index.bs

<pre class="metadata">
Title: Permissions Policy
Shortname: permissions-policy
Level: 1
Indent: 2
Status: ED
Group: WebAppSec
URL: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-permissions-policy/
Editor: Ian Clelland, Google, iclelland@google.com
Abstract: This specification defines a mechanism that allows developers to selectively enable and disable use of various browser features and APIs.
Repository: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/
Markup Shorthands: css no, markdown yes
</pre>
<pre class="link-defaults">
spec:dom; type:interface; for:/; text:Document
spec:html; type:dfn; for:/; text:origin
spec:fetch; type:dfn; for:Response; text:response
spec:html; type:dfn; for:/; text:browsing context
spec:html; type:element; text:script
spec:html; type:element; text:link
spec:fetch; type:dfn; text:name
spec:fetch; type:dfn; text:value
</pre>
<pre class="anchors">
spec:payment-request; urlPrefix: https://w3c.github.io/payment-request/
  type: dfn
    text: PaymentRequest; url: dom-paymentrequest
spec:reporting; urlPrefix: https://w3c.github.io/reporting/
  type: dfn
    text: report type
    text: visible to reportingobservers
spec: HEADER-STRUCTURE; urlPrefix: https://httpwg.org/http-extensions/draft-ietf-httpbis-header-structure.html#
  type: dfn
    text: sh-dictionary; url: dictionary
</pre>
<pre class="biblio">
{
  "HEADER-STRUCTURE": {
    "authors": [
      "Mark Nottingham",
      "Poul-Henning Kamp"
    ],
    "href": "https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-header-structure-18",
    "title": "Structured Field Values for HTTP",
    "status": "Draft",
    "publisher": "IETF"
  }
}
</pre>
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<section>
  <h2 id="introduction">Introduction</h2>
  <p>The web platform provides an ever-expanding set of features and APIs,
  offering richer functionality, better developer ergonomics, and improved
  performance. However, a missing piece is the ability for the developer to
  selectively enable, disable, or modify the behavior of some of these browser
  features and APIs within their application:</p>
  <ol>
    <li>The developer may want to selectively *disable* access to certain
    browser features and APIs to "lock down" their application, as a security
    or performance precaution, to prevent own and third-party content executing
    within their application from introducing unwanted or unexpected behaviors
    within their application.</li>
    <li>The developer may want to selectively *enable* access to certain
    browser features and APIs which may be disabled by default - e.g. some
    features may be disabled by default in embedded context unless explicitly
    enabled; some features may be subject to other policy requirements.</li>
    <li>The developer may want to use the policy to assert a promise to a
    client or an embedder about the use—or lack of thereof—of certain features
    and APIs. For example, to enable certain types of "fast path" optimizations
    in the browser, or to assert a promise about conformance with some
    requirements set by other embedders - e.g. various social networks, search
    engines, and so on.</li>
  </ol>
  <p>This specification defines a policy mechanism that addresses the above use
  cases.</p>
  <p class="note">This specification used to be named Feature Policy.</p>
</section>
<section>
  <h2 id="examples">Examples</h2>
  <div class="example">
    <p>SecureCorp Inc. wants to disable use of Fullscreen and Geolocation APIs
    within their application. It can do so by delivering the following HTTP
    response header to define a permissions policy:</p>
    <pre>
      <a http-header>Permissions-Policy</a>: fullscreen=(), geolocation=()</pre>
    <p>By specifying an empty origin list, the specified features will be
    disabled for all documents, including nested documents, regardless of their
    origin.</p>
  </div>
  <div class="example">
    <p>Geolocation is disabled by default in all cross-origin frames. FastCorp
    Inc. has a specific cross-origin iframe on their site for which it wants to
    enable geolocation. It can do so by including an "<code>allow</code>"
    attribute on the iframe element:</p>
    <pre>&lt;iframe src="https://other.com/map" <a href="#iframe-allow-attribute">allow</a>="geolocation"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;</pre>
    <p>Iframe attributes can selectively enable features in certain frames, and
    not in others, even if those contain documents from the same origin.</p>
  </div>
  <div class="example">
    <p>SecureCorp Inc. wants to completely disable use of the Geolocation API
    within all browsing contexts except for its own origin and those whose
    origin is "<code>https://example.com</code>", even in the presence of an
    attacker who can embed their own iframes on SecureCorp's pages. It can do
    this by delivering the following HTTP response header to define a restricted
    permissions policy for Geolocation:</p>
    <pre>
      <a http-header>Permissions-Policy</a>: geolocation=(self "https://example.com")</pre>
    <p>The <a>allowlist</a> is a list of one or more origins, which can include
    the application's origin, optionally with the keyword "<code>self</code>",
    and any third-party origin.</p>
    <p>With this policy in effect, it can then use the "<code>allow</code>"
    iframe attribute as usual to grant geolocation to certain frames, but only
    those frames hosting content from http://example.com or SecureCorp itself
    will actually be granted the ability to use that API.</p>
  </div>
</section>
<section>
  <h2 id="other-and-related-mechanisms">Other and related mechanisms</h2>
  <p>[[HTML5]] defines a <{iframe/sandbox}> attribute for <{iframe}> elements
  that allows developers to reduce the risk of including potentially untrusted
  content by imposing restrictions on content's abilities - e.g. prevent it
  from submitting forms, running scripts and plugins, and more. The
  [=sandbox=] directive defined by [[CSP2]] extends this capability to any
  resource, framed or not, to ask for the same set of restrictions - e.g. via an
  HTTP response header (<code>Content-Security-Policy: sandbox</code>). These
  mechanisms enable the developer to:</p>
  <ul>
    <li>Set and customize a sandbox policy on any resource via CSP.</li>
    <li>Set and customize individual sandbox policies on each
    <code>iframe</code> element within their application.</li>
  </ul>
  <p>However, there are several limitations to the above mechanism: the
  developer cannot automatically apply a policy across all contexts, which
  makes it hard or impossible to enforce consistently in some cases (e.g. due
  to third-party content injecting frames, which the developer does not
  control); there is no mechanism to selectively enable features that may be
  off by default; the sandbox mechanism automatically disables all sandbox
  features, and requires the developer to opt back in to each of them, so it is
  impossible to extend the set of sandbox features without significant
  compatibility risk.</p>
  <p>Permissions Policy is intended to be used in combination with the sandbox
  mechanism (i.e. it does not duplicate feature controls already covered by
  sandbox), and provides an extensible mechanism that addresses the above
  limitations.</p>
</section>
<section>
  <h2 id="framwork">Framework</h2>
  <section>
    <h3 id="features">Policy-controlled Features</h3>
    <p>A <dfn export
    data-lt="policy-controlled feature">policy-controlled feature</dfn> is an
    API or behaviour which can be enabled or disabled in a document by referring
    to it in a <a>permissions policy</a>.
    <div class="note">For brevity, policy-controlled features will often be
    referred to in this document simply as "Features". Unless otherwise
    indicated, the term "feature" refers to <a>policy-controlled features</a>.
    Other specifications, defining such features, should use the longer term to
    avoid any ambiguity.</div>
    <div class="issue">This spec currently only deals with features defined in
    Documents. We should figure out how to word this to include the possibility
    of features and permissions policies in Workers and Worklets as well.</div>
    <p><a>Policy-controlled features</a> are identified by tokens, which are
    character strings used in <a>policy directives</a>.
    <p>Each <a>policy-controlled feature</a> has a <a>default allowlist</a>,
    which defines whether that feature is available in documents in top-level
    browsing contexts, and how access to that feature is inherited in child
    browsing contexts.</p>
    <p>A user agent has a set of <dfn>supported features</dfn>, which is the set
    of <a data-lt="policy-controlled feature">features</a> which it allows to be
