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sysmonconfig-export.xml
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sysmonconfig-export.xml
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<!--
sysmon-config | A Sysmon configuration focused on default high-quality event tracing and easy customization by the community
Source version: 73 | Date: 2021-02-16
Source project: https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config
Source license: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 | You may privatize, fork, edit, teach, publish, or deploy for commercial use - with attribution in the text.
Fork version: 1.0
Fork author: Simon Duff (@sduff)
Fork project: https://github.com/sduff/sysmon-config
Fork license: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 | You may privatize, fork, edit, teach, publish, or deploy for commercial use - with attribution in the text.
REQUIRED: Sysmon version 13 or higher (due to changes in syntax and bug-fixes)
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
NOTE: To collect Sysmon logs centrally for free, see https://aka.ms/WEF | Command to allow log access to the Network Service:
wevtutil.exe sl Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational /ca:O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0xf0005;;;SY)(A;;0x5;;;BA)(A;;0x1;;;S-1-5-32-573)(A;;0x1;;;NS)
NOTE: Do not let the size and complexity of this configuration discourage you from customizing it or building your own.
This configuration is based around known, high-signal event tracing, and thus appears complicated, but it is only very
detailed. Significant effort over years has been invested in front-loading as much filtering as possible onto the
client. This is to make analysis of intrusions possible by hand, and to try to surface anomalous activity as quickly
as possible to technicians armed only with Event Viewer. Its purpose is to democratize system monitoring for all organizations.
NOTE: Sysmon is NOT a whitelist solution or HIDS correlation engine, it is a computer change logging tool.
Do NOT ignore everything possible. Sysmon's purpose is providing context during a threat or problem investigation. Legitimate
processes are routinely used by threats - do not blindly exclude them. Additionally, be mindful of process-hollowing / imitation.
NOTE: By default this monitors DNS, which is extremely noisy. If you are starting out on your monitoring journey, just remove that section.
You can remove DNS events from Event Viewer screen by applying a 'Filter Current View' for event IDs of: -22
Additionally, if you want to monitor DNS, you should deploy client-side adblocking to reduce lookups. See the DNS section for info.
NOTE: This configuration is designed for PER-MACHINE installs of Chrome and OneDrive. That moves their binaries out of user-controlled folders.
Otherwise, attackers could imitate these common applications, and bypass your logging. Below are silent upgrades you can do, no user impact:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/onedrive/per-machine-installation
- https://cloud.google.com/chrome-enterprise/browser/download/
- As of 2021-02-16 there is no machine-level version of Microsoft Teams. The one provided copies itself to the user profile.
NOTE: Sysmon is not hardened against an attacker with admin rights. Additionally, this configuration offers an attacker, willing
to study it, limited ways to evade some of the logging. If you are in a very high-threat environment, you should consider a broader,
log-most approach. However, in the vast majority of cases, an attacker will bumble through multiple behavioral traps which
this configuration monitors, especially in the first minutes.
NOTE: If you encounter unexplainable event inclusion/exclusion, you may have a second Sysmon instance installed under a different exe filename.
To clear this, try downloading the latest version and uninstalling with -u force. If it hangs, kill the processes and run it again to cleanup.
TECHNICAL:
- Run sysmon.exe -? for a briefing on Sysmon configuration.
- Sysmon XML cannot use the AMPERSAND sign. Replace it with this: &
- Sysmon 8+ can track which rule caused an event to be logged through the "RuleName" field.
- If you only specify exclude for a filtering subsection, everything in that subsection is logged by default.
- Some Sysmon monitoring abilities are not meant for widely deployed general-purpose use due to performance impact. Depends on environment.
- Duplicate or overlapping "Include" rules do not result in duplicate events being logged.
- All characters enclosed by XML tags are always interpreted literally. Sysmon does not support wildcards (*), alternate characters, or RegEx.
- In registry events, the value name is appended to the full key path with a "\" delimiter. Default key values are named "\(Default)"
- "Image" is a technical term for a compiled binary file like an EXE or DLL. Also, it can match just the filename, or entire path.
