}.

RSA {#rsa}

Clients and servers MUST NOT offer RSA cipher suites in TLS 1.2 connections. (Note that TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by {{!RFC8996}}, and TLS 1.3 does not support static RSA {{!RFC8446}}.) This includes all cipher suites listed in the table in {{appendix-rsa}}. Note that these cipher suites are already marked as not recommended in the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry.

IANA Considerations

This document makes no requests to IANA. Note that all cipher suites listed in {{rsa}} and in {{non-ephemeral}} are already marked as not recommended in the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry.

Security Considerations {#sec-considerations}

Non-ephemeral finite field DH cipher suites (TLS_DH_*), as well as ephemeral key reuse for finite field DH cipher suites, are prohibited due to the {{Raccoon}} attack. Both are already considered bad practice since they do not provide forward secrecy. However, Raccoon revealed that timing side channels in processing TLS premaster secrets may be exploited to reveal the encrypted premaster secret.

As for non-ephemeral elliptic curve DH cipher suites, forgoing forward secrecy not only allows retroactive decryption in the event of key compromise but may also enable a broad category of attacks where the attacker exploits key reuse to repeatedly query a cryptographic secret.

This category includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the following examples:

  1. Invalid curve attacks, where the attacker exploits key reuse to repeatedly query and eventually learn the key itself. These attacks have been shown to be practical against real-world TLS implementations {{ICA}}.

  2. Side channel attacks, where the attacker exploits key reuse and an additional side channel to learn a cryptographic secret. As one example of such attacks, refer to {{MAY4}}.

  3. Fault attacks, where the attacker exploits key reuse and incorrect calculations to learn a cryptographic secret. As one example of such attacks, see {{PARIS256}}.

Such attacks are often implementation-dependent, including the above examples. However, these examples demonstrate that building a system that reuses keys and avoids this category of attacks is difficult in practice. In contrast, avoiding key reuse not only prevents decryption in the event of key compromise, but also precludes this category of attacks altogether. Therefore, this document discourages the reuse of elliptic curve DH public keys.

Acknowledgments

This document was inspired by discussions on the TLS WG mailing list and a suggestion by Filippo Valsorda following the release of the {{Raccoon}} attack. Thanks to Christopher A. Wood for writing up the initial draft of this document.

--- back

DH Cipher Suites Deprecated by This Document {#appendix-dh}

Ciphersuite Reference
TLS_DH_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4346}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5469}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4346}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5469}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 {{!RFC4346}}{{RFC6347}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 {{!RFC5246}}{{RFC6347}}
TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4346}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5469}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4162}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4162}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4162}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}

ECDH Cipher Suites Whose Use Is Discouraged by This Document {#appendix-ecdh}

Ciphersuite Reference
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA {{!RFC8422}}{{RFC6347}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA {{!RFC8422}}{{RFC6347}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA {{!RFC8422}}{{RFC6347}}
TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC8422}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5289}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC5289}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5289}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC5289}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC5289}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC5289}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC5289}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC5289}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}

DHE Cipher Suites Refered to by This Document {#appendix-dhe}

Ciphersuite Reference
TLS_DHE_DSS_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4346}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5469}}{{SC-tls-des-idea-ciphers-to-historic}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4346}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5469}}{{SC-tls-des-idea-ciphers-to-historic}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA {{!RFC4785}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA {{!RFC4279}}{{!RFC6347}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4279}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4279}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4279}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4162}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4162}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM {{!RFC6655}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM {{!RFC6655}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 {{!RFC6655}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 {{!RFC6655}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM {{!RFC6655}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM {{!RFC6655}}
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 {{!RFC7905}}
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 {{!RFC7905}}

RSA Cipher Suites Deprecated by This Document {#appendix-rsa}

Ciphersuite Reference
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5 {{!RFC4346}}{{!RFC6347}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 {{!RFC5246}}{{!RFC6347}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA {{!RFC5246}}{{!RFC6347}}
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5 {{!RFC4346}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5469}}{{SC-tls-des-idea-ciphers-to-historic}}
TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4346}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5469}}{{SC-tls-des-idea-ciphers-to-historic}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA {{!RFC4785}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5246}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA {{!RFC4279}}{{!RFC6347}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4279}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4279}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4279}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA {{!RFC4162}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC5288}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 {{!RFC5487}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC5932}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6209}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 {{!RFC6367}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM {{!RFC6655}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM {{!RFC6655}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 {{!RFC6655}}
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 {{!RFC6655}}
TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 {{!RFC7905}}