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fix temper/tamper typos #6

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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions state_harmful.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ On the other hand, if it was the Trusted Stick that performed the encryption,
then there should be no way for the hypothetical ME rootkit to write anything
onto the user partition bypassing the forced encryption with the user key.

## Temper-resistance considerations
## Tamper-resistance considerations

The use of tamper-resistance technology is often thought as a beneficial means
to improve physical security of an endpoint device. Care must be applied
Expand All @@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ irrelevant whether the user would, in practice, be willing or capable to do that
or not -- it's a matter of having an _opportunity_ to do that. This is very
similar to guarantees of civil liberties, such as free speech.]

Thus a temper-proof mechanism might only be acceptable for the actual (small)
Thus a tamper-proof mechanism might only be acceptable for the actual (small)
persistent memory which holds the bits of the user keys, and for nothing more,
particularly not for the memory which holds the firmware for the device. Also,
any tamper-proof protection on volatile memory (RAM) is not necessary, as such
Expand Down