- "ProcessGuid" and "LoginGuid" are not random, they contain some embedded information. https://gist.github.com/mattifestation/0102042160c9a60b2b847378c0ef70b4
FILTERING: Filter conditions available for use are: is,is not,contains,contains any,contains all,excludes,excludes any,excludes all,begin with,end with,less than,more than,image
- The "image" filter is usable on any field. Same as "is" but can either match entire string, or only the text after last "\". Credit: @mattifestation
-->
<Sysmon schemaversion="4.50">
<!--SYSMON META CONFIG-->
<HashAlgorithms>md5,sha256,IMPHASH</HashAlgorithms> <!-- Both MD5 and SHA256 are the industry-standard algorithms. Remove IMPHASH if you do not use DLL import fingerprinting. -->
<CheckRevocation/> <!-- Check loaded drivers, log if their code-signing certificate has been revoked, in case malware stole one to sign a kernel driver -->
<!-- <ImageLoad/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on ImageLoad monitoring, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
<!-- <ProcessAccessConfig/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on ProcessAccess monitoring, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
<!-- <PipeMonitoringConfig/> --> <!-- Would manually force-on PipeCreated / PipeConnected events, even without configuration below. Included only documentation. -->
<!-- <ArchiveDirectory> -->
<EventFiltering>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 1 : PROCESS CREATION [ProcessCreate]-->
<!--COMMENT: All processes launched will be logged, except for what matches a rule below. It's best to be as specific as possible,
to avoid user-mode executables imitating other process names to avoid logging, or if malware drops files in an existing directory.
Ultimately, you must weigh CPU time checking many detailed rules, against the risk of malware exploiting the blindness created.
Beware of Masquerading, where attackers imitate the names and paths of legitimate tools. Ideally, you'd use both file path and
code signatures to validate, but Sysmon does not support that. Look into AppLocker/WindowsDeviceGuard for whitelisting support. -->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessID, Image, FileVersion, Description, Product, Company, CommandLine, CurrentDirectory, User, LogonGuid, LogonId, TerminalSessionId, IntegrityLevel, Hashes, ParentProcessGuid, ParentProcessId, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, RuleName-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ProcessCreate onmatch="exclude">
<!--SECTION: Microsoft Windows-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with"> "C:\Windows\system32\wermgr.exe" "-queuereporting_svc" </CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid</CommandLine> <!--Windows-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: WMI provider host-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: WMI provider host-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wermgr.exe -upload</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe /Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Search Indexer-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe -queuereporting</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
<CommandLine condition="is">\??\C:\Windows\system32\autochk.exe *</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Bootup: Auto Check Utility-->
<CommandLine condition="is">\SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Bootup: Windows Session Manager-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps permissions [ https://fossbytes.com/runtime-broker-process-windows-10/ ] -->
<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\TabTip32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Touch Keyboard and Handwriting Panel Helper-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\TokenBrokerCookies.exe</Image> <!--Windows: SSO sign-in assistant for MicrosoftOnline.com-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\plasrv.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Performance Logs and Alerts DCOM Server-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\wifitask.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Wireless Background Task-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\CompatTelRunner.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Customer Experience Improvement-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\PrintIsolationHost.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Printing-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.Exe</Image> <!--Windows: KMS activation-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\audiodg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Launched constantly-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Command line interface host process-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\mobsync.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Network file syncing-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\musNotification.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Update pop-ups-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\musNotificationUx.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Update pop-ups-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Power configuration management-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\sndVol.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Volume control-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\sppsvc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Software Protection Service-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiApSrv.exe</Image> <!--Windows: WMI performance adapter host process-->
<IntegrityLevel condition="is">AppContainer</IntegrityLevel> <!--Windows: Don't care about sandboxed processes right now. Will need to revisit this decision.-->
<ParentCommandLine condition="begin with">%%SystemRoot%%\system32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows:CommandShell: Triggered when programs use the command shell, but doesn't provide attribution for what caused it-->
<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe -queuereporting</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows:Windows error reporting/telemetry-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\WINDOWS\system32\devicecensus.exe UserCxt</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\usocoreworker.exe -Embedding</CommandLine>
<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\SearchIndexer.exe</ParentImage> <!--Windows:Search: Launches many uninteresting sub-processes-->
<!--SECTION: Windows:svchost-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -s StateRepository</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel</CommandLine> <!--Windows 10-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s tiledatamodelsvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k camera -s FrameServer</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s LSM</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k dcomlaunch -s PlugPlay</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k defragsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows defragmentation-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k devicesflow -s DevicesFlowUserSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k imgsvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:The Windows Image Acquisition Service-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s EventSystem</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s bthserv</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s BthAvctpSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s nsi</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localService -s w32Time</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s Dhcp</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s EventLog</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s TimeBrokerSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -s WFDSConMgrSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s BTAGService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService</CommandLine> <!