    controlled through policies. User agents are not required to support every
    <a data-lt="policy-controlled feature">feature</a>.</p>
    <div class="note">
      The <a>policy-controlled features</a> themselves are not themselves part
      of this framework. A non-normative list of currently-defined features is
      maintained as a
      <a href="https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/blob/master/features.md">companion
      document</a> alongside this specification.
    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="policies">Policies</h3>
    <p>A <dfn>permissions policy</dfn> is a struct with the following items:</p>
    <ul>
      <li>An <a data-lt="inherited policy">inherited policy</a>.
      </li>
      <li>A <a data-lt="declared policy">declared policy</a>.
      </li>
    </ul>
    <p>An <dfn export>empty permissions policy</dfn> is a <a>permissions
    policy</a> that has an <a>inherited policy</a> which contains
    "<code>Enabled</code>" for every <a>supported feature</a>, and a <a>declared
    policy</a> which is an empty map.</p>
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="inherited-policies">Inherited policies</h3>
    <p>An <dfn data-lt="inherited policy|inherited policies">inherited
    policy</dfn> is an ordered map from <a
    data-lt="policy-controlled feature">features</a> to either
    "<code>Enabled</code>" or "<code>Disabled</code>".</p>
    <p>The <dfn export>inherited policy for a feature</dfn> <var>feature</var>
    is the value in the <a>inherited policy</a> whose key is <var>feature</var>.
    After a <a>permissions policy</a> has been initialized, its <a>inherited
    policy</a> will contain a value for each <a>supported feature</a>.</p>
    <div class="note">
    <p>Each document in a frame tree inherits a set of policies from its parent
    frame, or in the case of the top-level document, from the defined defaults
    for each <a>policy-controlled feature</a>. This inherited policy determines
    the initial state ("<code>Enabled</code>" or "<code>Disabled</code>") of
    each feature, and whether it can be controlled by a <a>declared policy</a>
    in the document.
    </p>
    <p>In a {{Document}} in a [=top-level browsing context=], the inherited
    policy is based on defined defaults for each feature.</p>
    <p>In a {{Document}} in a [=child browsing context=], the inherited policy
    is based on the parent document's permissions policy, as well as the [=child
    browsing context=]'s <a>container policy</a>.
    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="declared-policies">Declared policies</h3>
    <p>A <dfn data-lt="declared policy|declared permissions policy">declared
    policy</dfn> is an ordered map from
    <a data-lt="policy-controlled feature">features</a> to <a>allowlists</a>.
    </p>
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="header-policies">Header policies</h3>
    <p>A <dfn>header policy</dfn> is a list of <a>policy directives</a>
    delivered via an HTTP header with a document. This forms the document's
    <a>permissions policy</a>'s <a>declared policy</a>.</p>
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="container-policies">Container policies</h3>
    <p>In addition to the <a>header policy</a>, each [=nested browsing context=]
    has a <dfn export>container policy</dfn>, which is a <a>policy directive</a>,
    which may be empty. The <a>container policy</a> can set by attributes on the
    [=browsing context container=].</p>
    <p>The <a>container policy</a> for a [=nested browsing context=] influences
    the <a>inherited policy</a> of any document loaded into that context.
    (See <a href="#algo-define-inherited-policy"></a>)</p>
    <div class="note">
      Currently, the <a>container policy</a> cannot be set directly, but is
      indirectly set by <code>iframe</code> "<a href=
      "#iframe-allowfullscreen-attribute"><code>allowfullscreen</code></a>",
      and "<a href="#iframe-allow-attribute"><code>allow</code></a>" attributes.
      Future revisions to this spec may introduce a mechanism to explicitly
      declare the full <a>container policy</a>.
    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="policy-directives">Policy directives</h3>
    <p>A <dfn data-lt="policy directive|policy directives">policy
    directive</dfn> is an ordered map, mapping <a>policy-controlled features</a>
    to corresponding <a>allowlists</a> of origins.</p>
    <p>A <a>policy directive</a> is represented in HTTP headers as the
    serialization of an <a>sh-dictionary</a> structure, and in and HTML
    attributes as its ASCII serialization.</p>
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="allowlists">Allowlists</h3>
    <p>A permissions policy <dfn export
    lt="allowlist|allowlists">allowlist</dfn> is conceptually a set of
    [=origins=]. An <a>allowlist</a> may be either:
    <ul>
      <li><dfn>The special value <code>*</code></dfn>, which represents every
      origin, or</li>
      <li>An <a>ordered set</a> of [=origins=]</li>
    </ul>
    <div class="note">
      The keywords <code>'self'</code>, <code>'src'</code>, and
      <code>'none'</code> can appear in the text representation of allowlists in
      headers and attribute strings. These keywords are always interpreted in
      context during parsing, and only the origins which they refer to are
      stored in the allowlist. The keywords themselves are not part of the
      allowlist.
    </div>
    <p>To determine whether an <a>allowlist</a> <dfn>matches</dfn> an origin
    <var>origin</var>, run these steps:
    <ol>
      <li>If the <a>allowlist</a> is <a>the special value <code>*</code></a>,
      then return true.</li>
      <li>Otherwise, for each <var>item</var> in the <a>allowlist</a>:
        <ol>
          <li>If <var>item</var> is [=same origin-domain=] with
          <var>origin</var>, then return true.</li>
        </ol>
      </li>
      <li>return false.</li>
    </ol>
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="default-allowlists">Default Allowlists</h3>
    <p>Every <a>policy-controlled feature</a> has a <dfn export lt=
    "default allowlist|default allowlists">default allowlist</dfn>. The
    <a>default allowlist</a> determines whether the feature is allowed in a
    document with no declared policy in a top-level browsing context, and also
    whether access to the feature is automatically delegated to documents in
    child browsing contexts.</p>
    <p>The <a>default allowlist</a> for a <a
    data-lt="policy-controlled feature">feature</a> is one of these values:</p>
    <dl>
      <dt><dfn for="default allowlist" export><code>*</code></dfn></dt>
      <dd>The feature is allowed in documents in top-level browsing contexts by
      default, and when allowed, is allowed by default to documents in child
      browsing contexts.</dd>
      <dt><dfn for="default allowlist" export><code>'self'</code></dfn></dt>
      <dd>The feature is allowed in documents in top-level browsing contexts by
      default, and when allowed, is allowed by default to same-origin domain
      documents in child browsing contexts, but is disallowed by default in
      cross-origin documents in child browsing contexts.</dd>
    </dl>
  </section>
</section>
<section>
  <h2 id="serialization">Permissions Policy Serialization</h2>
  <section>
    <h3 id="ascii-serialization">HTML attribute serialization</h3>
    <p><a>Policy Directives</a> in HTML attributes are represented as their
    ASCII serialization, with the following ABNF:
    <pre class="abnf">
      <dfn>serialized-permissions-policy</dfn> = <a>serialized-policy-directive</a> *(";" <a>serialized-policy-directive</a>)
      <dfn>serialized-policy-directive</dfn> = <a>feature-identifier</a> RWS <a>allow-list</a>
      <dfn>feature-identifier</dfn> = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
      <dfn>allow-list</dfn> = <a>allow-list-value</a> *(RWS <a>allow-list-value</a>)
      <dfn>allow-list-value</dfn> = <a>serialized-origin</a> / "*" / "'self'" / "'src'" / "'none'"
    </pre>
    <p><dfn><code>serialized-origin</code></dfn> is the
    <a>serialization of an origin</a>. However, the code points U+0027 ('),
    U+0021 (*), U+002C (,) and U+003B (;) MUST NOT appear in the serialization.
    If they are required, they must be percent-encoded as "`%27`", "`%2A`",
    "`%2C`" or "`%3B`", respectively.</p>
    <div class="note">
      The string "<code>'self'</code>" may be used as an origin in an allowlist.
      When it is used in this way, it will refer to the origin of the document
      which contains the permissions policy.
    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="structured-header-serialization">Structured header serialization</h3>
    <a>Policy Directives</a> in HTTP headers are represented as Structured
    Fields. [[!HEADER-STRUCTURE]]

    In this representation, a <a>policy directive</a> is represented by a
    Dictionary.

    Each Dictionary Member associates a <a>feature</a> with an <a>allowlist</a>.
    The Member Names must be Tokens. If a token does not name a supported
    feature, then the Dictionary Member will be ignored by the processing steps.

    The Member Values represent <a>allowlists</a>, and must be one of:
    * a String containing the ASCII <a>serialization of an origin</a>
    * the Token `*`
    * the Token `self`
    * an Inner List containing zero or more of the above items.

    Any other items inside of an Inner List will be ignored by the processing
    steps, and the Member Value will be processed as if they were not present.
    Member Values of any other form will cause the entire Dictionary Member to
    be ignored by the processing steps.
  </section>
</section>
<section>
  <h2 id="delivery">Delivery</h2>
  <section>
    <h3 id="permissions-policy-http-header-field">Permissions-Policy HTTP Header
    Field</h3>
    <p>The &#96;<dfn export http-header
    id="permissions-policy-header"><code>Permissions-Policy</code></dfn>&#96;
    HTTP header field can be used in the [=response=] (server to client) to
    communicate the <a>permissions policy</a> that should be enforced by the
    client.</p>
    <p><a>Permissions-Policy</a> is a structured header. Its value must be a
    dictionary. It's ABNF is:
    <pre class="abnf">
      PermissionsPolicy = <a>sh-dictionary</a>
    </pre>
    The semantics of the dictionary are defined in
    [[#structured-header-serialization]].

    The processing steps are defined in [[#algo-construct-policy]].
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="iframe-allow-attribute">The <code>allow</code> attribute of the
    <code>iframe</code> element</h3>
    <p><{iframe}> elements have an "<code>allow</code>" attribute, which
    contains an <a href="#serialized-policy-directive">ASCII-serialized policy
    directive</a>.</p>
    <p>The allowlist for the features named in the attribute may be empty; in
    that case, the default value for the allowlist is <code>'src'</code>, which
    represents the origin of the URL in the iframe's <{iframe/src}> attribute.
    </p>
    <p>When not empty, the "<code>allow</code>" attribute will result in adding
    an <a>allowlist</a> for each recognized
    <a data-lt="policy-controlled feature">feature</a> to the <{iframe}>
    element's [=nested browsing context=]'s <a>container policy</a>, when it is
    constructed.</p>
  </section>
  <section>
    <h3 id="legacy-attributes">Additional attributes to support legacy
    features</h3>
    <p>Some <a data-lt="policy-controlled feature">features</a> controlled by
    Permissions Policy have existing iframe attributes defined. This
    specification redefines these attributes to act as declared policies for the
    iframe element.</p>
    <section>
      <h4 id="iframe-allowfullscreen-attribute">allowfullscreen</h4>
      <p>The "<code>allowfullscreen</code>" iframe attribute controls access to
      {{requestFullscreen()}}.</p>
      <p>If the iframe element has an "<code>allow</code>" attribute whose
      value contains the token "<code>fullscreen</code>", then the
      "<code>allowfullscreen</code>" attribute must have no effect.</p>
      <p>Otherwise, the presence of an "<code>allowfullscreen</code>" attribute
      on an iframe will result in adding an <a>allowlist</a> of <code>*</code>
      for the "<code>fullscreen</code>" feature to the <{iframe}> element's
      [=nested browsing context=]'s <a>container policy</a>, when it is
      constructed.</p>
      <div class="note">
        This is different from the behaviour of <code>&lt;iframe
        allow="fullscreen"&gt;</code>, and is for compatibility with existing
        uses of <code>allowfullscreen</code>. If
        <code>allow="fullscreen"</code> and <code>allowfullscreen</code> are
        both present on an iframe element, then the more restrictive allowlist
        of <code>allow="fullscreen"</code> will be used.
      </div>
    </section>
  </section>
</section>
<section>
  <h2 id="introspection">Policy Introspection from Scripts</h2>
  <section class="non-normative">
  <h3 id="introspection-overview">Overview</h3>
  <p>The current policy which is in effect in a document can be observed by
  scripts. This can be used to make decisions, for instance, about what user
  interface to display, in cases where it is not possible to determine otherwise
  whether a feature is enabled or not. (Some features may not have any
  observable failure mode, or may have unwanted side effects to feature
  detection.)</p>
  <p>Documents and iframes both provide a {{PermissionsPolicy}} object which can
  be used to inspect the permissions policies which apply to them.</p>
  <h4 id="document-policies">Document policies</h4>
  <p>To retreive the currently effective policy, use
  <code>document.permissionsPolicy</code>. This returns a {{PermissionsPolicy}}
  object, which can be used to:
    * query the state (allowed or denied) in the current document for a given
        feature,
    * get a list of all available features (allowed or not) in the current
        document,
    * get a list of all allowed features in the current document, or
    * get the allowlist for a given feature in the current document.
  </p>