--Win10:1903:Network Connection Broker-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -s SensrSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV</CommandLine> <!--Windows:SSDP [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Service_Discovery_Protocol ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNoNetwork</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s WPDBusEnum</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s fhsvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s DeviceAssociationService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s NcbService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s SensorService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s TabletInputService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s UmRdpService</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s WPDBusEnum</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcSvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Passport-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Passport Container-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localServiceAndNoImpersonation -s SCardSvr</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SessionEnv</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Remote desktop configuration-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -s WdiSystemHost</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Diagnostic System Host [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/diagnostic-system-host/ ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s WdiSystemHost</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Diagnostic System Host [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/diagnostic-system-host/ ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Windows Live Sign-In Assistant [ https://www.howtogeek.com/howto/30348/what-are-wlidsvc.exe-and-wlidsvcm.exe-and-why-are-they-running/ ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ncaSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network Connectivity Assistant [ http://www.blackviper.com/windows-services/network-connectivity-assistant/ ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BDESVC</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: BitLocker Drive Encryption-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BDESVC</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Win10:1903:Network: BitLocker Drive Encryption-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Background Intelligent File Transfer (BITS) -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s BITS</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Background Intelligent File Transfer (BITS) -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s CertPropSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s DsmSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Gpsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Group Policy -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s ProfSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SENS</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s SessionEnv</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Themes</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -s Winmgmt</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -p -s DoSvc</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s Dnscache</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: DNS caching, other uses -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s LanmanWorkstation</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: "Workstation" service, used for SMB file-sharing connections and RDP-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s NlaSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Network Location Awareness-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService -s TermService</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Network: Terminal Services (RDP)-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkService</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k networkServiceNetworkRestricted</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k rPCSS</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k secsvcs</CommandLine>
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k swprv</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:Software Shadow Copy Provider-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k unistackSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows 10-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k utcsvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wbioSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows Services-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k werSvcGroup</CommandLine> <!--Windows: ErrorReporting-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wusvcs -p -s WaaSMedicSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows: Update Medic Service [ https://www.thewindowsclub.com/windows-update-medic-service ] -->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k wsappx -p -s ClipSVC</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps: Client License Service-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wsappx -p -s AppXSvc</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps: AppX Deployment Service-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wsappx -s ClipSVC</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps: Client License Service-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k wsappx</CommandLine> <!--Windows:Apps [ https://www.howtogeek.com/320261/what-is-wsappx-and-why-is-it-running-on-my-pc/ ] -->
<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows: Network services: Spawns Consent.exe-->
<ParentCommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k localSystemNetworkRestricted</ParentCommandLine> <!--Windows-->
<CommandLine condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\deviceenroller.exe /c /AutoEnrollMDM</CommandLine> <!--Windows: AzureAD device enrollment agent-->
<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Edge-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge Dev\Application\msedge.exe" --type=</CommandLine>
<!--SECTION: Microsoft:dotNet-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngen.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">C:\WINDOWS\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Ngen.exe</CommandLine> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v3.0\WPF\PresentationFontCache.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Font cache service-->
<ParentCommandLine condition="contains">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</ParentCommandLine>
<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\mscorsvw.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet-->
<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\ngentask.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:DotNet: Spawns thousands of ngen.exe processes-->
<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office16\MSOSYNC.EXE</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process for SharePoint/Office365 connectivity-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Office16\MSOSYNC.EXE</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process for SharePoint/Office365 connectivity-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\OfficeSoftwareProtectionPlatform\OSPPSVC.EXE</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Licensing service-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office16\msoia.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Telemetry collector-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\officebackgroundtaskhandler.exe</Image>
<!--SECTION: Microsoft:Office:Click2Run-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process-->
<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process-->