  <div class="example">
  <pre>
  &lt;!doctype html&gt;
  &lt;script&gt;
   const policy = document.permissionsPolicy;

   // This will be true if this document can use WebUSB.
   const can_use_usb = policy.allowsFeature('usb');

   // True if a new frame at https://example.com will be allowed to use WebXR.
   if (policy.allowsFeature('xr-spatial-tracking', 'https://example.com')) {
     // Show UI to create frame at https://example.com.
   } else {
     // Show an alternative UI.
   }

   // Get the list of origins which are allowed to request payment. The result
   // will be a list of explicit origins, or the single element ['*'] if all
   // origins are allowed.
   const allowed_payment_origins = policy.getAllowlistForFeature('payment');

   // Get the list of all features supported in this document (even those
   // which are not allowed). The result will be an array of strings, each
   // representing a feature.
   const all_features = policy.features();
   if (all_features.includes('geolocation')) {
     // Append a child frame to a third-party map service.
   }
  &lt;/script&gt;
  </pre>
  </div>
  <h4 id="frame-policies">Frame policies</h4>
  <p>It is also possible to inspect the policy on an iframe element, from the
  document which contains it. The policy object in this case represents the
  <a>observable policy</a> for the frame, which depends only on the current
  document and the attributes of the iframe element. It does not reveal whether
  a feature is actually currently allowed in the frame, as the document in the
  frame may have applied its own policy via an HTTP header, or may have
  navigated away from its initial location to a new origin. Revealing the
  effective policy in the iframe element's nested browsing context in that case
  could leak information about the behaviour of a cross-origin document.</p>

  <div class="example">
  <pre>
  &lt;!doctype html&gt;
  &lt;iframe id="frame" allow="fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking"&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;
  &lt;script&gt;
   const iframe_element = document.getElementById("frame");
   const iframe_policy = iframe_element.permissionsPolicy;

   // True if the framed document will be allowed to use WebXR
   if (iframe_policy.allowsFeature('xr-spatial-tracking')) {
    // display virtual reality controls
   }
  &lt;/script&gt;
  </pre>
  </div>

  <p>The <a>observable policy</a> on an iframe element is independent of any
  actual content loaded into the frame (to avoid cross-origin information
  leakage,) or even whether it is in a document tree.</p>

  <div class="example">
  <pre>
  &lt;!doctype html&gt;
  &lt;!-- this frame should not be allowed to use fullscreen when the document
      in its src attribute is loaded in it --&gt;
  &lt;iframe id="frame" allow="fullscreen https://example.com" src="https://example.net/" &gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;
  &lt;script&gt;
   const iframe_element = document.getElementById("frame");
   const iframe_policy = iframe_element.permissionsPolicy;
   // This will be false, as the URL listed in the src attribute is not allowed
   // by policy to use fullscreen.
   const is_fullscreen_allowed_in_frame = iframe_policy.allowsFeature('fullscreen');

   const new_frame = document.createElement('iframe');
   new_frame.allow = 'sync-xhr';
   // This will be true, as the iframe is allowed to use sync-xhr at whatever URL is
   // mentioned in its src attribute, even though that attribute is not yet set.
   const is_sync_xhr_allowed = new_frame.permissionsPolicy.allowsFeature('sync-xhr');
  &lt;/script&gt;
  </pre>
  </div>
  </section>

  <section>
    <h3 id="the-policy-object">The permissionsPolicy object</h3>
    <pre class="idl">
[Exposed=Window]
interface PermissionsPolicy {
  boolean allowsFeature(DOMString feature, optional DOMString origin);
  sequence&lt;DOMString&gt; features();
  sequence&lt;DOMString&gt; allowedFeatures();
  sequence&lt;DOMString&gt; getAllowlistForFeature(DOMString feature);
};

partial interface Document {
    [SameObject] readonly attribute PermissionsPolicy permissionsPolicy;
};

partial interface HTMLIFrameElement {
    [SameObject] readonly attribute PermissionsPolicy permissionsPolicy;
};
    </pre>
    <p>A {{PermissionsPolicy}} object has an <dfn>associated node</dfn>, which
    is a {{Node}}. The <a>associated node</a> is set when the
    {{PermissionsPolicy}} object is created.</p>
    <p>A {{PermissionsPolicy}} object has a <dfn>default origin</dfn>, which is
    an <a>origin</a>, whose value depends on the state of the
    {{PermissionsPolicy}} object's <a>associated node</a>:
    * If the {{PermissionsPolicy}} object's <a>associated node</a> is a
        {{Document}}, then its <a>default origin</a> is the {{Document}}'s
        <a>origin</a>.
    * If the {{PermissionsPolicy}} object's <a>associated node</a> is an
        {{Element}}, then its <a>default origin</a> is the {{Element}}'s
        <a>declared origin</a>.