<ParentImage condition="is">C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeC2RClient.exe</ParentImage> <!--Microsoft:Office: Background process-->
<!--SECTION: Windows: Media player-->
<Image condition="is">C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnscfg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service Configuration Application-->
<!--SECTION: Google-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=</CommandLine> <!--Google:Chrome: massive command-line arguments-->
<CommandLine condition="begin with">"C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --type=</CommandLine> <!--Google:Chrome: massive command-line arguments-->
</ProcessCreate>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 2 : FILE CREATION TIME RETROACTIVELY CHANGED IN THE FILESYSTEM [FileCreateTime]-->
<!--COMMENT: [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099 ] -->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime, PreviousCreationUtcTime-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<FileCreateTime onmatch="include">
<Image name="T1099" condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Look for timestomping in user area, usually nothing should be doing that here-->
<TargetFilename name="T1099" condition="end with">.exe</TargetFilename> <!--Look for backdated executables anywhere-->
<Image name="T1099" condition="begin with">\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy</Image> <!--Nothing should be written here | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1133030955407630336 ] -->
</FileCreateTime>
</RuleGroup>
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<FileCreateTime onmatch="exclude">
<Image condition="image">OneDrive.exe</Image> <!--OneDrive constantly changes file times-->
<Image condition="image">C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe</Image>
<Image condition="contains">setup</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<Image condition="contains">install</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<Image condition="contains">Update\</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<Image condition="end with">redist.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<Image condition="is">msiexec.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<Image condition="is">TrustedInstaller.exe</Image> <!--Ignore setups-->
<TargetFilename condition="contains">\NVIDIA\NvBackend\ApplicationOntology\</TargetFilename> <!--NVIDIA GeForce Experience Application Ontology, 1000's of events in user profile-->
</FileCreateTime>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 3 : NETWORK CONNECTION INITIATED [NetworkConnect]-->
<!--COMMENT: By default this configuration takes a very conservative approach to network logging, limited to only extremely high-signal events.-->
<!--COMMENT: [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Command_and_Control ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Exfiltration ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Lateral_Movement ] -->
<!--TECHNICAL: For the DestinationHostname, Sysmon uses the GetNameInfo API, which will often not have any information, and may just be a CDN. This is NOT reliable for filtering.-->
<!--TECHNICAL: For the DestinationPortName, Sysmon uses the GetNameInfo API for the friendly name of ports you see in logs.-->
<!--TECHNICAL: These exe do not initiate their connections, and thus includes do not work in this section: BITSADMIN NLTEST-->
<!-- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/APT-Log-Analysis-Tracking-Attack-Tools-by-Audit-Policy-and-Sysmon.pdf -->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, User, Protocol, Initiated, SourceIsIpv6, SourceIp, SourceHostname, SourcePort, SourcePortName, DestinationIsIpV6, DestinationIp, DestinationHostname, DestinationPort, DestinationPortName-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<NetworkConnect onmatch="include">
<!--Suspicious sources for network-connecting binaries-->
<Image name="Usermode" condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Tools downloaded by users can use other processes for networking, but this is a very valuable indicator.-->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Recycle</Image> <!--Nothing should operate from the RecycleBin locations.-->
<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData</Image> <!--Normally, network communications should be sourced from "Program Files" not from ProgramData, something to look at-->
<Image condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Temp</Image> <!--Suspicious anything would communicate from the system-level temp directory-->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\perflogs</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\intel</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\fonts</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
<Image name="Caution" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\config</Image> <!-- Credit @blu3_team [ https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/05/netconn-from-suspicious-directories.html ] -->
<!--Suspicious Windows tools-->
<Image condition="image">at.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote task scheduling, removed in Win10 | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">certutil.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Certificate tool can contact outbound | Credit @ion-storm @FVT [ https://twitter.com/FVT/status/834433734602530817 ] -->
<Image condition="image">cmd.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote command prompt-->
<Image condition="image">cmstp.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Connection manager profiles can launch executables from WebDAV [ https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 ] | Credit @NickTyrer @Oddvarmoe @KyleHanslovan @subTee -->
<Image condition="image">cscript.exe</Image> <!--WindowsScriptingHost: | Credit @Cyb3rOps [ https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a4b4af9481e01e749409 ] -->
<Image condition="image">driverquery.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote recognisance of system configuration, oudated/vulnerable drivers -->
<Image condition="image">dsquery.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: Query Active Directory -->
<Image condition="image">hh.exe</Image> <!--Windows: HTML Help Executable, opens CHM files -->
<Image condition="image">infDefaultInstall.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: [ https://github.com/huntresslabs/evading-autoruns ] | Credit @KyleHanslovan -->
<Image condition="image">java.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">javaw.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files -->
<Image condition="image">javaws.exe</Image> <!--Java: Monitor usage of vulnerable application and init from JAR files -->
<Image condition="image">mmc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: -->
<Image condition="image">msbuild.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/a314f6106633fba4b70f9d6ddbee452e8f8f44a72117749c21243dc93c7ed3ac?environmentId=100 ] -->
<Image condition="image">mshta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: HTML application executes scripts without IE protections | Credit @ion-storm [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application ] -->
<Image condition="image">msiexec.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Can install from http:// paths | Credit @vector-sec -->
<Image condition="image">nbtstat.exe</Image> <!--Windows: NetBIOS statistics, attackers use to enumerate local network -->
<Image condition="image">net.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Note - May not detect anything, net.exe is a front-end to lower APIs | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">net1.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Launched by "net.exe", but it may not detect connections either -->
<Image condition="image">notepad.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://secrary.com/ReversingMalware/CoinMiner/ ] [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2013/08/08/why-is-notepad-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/ ] -->
<Image condition="image">nslookup.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Retrieve data over DNS -->
<Image condition="image">powershell.exe</Image> <!--Windows: PowerShell interface-->
<Image condition="image">qprocess.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/APT-Log-Analysis-Tracking-Attack-Tools-by-Audit-Policy-and-Sysmon.pdf ] -->
<Image condition="image">qwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Query remote sessions | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">qwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remotely query login sessions on a server or workstation | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">reg.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remote Registry editing ability | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">regsvcs.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/3f94d7080e6c5b8f59eeecc3d44f7e817b31562caeba21d02ad705a0bfc63d67?environmentId=100 ] -->
<Image condition="image">regsvr32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html ] -->
<Image condition="image">rundll32.exe</Image> <!--Windows: [ https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2016/07/22/why-is-rundll32-exe-connecting-to-the-internet/ ] -->
<Image condition="image">rwinsta.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Disconnect remote sessions | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">sc.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Remotely change Windows service settings | Credit @ion-storm -->
<Image condition="image">schtasks.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Command-line interface to local and remote tasks -->
<Image condition="image">taskkill.exe</Image> <!--Windows: Kill processes, has remote ability -->
<Image condition="image">tasklist.exe</Image> <!--Windows: List processes, has remote ability -->
<Image condition="image">wmic.exe</Image> <!--WindowsManagementInstrumentation: Credit @Cyb3rOps [ https://gist.github.com/Neo23x0/a4b4af9481e01e749409 ] -->
<Image condition="image">wscript.exe</Image> <!--WindowsScriptingHost: | Credit @arekfurt -->
<!--Relevant 3rd Party Tools-->
<Image condition="image">nc.exe</Image> <!-- Nmap's modern version of netcat [ https://nmap.org/ncat/guide/index.html#ncat-overview ] [ https://securityblog.gr/1517/create-backdoor-in-windows-with-ncat/ ] -->
<Image condition="image">ncat.exe</Image> <!-- Nmap's modern version of netcat [ https://nmap.org/ncat/guide/index.html#ncat-overview ] [ https://securityblog.gr/1517/create-backdoor-in-windows-with-ncat/ ] -->
<Image condition="image">psexec.exe</Image> <!--Sysinternals:PsExec client side | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">psexesvc.exe</Image> <!--Sysinternals:PsExec server side | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">tor.exe</Image> <!--Tor [ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/800bf028a23440134fc834efc5c1e02cc70f05b2e800bbc285d7c92a4b126b1c?environmentId=100 ] -->
<Image condition="image">vnc.exe</Image> <!-- VNC client | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">vncservice.exe</Image> <!-- VNC server | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">vncviewer.exe</Image> <!-- VNC client | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">winexesvc.exe</Image> <!-- Winexe service executable | Credit @Cyb3rOps -->
<Image condition="image">nmap.exe</Image>
<Image condition="image">psinfo.exe</Image>
<!--Ports: Suspicious-->
<DestinationPort name="SSH" condition="is">22</DestinationPort> <!--SSH protocol, monitor admin connections-->
<DestinationPort name="Telnet" condition="is">23</DestinationPort> <!--Telnet protocol, monitor admin connections, insecure-->
<DestinationPort name="SMTP" condition="is">25</DestinationPort> <!--SMTP mail protocol port, insecure, used by threats-->
<DestinationPort name="IMAP" condition="is">143</DestinationPort> <!--IMAP mail protocol port, insecure, used by threats-->
<DestinationPort name="RDP" condition="is">3389</DestinationPort> <!--Windows:RDP: Monitor admin connections-->
<DestinationPort name="VNC" condition="is">5800</DestinationPort> <!--VNC protocol: Monitor admin connections, often insecure, using hard-coded admin password-->
<DestinationPort name="VNC" condition="is">5900</DestinationPort> <!--VNC protocol Monitor admin connections, often insecure, using hard-coded admin password-->
<DestinationPort name="Alert,Metasploit" condition="is">444</DestinationPort>
<!--Ports: Proxy-->
<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">1080</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">3128</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
<DestinationPort name="Proxy" condition="is">8080</DestinationPort> <!--Socks proxy port | Credit @ion-storm-->
<!--Ports: Tor-->
<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">1723</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090 ] | Credit @ion-storm-->
<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">9001</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ http://www.computerworlduk.com/tutorial/security/tor-enterprise-2016-blocking-malware-darknet-use-rogue-nodes-3633907/ ] -->
<DestinationPort name="Tor" condition="is">9030</DestinationPort> <!--Tor protocol [ http://www.computerworlduk.com/tutorial/security/tor-enterprise-2016-blocking-malware-darknet-use-rogue-nodes-3633907/ ] -->
</NetworkConnect>
</RuleGroup>
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<NetworkConnect onmatch="exclude">
<!--SECTION: Microsoft-->
<Image condition="begin with">C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\</Image>
<Image condition="end with">AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe</Image> <!--Microsoft: Teams-->
<DestinationHostname condition="end with">.microsoft.com</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
<DestinationHostname condition="end with">microsoft.com.akadns.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
<DestinationHostname condition="end with">microsoft.com.nsatc.net</DestinationHostname> <!--Microsoft:Update delivery-->
<!--OCSP known addresses-->
<DestinationIp condition="is">23.4.43.27</DestinationIp> <!--Digicert [ https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/23.4.43.27 ] -->
<DestinationIp condition="is">72.21.91.29</DestinationIp> <!--Digicert [ https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/72.21.91.29 ] -->
<!--Section: Loopback Addresses-->
<DestinationIp condition="is">127.0.0.1</DestinationIp> <!--Credit @ITProPaul-->
<DestinationIp condition="begin with">fe80:0:0:0</DestinationIp> <!--Credit @ITProPaul-->
</NetworkConnect>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 4 : RESERVED FOR SYSMON SERVICE STATUS MESSAGES-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, State, Version, SchemaVersion-->
<!--Cannot be filtered.-->
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 5 : PROCESS ENDED [ProcessTerminate]-->
<!--COMMENT: Useful data in building infection timelines.-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ProcessTerminate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="begin with">C:\Users</Image> <!--Process terminations by user binaries-->
<Image condition="begin with">\</Image> <!--Devices and VSC shouldn't be executing changes | Credit: @SBousseaden @ionstorm @neu5ron @PerchedSystems [ https://twitter.com/SwiftOnSecurity/status/1133167323991486464 ] -->
</ProcessTerminate>
</RuleGroup>
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ProcessTerminate onmatch="exclude">
</ProcessTerminate>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 6 : DRIVER LOADED INTO KERNEL [DriverLoad]-->
<!--COMMENT: Because drivers with bugs can be used to escalate to kernel permissions, be extremely selective
about what you exclude from monitoring. Low event volume, little incentive to exclude.