    <p>Each {{Document}} has a <dfn for="Document">policy object</dfn>, which is
    a {{PermissionsPolicy}} instance whose <a>associated node</a> is that
    {{Document}}.</p>
    <p>A {{Document}}'s {{Document/permissionsPolicy}} IDL attribute, on
    getting, must return the {{Document}}'s [=Document/policy object=].</p>

    <p>Each <{iframe}> element has a <dfn for="iframe">policy object</dfn>,
    which is a {{PermissionsPolicy}} instance whose <a>associated node</a> is
    that element.</p>
    <p>An <{iframe}>'s {{HTMLIFrameElement/permissionsPolicy}} IDL attribute, on
    getting, must return the <{iframe}>'s [=iframe/policy object=].</p>

    <p>The {{allowsFeature(feature, origin)}} method must run the following
    steps:
    1. If |origin| is omitted, set |origin| to this {{PermissionsPolicy}}
        object's <a>default origin</a>.
    2. Let |policy| be the <a>observable policy</a> for this
        {{PermissionsPolicy}} object's <a>associated node</a>.
    3. If |feature| is allowed by |policy| for |origin|, return true.
    4. Otherwise, return false.

    <p>The {{features()}} method must run the following steps:
    1. Set |result| to an empty ordered set.
    2. For each <a>supported feature</a> |feature|:
        1. Append |feature| to |result|.
    3. return result

    <p>The {{allowedFeatures()}} method must run the following steps:
    1. Set |result| to an empty ordered set.
    2. Let |origin| be this {{PermissionsPolicy}} object's <a>default
        origin</a>.
    3. Let |policy| be the <a>observable policy</a> for this
        {{PermissionsPolicy}} object's <a>associated node</a>.
    4. For each <a>supported feature</a> |feature|:
        1. If |feature| is allowed by |policy| for |origin|, append |feature| to
            |result|.
    5. return result

    <p>The {{getAllowlistForFeature(feature)}} method must run the following
    steps:
    1. Set |result| to an empty list
    2. Let |origin| be this {{PermissionsPolicy}} object's <a>default
        origin</a>.
    3. Let |policy| be the <a>observable policy</a> for this
        {{PermissionsPolicy}} object's <a>associated node</a>.
    4. If |feature| is not allowed in |policy| for |origin|, return |result|
    5. Let |allowlist| be |policy|'s declared policy[|feature|]
    6. If |allowlist| is the special value `*`, append "`*`" to |result|
    7. Otherwise, for each |origin| in |allowlist|:
        1. Append the <a lt="serialization of an origin">serialization</a> of
            |origin| to |result|
    8. Return |result|.

    <p>The <dfn>observable policy</dfn> for any Node is a <a>permissions
    policy</a>, which contains the information about the policy in the browsing
    context represented by that Node which is visible from the current browsing
    context.</p>

    <p>To get the <a>observable policy</a> for a Document |document|, return
    |document|'s permissions policy.</p>
    <p>To get the <a>observable policy</a> for an Element |node|, run the
    following steps:</p>
        1. Let |inherited policy| be a new ordered map.
        2. Let |declared policy| be a new ordered map.
        3. For each <a>supported feature</a> |feature|:
            1. Let |isInherited| be the result of running <a abstract-op>Define an
                inherited policy for feature in container at origin</a> on |feature|,
                |node| and |node|'s <a>declared origin</a>.
            2. Set |inherited policy|[|feature|] to |isInherited|.
        4. Return a new <a>permissions policy</a> with inherited policy
            |inherited policy| and declared policy |declared policy|.

    <p>To get the <dfn>declared origin</dfn> for an Element |node|, run the
    following steps:
        1. If |node|'s <a>node document</a>'s <a>sandboxed origin browsing
            context flag</a> is set, then return a unique opaque origin.
        2. If |node|'s <{iframe/sandbox}> attribute is set, and does not contain
            the <code>allow-same-origin</code> keyword, then return a unique
            opaque origin.
        3. If |node|'s <{iframe/srcdoc}> attribute is set, then return |node|'s
            <a>node document</a>'s origin.
        4. If |node|'s <{iframe/src}> attribute is set:
            1. Let |url| be the result of parsing |node|'s src attribute,
                relative to |node|'s <a>node document</a>.
            2. If |url| is not failure, return |url|'s origin.
        5. Return |node|'s <a>node document</a>'s origin.
    <p class="note">
      The <a>declared origin</a> concept is intended to represent the origin of
      the document which the embedding page intends to load into a frame. This
      means, for instance, that if the browser does not support the
      <code>sandbox</code> or <code>srcdoc</code> attributes, it should not take
      those attributes into account when computing the declared origin.
  </section>

</section>

<section>
  <h2 id="reporting">Reporting</h2>
  <p><dfn>Permissions policy violation reports</dfn> indicate that some behavior
  of the <a>Document</a> has <a>violated</a> a permissions policy. It is up to
  the specification of each individual policy-controlled feature to define what
  it means to <dfn data-lt="violate|violation|violated">violate</dfn> that
  policy, and how to determine when such a violation has occurred.</p>

  <p><a>Permissions policy violation reports</a> have the <a>report type</a>
  "permissions-policy-violation".</p>

  <p><a>Permissions policy violation reports</a> are <a>visible to
  <code>ReportingObserver</code>s</a>.

  <pre class="idl">
    [Exposed=Window]
    interface PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody : ReportBody {
      readonly attribute DOMString featureId;
      readonly attribute DOMString? sourceFile;
      readonly attribute long? lineNumber;
      readonly attribute long? columnNumber;
      readonly attribute DOMString disposition;
    };
  </pre>

  A <a>permissions policy violation report</a>'s [=report/body=], represented in
  JavaScript by {{PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody}}, contains the following
  fields:

    - <dfn for="PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody">featureId</dfn>: The
      string identifying the <a>policy-controlled feature</a> whose policy has
      been <a>violated</a>. This string can be used for grouping and counting
      related reports.

    - <dfn for="PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody">sourceFile</dfn>: If
      known, the file where the <a>violation</a> occured, or null otherwise.

    - <dfn for="PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody">lineNumber</dfn>: If
      known, the line number in
      [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/sourceFile=] where the
      <a>violation</a> occured, or null otherwise.

    - <dfn for="PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody">columnNumber</dfn>: If
      known, the column number in
      [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/sourceFile=] where the
      <a>violation</a> occured, or null otherwise.

    - <dfn for="PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody">disposition</dfn>: A
      string indicating whether the <a>violated</a> permissions policy was
      enforced in this case.
      [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/disposition=] will be set to
      "enforce" if the policy was enforced, or "report" if the <a>violation</a>
      resulted only in this report being generated (with no further action taken
      by the user agent in response to the violation).

      Note: There is currently no mechanism in place for enabling report-only
      mode, so [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/disposition=] will always
      be set to "enforce".
</section>

<section>
  <h2 id="algorithms">Algorithms</h2>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="process-response-policy">Process response policy</dfn> ## {#algo-process-response-policy}

    <div class="algorithm" data-algorithm="process-response-policy">
    Given a [=response=] (|response|) and an [=origin=] (|origin|), this
    algorithm returns a <a>declared permissions policy</a>.