[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014 ] -->
<!--TECHNICAL: Sysmon will check the signing certificate revocation status of any driver you don't exclude.-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<DriverLoad onmatch="exclude">
<Signature condition="contains">microsoft</Signature> <!--Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->
<Signature condition="contains">windows</Signature> <!--Exclude signed Microsoft drivers-->
<Signature condition="begin with">Intel </Signature> <!--Exclude signed Intel drivers-->
</DriverLoad>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 7 : DLL (IMAGE) LOADED BY PROCESS [ImageLoad]-->
<!--COMMENT: Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
<!--COMMENT: [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1073 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1038 ] [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1034 ] -->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, ImageLoaded, Hashes, Signed, Signature, SignatureStatus-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ImageLoad onmatch="include">
<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
</ImageLoad>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 8 : REMOTE THREAD CREATED [CreateRemoteThread]-->
<!--COMMENT: Monitor for processes injecting code into other processes. Often used by malware to cloak their actions. Also when Firefox loads Flash.
[ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055 ] -->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, SourceImage, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, NewThreadId, StartAddress, StartModule, StartFunction-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<CreateRemoteThread onmatch="exclude">
<!--COMMENT: Exclude mostly-safe sources and log anything else.-->
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\wininit.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\csrss.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\services.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe</SourceImage>
<SourceImage condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\audiodg.exe</SourceImage>
<StartModule condition="is">C:\Windows\system32\kernel32.dll</StartModule>
<TargetImage condition="is">C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe</TargetImage>
</CreateRemoteThread>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 9 : RAW DISK ACCESS [RawAccessRead]-->
<!--EVENT 9: "RawAccessRead detected"-->
<!--COMMENT: Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
<!--COMMENT: Monitor for raw sector-level access to the disk, often used to bypass access control lists or access locked files.
Disabled by default since including even one entry here activates this component. Reward/performance/rule maintenance decision.
Encourage you to experiment with this feature yourself. [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1067 ] -->
<!--COMMENT: You will likely want to set this to a full capture on domain controllers, where no process should be doing raw reads.-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, Device-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<RawAccessRead onmatch="include">
<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
</RawAccessRead>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 10 : INTER-PROCESS ACCESS [ProcessAccess]-->
<!--EVENT 10: "Process accessed"-->
<!--COMMENT: Can cause high system load, disabled by default.-->
<!--COMMENT: Monitor for processes accessing other process' memory.-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, SourceProcessGuid, SourceProcessId, SourceThreadId, SourceImage, TargetProcessGuid, TargetProcessId, TargetImage, GrantedAccess, CallTrace-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<ProcessAccess onmatch="include">
<!--NOTE: Using "include" with no rules means nothing in this section will be logged-->
</ProcessAccess>
</RuleGroup>
<!--SYSMON EVENT ID 11 : FILE CREATED [FileCreate]-->
<!--EVENT 11: "File created"-->
<!--NOTE: Other filesystem "minifilters" can make it appear to Sysmon that some files are being written twice. This is not a Sysmon issue, per Mark Russinovich.-->
<!--NOTE: You may not see files detected by antivirus. Other filesystem minifilters, like antivirus, can act before Sysmon receives the alert a file was written.-->
<!--DATA: UtcTime, ProcessGuid, ProcessId, Image, TargetFilename, CreationUtcTime-->
<RuleGroup name="" groupRelation="or">
<FileCreate onmatch="include">
<TargetFilename name="T1023" condition="contains">\Start Menu</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: Startup links and shortcut modification [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1023 ] -->
<TargetFilename name="T1165" condition="contains">\Startup\</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Changes to user's auto-launched files and shortcuts-->
<TargetFilename name="OutlookAttachment" condition="contains">\Content.Outlook\</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Outlook: attachments-->
<TargetFilename name="Downloads" condition="contains">\Downloads\</TargetFilename> <!--Downloaded files. Does not include "Run" files in IE-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.application</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce: [ https://blog.netspi.com/all-you-need-is-one-a-clickonce-love-story/ ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.appref-ms</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ClickOnce application | Credit @ion-storm -->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bat</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.chm</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cmd</TargetFilename> <!--Batch scripting: Batch scripts can also use the .cmd extension | Credit: @mmazanec -->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cmdline</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:dotNet: Executed by cvtres.exe-->
<TargetFilename name="T1176" condition="end with">.crx</TargetFilename> <!--Chrome extension-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dmp</TargetFilename> <!--Process dumps [ (fr) http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/minidump ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.docm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
<TargetFilename name="DLL" condition="end with">.dll</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
<TargetFilename name="EXE" condition="end with">.exe</TargetFilename> <!--Executable-->
<TargetFilename name="ProcessHostingdotNETCode" condition="end with">.exe.log</TargetFilename> <!-- [ https://github.com/bitsadmin/nopowershell ] | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1137493597769687040 ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jar</TargetFilename> <!--Java applets-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jnlp</TargetFilename> <!--Java applets-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.jse</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting [ Example: https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Mal~Phires-C/detailed-analysis.aspx ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.hta</TargetFilename> <!--Scripting-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.job</TargetFilename> <!--Scheduled task-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.pptm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ps1</TargetFilename> <!--PowerShell [ More information: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/08/27/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-16/ ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.sys</TargetFilename> <!--System driver files-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.scr</TargetFilename> <!--System driver files-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbe</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.vbs</TargetFilename> <!--VisualBasicScripting-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.xlsm</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Office:Word: Macro-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ocx</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ActiveX-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">proj</TargetFilename><!--Microsoft:MSBuild:Script: [ https://twitter.com/subTee/status/885919612969394177 ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.sln</TargetFilename><!--Microsoft:MSBuild:Script: [ https://twitter.com/subTee/status/885919612969394177 ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.xls</TargetFilename><!--Microsoft [ https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75 ] -->
<TargetFilename name="DefaultUserModified" condition="begin with">C:\Users\Default</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: Changes to default user profile-->
<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\Drivers</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft: Drivers dropped here-->
<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Drivers</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft: Drivers dropped here-->
<TargetFilename name="T1037,T1484" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\GroupPolicy\Machine\Scripts</TargetFilename> <!--Group policy [ More information: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/07/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-52/ ] -->
<TargetFilename name="T1037,T1484" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\GroupPolicy\User\Scripts</TargetFilename> <!--Group policy [ More information: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/07/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-52/ ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\Wbem</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:WMI: [ More information: http://2014.hackitoergosum.org/slides/day1_WMI_Shell_Andrei_Dumitrescu.pdf ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Wbem</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:WMI: [ More information: http://2014.hackitoergosum.org/slides/day1_WMI_Shell_Andrei_Dumitrescu.pdf ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Powershell: Look for modifications for persistence [ https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:Powershell: Look for modifications for persistence [ https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets ] -->
<TargetFilename name="T1053" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\Tasks\</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ScheduledTasks [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053 ] -->
<TargetFilename name="T1053" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\system32\Tasks</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ScheduledTasks [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053 ] -->
<TargetFilename name="T1053" condition="begin with">C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks</TargetFilename> <!--Microsoft:ScheduledTasks [ https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053 ] -->
<Image condition="begin with">\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy</Image> <!--Nothing should be executing from VSC | Credit: @SBousseaden [ https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1133030955407630336 ] -->
<!--Windows application compatibility-->
<TargetFilename condition="begin with">C:\Windows\AppPatch\Custom</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: Application compatibility shims [ https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html ] -->
<TargetFilename condition="contains">VirtualStore</TargetFilename> <!--Windows: UAC virtualization [ https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20150902-00/?p=91681 ] -->
<!--Exploitable file names-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.xls</TargetFilename> <!--Legacy Office files are often used for attacks-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ppt</TargetFilename> <!--Legacy Office files are often used for attacks-->
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.rtf</TargetFilename> <!--RTF files often 0day malware vectors when opened by Office-->
<!-- Ransomare can leave notes on the filesystem, explaining their recovery process | Credit: @sduff -->
<TargetFilename condition="contains">decrypt all files</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">_h_e_l_p_recover_instructions</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">help_recover_instructions</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">how_recover</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">@please_read_me@</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">-read-for-hellpp.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">readme_decrypt_hydra_id_</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">readme_decrypt_umbre_id_</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">recover_files_</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">recover_file_</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">recovery_file_</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">recovery</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">-sorry-for-files.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">@wanadecryptor@.exe</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">about_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">allfilesarelocked_.bmp</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">attention.rtf</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">bitcryptorfilelist.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">bleepedfiles.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">buyunlockcode</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">coin.locker.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">cryptinfo.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">cryptlogfile.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">decrypt all files *.bmp</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">decryptallfiles.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">decryptallfiles_.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">decrypt_instructions.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">decrypt_instructions.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">decrypt_instruction.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with"># decrypt my files #.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with"># decrypt my files #.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with"># decrypt my files #.vbs</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">decrypt_readme.txt.readme</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">decrypt_readme.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">decrypt_your_files.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">encryptor_raas_readme_liesmich.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">exit.hhr.obleep</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">filesaregone.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">getyoufiles.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">hellothere.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">help_decrypt.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">help_decrypt_your_files.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">help_decyprt_your_files.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">*-help_for_decrypt_file.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">help recover files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">help_recover_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">help_restore_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">help_to_decrypt_your_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">help_to_save_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">help_yourfiles.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">help_your_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">howdecrypt.gif</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">how_decrypt.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">_how_recover_.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">how to decrypt files.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">how-to-decrypt-files.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">how to decrypt files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">how_to_decrypt_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">how_to_decrypt.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">how to get data.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">how_to_recover_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">howto_recover_file_.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">how_to_restore_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">howto_restore_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">howto_restore_files_.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">iamreadytopay.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">ihaveyoursecret.key</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">important read me.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">kryptolocker_readme.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">_locky_recover_instructions.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">nefilim-decrypt.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">qwer2.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">qwer.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readdecryptfileshere.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">read if you want your files back.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme10.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme1.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme2.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme3.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme4.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme5.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme6.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme7.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme8.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme9.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readme.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">readthisnow!!!.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">read.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">recovery_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">recovery_file.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">recovery_key.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">restore_files_.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">ryukreadme.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">_secret_code.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">secretidhere.key</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">secret.key</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">unblockfiles.vbs</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">your_files_are_encrypted.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">your_files.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">your_files.url</TargetFilename>