    1. Let |parsed header| be the result of executing <a>get a structured
      field value</a> given "<code>Permissions-Policy</code>" and "dictionary" from
      |response|’s header list.
    1. If |parsed header| is null, abort these steps.
    1. Let |policy| be the result of executing <a abstract-op>Construct policy from
      dictionary and origin</a> on |parsed header| and |origin|.
    1. Return |policy|.

    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="construct-policy">Construct policy from dictionary and origin</dfn> ## {#algo-construct-policy}

    <div class="algorithm" data-algorithm="construct-policy">
    Given an <a>ordered map</a> (|dictionary|) and an [=origin=] (|origin|), this
    algorithm will return a <a>declared permissions policy</a>.
    1. Let |policy| be an empty ordered map.
    1. For each |feature-name| → |value| of |dictionary|:
        1. If |feature-name| does not identify any recognized
          <a>policy-controlled feature</a>, then continue.
        1. Let |feature| be the <a>policy-controlled feature</a> identified by
          |feature-name|.
        1. Let |allowlist| be a new <a>allowlist</a>.
        1. If |value| is the token `*`, or if |value| is a list which contains
          the token `*`, set |allowlist| to <a>the special value
          <code>*</code></a>.
        1. Otherwise:
            1. Set |allowlist| to an new <a>ordered set</a>.
            1. If |value| is the token `self`, append |origin| to |allowlist|.
            1. If |value| is a list, then for each |element| in |value|:
                1. If |element| is the token `self`, append |origin| to
                  |allowlist|.
                1. Otherwise, let |result| be the result of executing the <a>URL
                  parser</a> on |element|.
                1. If |result| is not failure:
                    1. Let |target| be the origin of |result|.
                    1. If |target| is not an opaque origin, append |target| to
                      |allowlist|.
        1. Set |policy|[|feature|] to |allowlist|.
    1. Return |policy|.

    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="parse-policy-directive">Parse policy directive</dfn> ## {#algo-parse-policy-directive}

    <div class="algorithm" data-algorithm="parse-policy-directive">
    Given a string (|value|), an [=origin=] (|container origin|), and an
    optional [=origin=] (|target origin|), this algorithm returns a <a>policy
    directive</a>.
    1. Let |directive| be an empty ordered map.
    1. For each |serialized-declaration| returned by <a
      lt="strictly split">strictly splitting |value| on the delimiter
      U+003B (;)</a>:
        1. Let |tokens| be the result of <a
          lt="split on ascii whitespace">splitting |serialized-declaration| on
          ASCII whitespace.</a>
        1. If |tokens| is an empty list, then continue.
        1. Let |feature-name| be the first element of |tokens|.
        1. If |feature-name| does not identify any recognized
          <a>policy-controlled feature</a>, then continue.
        1. Let |feature| be the <a>policy-controlled feature</a> identified by
          |feature-name|.
        1. Let |targetlist| be the remaining elements, if any, of |tokens|.
        1. Let |allowlist| be a new <a>allowlist</a>.
        1. If any element of |targetlist| is the string "<code>*</code>", set
          |allowlist| to <a>the special value <code>*</code></a>.
        1. Otherwise:
            1. Set |allowlist| to an new <a>ordered set</a>.
            1. If |targetlist| is empty and |target origin| is given, append
              |target origin| to |allowlist|.
            1. For each |element| in |targetlist|:
                1. If |element| is an <a>ASCII case-insensitive</a> match for
                  "<code>'self'</code>", let |result| be |container origin|.
                1. If |target origin| is given, and |element| is an <a>ASCII
                  case-insensitive</a> match for "<code>'src'</code>", let
                  |result| be |target origin|.
                1. Otherwise, let |result| be the result of executing the <a>URL
                  parser</a> on |element|.
                1. If |result| is not failure:
                    1. Let |target| be the origin of |result|.
                    1. If |target| is not an opaque origin, append |target| to
                      |allowlist|.
        1. Set |directive|[|feature|] to |allowlist|.
    1. Return |directive|

    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="process-policy-attributes">Process permissions policy attributes</dfn> ## {#algo-process-policy-attributes}

    <div class="algorithm" data-algorithm="process-policy-attributes">
    Given an element (|element|), this algorithm returns a <a>container
    policy</a>, which may be empty.
    1. Let |container policy| be the result of running <a>Parse policy
      directive</a> on the value of |element|'s <code>allow</code> attribute,
      with <var ignore>container origin</var> set to the origin of |element|'s
      node document, and <var ignore>target origin</var> set to |element|'s
      <a>declared origin</a>.
    1. If |element| is an <{iframe}> element:
        1. If |element|'s <code>allowfullscreen</code> attribute is specified,
          and |container policy| does not contain an allowlist for
          <code>fullscreen</code>:
            1. Construct a new declaration for <code>fullscreen</code>, whose
              allowlist is <a>the special value <code>*</code></a>.
            1. Add |declaration| to |container policy|.
    1. Return |container policy|.

    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="create-for-browsingcontext">Create a Permissions Policy for a browsing context</dfn> ## {#algo-create-for-browsingcontext}

    <div class="algorithm" data-algorithm="create-for-browsingcontext">
    Given a <a>browsing context</a> (|browsingContext|), and an <a>origin</a>
    (|origin|) this algorithm returns a new <a>Permissions Policy</a>.
    1. Let |inherited policy| be a new ordered map.
    1. Let |declared policy| be a new ordered map.
    1. For each |feature| supported,
        1. Let |isInherited| be the result of running <a abstract-op>Define an
          inherited policy for feature in browsing context</a> on |feature|,
          |origin| and |browsingContext|.
        1. Set |inherited policy|[|feature|] to |isInherited|.
    1. Let |policy| be a new <a>permissions policy</a>, with inherited policy
      |inherited policy| and declared policy |declared policy|.
    1. Return |policy|.

    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="create-from-response">Create a Permissions Policy for a browsing context from response</dfn> ## {#algo-create-from-response}

    <div class="algorithm" data-algorithm="create-from-response">
    Given a <a>browsing context</a> (|browsingContext|), <a>origin</a>
    (|origin|), and a [=response=] (|response|), this algorithm returns a new
    <a>Permissions Policy</a>.
    1. Let |policy| be the result of running <a abstract-op>Create a Permissions
      Policy for a browsing context</a> given |browsingContext|, and |origin|.
    1. Let |d| be the result of running <a abstract-op>Process response
      policy</a> on |response| and |origin|.
    1. For each |feature| → |allowlist| of |d|:
        1. If |policy|'s <a>inherited policy</a>[|feature|] is true, then set
          |policy|'s <a>declared policy</a>[|feature|] to |allowlist|.
    1. Return |policy|.

    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="define-inherited-policy">Define an inherited policy for feature in browsing context</dfn> ## {#algo-define-inherited-policy}

    <div class="algorithm" data-algorithm="define-inherited-policy">
    Given a feature (|feature|), an <a>origin</a> (|origin|), and a <a>browsing
    context</a> (|browsingContext|), this algorithm returns the <a>inherited
    policy</a> for that feature.
    1. If |browsingContext| is the [=nested browsing context=] of a [=browsing
      context container=], return the result of executing <a abstract-op>Define
      an inherited policy for feature in container at origin</a> for |feature|
      in |browsingContext|'s <a>browsing context container</a> at |origin|.
    1. Otherwise, return "<code>Enabled</code>".

    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="define-inherited-policy-in-container">Define an inherited policy for feature in container at origin</dfn> ## {#algo-define-inherited-policy-in-container}

    <div class="algorithm"
    data-algorithm="define-inherited-policy-in-container">
    Given a feature (|feature|) a <a>browsing context container</a>
    (|container|), and an <a>origin</a> for a document in that container
    (|origin|), this algorithm returns the <a>inherited policy</a> for that
    feature.
    1. Let |policy| be |container|'s <a>node document</a>'s <a>Permissions
      Policy</a>
    1. If |policy|'s <a>inherited policy</a> for |feature| is
      "<code>Disabled</code>", return "<code>Disabled</code>".
    1. If |feature| is present in |policy|'s <a>declared policy</a>, and the
      <a>allowlist</a> for |feature| in |policy|'s <a>declared policy</a> does
      not <a>match</a> |origin|, then return "<code>Disabled</code>".
    1. Let |container policy| be the result of running <a abstract-op>Process
      permissions policy attributes</a> on |container|.
    1. If |feature| is a key in |container policy|:
        1. If the <a>allowlist</a> for |feature| in |container policy|
          <a>matches</a> |origin|, return "<code>Enabled</code>".
        1. Otherwise return "<code>Disabled</code>".
    1. If |feature|'s <a>default allowlist</a> is <code>*</code>, return
      "<code>Enabled</code>".
    1. If |feature|'s <a>default allowlist</a> is <code>'self'</code>, and
      |origin| is [=same origin=] with |container|'s <a>node document</a>'s
      origin, return "<code>Enabled</code>".
    1. Otherwise return "<code>Disabled</code>".

    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="is-feature-enabled">Is feature enabled in document for origin?</dfn> ## {#algo-is-feature-enabled}

    <div class="algorithm" data-algorithm="is-feature-enabled">
    Given a feature (|feature|), a {{Document}} object
    (|document|), and an [=origin=] (|origin|), this algorithm
    returns "<code>Disabled</code>" if |feature| should be considered
    disabled, and "<code>Enabled</code>" otherwise.</p>
    1. Let |policy| be |document|'s <a>Permissions Policy</a>
    1. If |policy|'s <a>inherited policy</a> for |feature| is Disabled, return
      "<code>Disabled</code>".
    1. If |feature| is present in |policy|'s <a>declared policy</a>:
        1. If the <a>allowlist</a> for |feature| in |policy|'s <a>declared
          policy</a> <a>matches</a> |origin|, then return
          "<code>Enabled</code>".
        1. Otherwise return "<code>Disabled</code>".
    1. If |feature|'s <a>default allowlist</a> is <code>*</code>, return
      "<code>Enabled</code>".
    1. If |feature|'s <a>default allowlist</a> is <code>'self'</code>, and
      |origin| is [=same origin=] with |document|'s origin, return
      "<code>Enabled</code>".
    1. Return "<code>Disabled</code>".

    </div>
  </section>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="report-permissions-policy-violation">Generate report for violation of permissions policy on settings</dfn> ## {#algo-report-permissions-policy-violation}

    <div class="algorithm" data-algorithm="report-permissions-policy-violation">
    Given a feature (|feature|), an <a>environment settings object</a>
    (|settings|), and an optional string (|group|), this algorithm generates a
    <a>report</a> about the <a>violation</a> of the policy for |feature|.

    1. Let |body| be a new {{PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody}}, initialized
      as follows:

        :   [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/featureId=]
        ::  |feature|'s string representation.
        :   [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/sourceFile=]
        ::  null
        :   [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/lineNumber=]
        ::  null
        :   [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/columnNumber=]
        ::  null
        :   [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/disposition=]
        ::  "enforce"

    1. If the user agent is currently executing script, and can extract the
      source file's URL, line number, and column number from |settings|, then
      set |body|'s [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/sourceFile=],
      [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/lineNumber=], and
      [=PermissionsPolicyViolationReportBody/columnNumber=] accordingly.

    1. If |group| is omitted, set |group| to "default".

    1. Execute [=reporting/generate and queue a report=] with |body|,
      "permissions-policy-violation", |group|, and |settings|.

    </div>

    Note: This algorithm should be called when a permissions policy has
    been <a>violated</a>.
  </section>
  <section>
    ## <dfn export abstract-op id="should-request-be-allowed-to-use-feature">Should request be allowed to use feature?</dfn> ## {#algo-should-request-be-allowed-to-use-feature}

    <div class="algorithm"
    data-algorithm="should-request-be-allowed-to-use-feature">
    Given a feature (|feature|) and a  <a for="/">request</a> (|request|), this
    algorithm returns <code>true</code> if the request should be allowed to use
    |feature|, and <code>false</code> otherwise.</p>
    1. Set |window| to |request|’s <a for="request">window</a>.
    1. If |window| is not a {{Window}}, return <code>false</code>.
       <div class="issue">Permissions Policy within non-Window contexts
       ({{WorkerGlobalScope}} or {{WorkletGlobalScope}}) is being figured out in
       <a href="https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/issues/207">issue
       #207</a>. After that’s resolved, update this algorithm to allow fetches
       initiated within these contexts to use policy-controlled features.
       *Until* that’s resolved, disallow all policy-controlled features (e.g.,
       sending Client Hints to third parties) in these contexts.</div>
    1. Set |document| to |window|’s <a>associated `Document`</a>.
    1. Let |origin| be |request|’s <a for="request">origin</a>.
    1. Let |result| be the result of executing <a abstract-op>Is feature
      enabled in document for origin?</a> on |feature|, |document|, and |origin|.
    1. If |result| is "<code>Enabled</code>", return <code>true</code>.
    1. Otherwise, return <code>false</code>.

    </div>
  </section>
</section>

<section>
  <h2 id="iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</h2>
  <p>The permanent message header field registry should be updated with the
  following registration [[!RFC3864]]:</p>
  <dl>
    <dt>Header field name</dt>
    <dd>Permissions-Policy</dd>
    <dt>Applicable protocol</dt>
    <dd>http</dd>
    <dt>Status</dt>
    <dd>standard</dd>
    <dt>Author/Change controller</dt>
    <dd>W3C</dd>
    <dt>Specification document</dt>
    <dd>
      <a href="">Permissions Policy API</a>
    </dd>
  </dl>
</section>
<section id="privacy" class="informative">
  <h2 id="privacy-and-security">Privacy and Security</h2>
  <p>This specification standardizes a mechanism for an embedding page to set a
  policy which will be enforced on an embedded page. Similar to iframe
  <{iframe/sandbox}>, this can be done without the express permission of the
  embedded page, which means that behaviors of existing features can be changed
  in published web sites, by embedding them in another document with an
  appropriate container policy.</p>

  <p>As such, the biggest privacy and security concerns are:</p>
  <ul>
    <li>Exposure of behavior in a cross-origin subframe to its embedder</li>
    <li>Unanticipated behavior changes in subframes controlled by the
    embedder</li>
  </ul>

  <p>To a degree, these concerns are already present in the web platform, and
  this specification attempts to at least not make them needlessly worse.</p>

  <p>Security and privacy issues may also be caused by the design of individual
  features, so care must be taken when integrating with this specification. This
  section attempts to provide some guidance as to what kinds of behaviors could
  cause such issues.</p>

  <h3 id="privacy-expose-behavior">Exposure of cross-origin behavior</h3>

  <p>Features should be designed such that a <a>violation</a> of the policy in a
  framed document is not observable by documents in other frames. For instance,
  a hypothetical feature which caused a event to be fired in the embedding
  document if it is used while disabled by policy, could be used to extract
  information about the state of an embedded document. If the feature is known
  only to be used while a user is logged in to the site, for instance, then the
  embedder could disable that feature for the frame, and then listen for the
  resulting events to determine whether or not the user is logged in.</p>

  <p>The introspection API is designed to only show information about a
  subframe's policy which could already be deduced by the embedding document.
  This <a>observable policy</a> is not affected by any HTTP headers delivered
  with the framed document, and does not change when the frame navigates itself,
  even if such navigation is to a different origin, where a different policy
  applies. Only navigations caused by setting the `src` attribute of the
  `<iframe>` element will cause the <a>observable policy</a> to be updated.</p>

  <h3 id="privacy-alter-behavior">Unanticipated behavior changes</h3>

  <p>The Permissions Policy mechanism grants a document the ability to control
  which features will and will not be availble in a subframe at the time it is
  loaded. When a feature represents an existing, long-standing behavior of the
  web platform, this may mean that existing published content on the web was not
  written with the expectation that a particular API could fail.</p>

  <div class="example">
    <p>As a practical (though contrived) example, consider a document which uses
    synchronous XMLHttpRequest to determine whether a user has sufficient
    privileges to access the page:</p>

    <pre>
      &lt;!DOCTYPE html&gt;
      &lt;h1&gt;Welcome to SecureCorp!&lt;/h1&gt;
      &lt;script&gt;
        var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
        req.open("GET", "/api/security_check.json", false);
        req.send();
        if (req.response == "untrusted user") {
          // User is not logged in; redirect to a safe page
          location.href = "/security_check_failed.html";
        }
      &lt;/script&gt;
      &lt;!-- Page continues with assumption that user is logged in --&gt;
    </pre>

    <p>If this document is embedded by a page which disables the
    "<code>sync-xhr</code>" feature, the call to `XMLHttpRequest.open()` would
    fail, and the security check would be bypassed.</p>
  </div>

  <p>Note that this sort of behavior forcing is already possible on the web:
  some features are only allowed in top-level documents, and not in any iframes,
  and iframe sandboxing can be used in a similar way to embed a frame without
  access to features which it may be depending on.</p>

  <p>In general, this concern is mitigated in two ways:</p>
  <ul>
    <li>The vulnerable page may be served with an `X-Frame-Options` HTTP header
    which does not allow it to be framed by an attacker.</li>
    <li>Sites should use feature detection to determine whether an API or
    behavior is available before attempting to use it, and should handle any
    documented errors returned or exceptions thrown by the APIs they call.</li>

    <li>In the case where feature detection is not possible, new web content can
    be written to use the `policy` object to inspect the permissions policy
    which is currently enforced, and adjust behaviour or user interface
    accordingly.</li>
  </ul>

  <p>Authors integrating their features with Permissions Policy can decide when
  and how the feature will fail when a document attempts to use it while it is
  disabled. Authors should attempt to make use of existing failure modes, when
  they exist, to increase the chance that existing content will already be
  correctly handling such failures.</p>

  <h3 id="privacy-expose-policy">Exposure of embedding policy</h3>

  <p>Care has been taken to limit the information which an page can infer about
  the behavior of cross-origin pages which it embeds. It may be possible in some
  scenarios however, for the embedded page to infer information about its
  embedder, by examining the policy which the embedder has enforced on it.</p>

  <p>This is similar to the existing `document.fullscreenEnabled` property,
  which can be used by the embedded document to infer whether its embedder has
  granted it the ability to use the Fullscreen API. If this is only granted in
  certain cases &mdash; when the user is logged in to the embedding site, for
  instance &mdash; then the embedded site can learn something about the state of
  its embedder.</p>
</section>
<section>
  <h2 id="change-log">Change log</h2>

  <h3>Changes since FPWD</h3>

  * Expose new algorithms to create a Feature Policy before document is created. [Link](https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/pull/324)
  * Remove algorithms no longer needed. [Link](https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/pull/325)
  * Change same-origin-domain check to same-origin. [Link](https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/pull/326)
  * Change Header and attribute combination from OR to AND semantics. [Link](https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/pull/378)
  * Rename to "Permissions Policy". [Link](https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/pull/379)
  * Define "Permissions-Policy" as a structured header. [Link](https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-permissions-policy/pull/383)
  * Editorial fixes.
  * The <code>allowpaymentrequest</code> attribute was removed due to deprecation by Payment Request API and HTML. [Link](https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-feature-policy/pull/)

</section>