<!-- Ransomware can encrypt files, often renaming them in the process. These are common ransomware extensions | Credit: @sduff -->
<TargetFilename condition="contains">cpyt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">crypt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">darkness</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">decipher</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">enc</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">exx</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">@gmail_com_</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">help_restore</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">help_your_files</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">how_to_recover</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">.hydracrypt_id_</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">@india.com</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">install_tor</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">keemail.me</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">qq_com</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">restore_fi</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">ukr.net</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">.unbrecrypt_id_</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="contains">want your files back</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.0x0</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.1999</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.1cbu1</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.1txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.73i87a</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.777</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.7h9r</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.8lock8</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.a5zfn</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.aaa</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.abc</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.adk</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.adr</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.aes256</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">aes256</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.aesir</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.afd</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.aga</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">._airacropencrypted</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.alcatraz</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.amba</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.angelamerkel</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.angleware</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.antihacker2017</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.areyoulovemyransfile</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.areyoulovemyrans</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.asier</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.atlas</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.axx</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.barrax</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bart</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bart.zip</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.better_call_saul</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bin</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bitstak</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bleep</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bleepyourfiles</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.blocatto</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bloc</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.braincrypt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.breaking_bad</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.breeding123</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.bript</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.btcbtcbtc</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.btc-help-you</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.btc</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.canihelpyou</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cbf</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cccrrrppp</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ccc</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cerber2</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cerber3</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cerber</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.checkdiskenced</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.chifrator@qq_com</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cifgksaffsfyghd</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.clf</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.coded</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.code</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.comrade</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.conficker</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.confirmation.key</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.country82000</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.coverton</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crab</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crashed</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crime</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crinf</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.criptiko</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.criptokod</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.criptoko</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cripttt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crjocker</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crjoker</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crptrgr</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crrrt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cryeye</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cryp1</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crypt38</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crypted</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crypte</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cryptolocker</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crypto</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">crypto</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cryptotorlocker2015!</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cryptowall</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">._crypt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crypt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cryptz</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crypz</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.crysis</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.cry</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">cry</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ctb2</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ctbl2</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ctbl</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.czvxce</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.d4nk</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dale</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.damage</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.darkness</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.da_vinci_code</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dcrypt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.decrypt2017</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ded</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dexter</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dharma</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.disposed2017</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dll</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.domino</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dxxd</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.dyatel@qq_com</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ecc</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.edgel</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.encedrsa</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.enc_files.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.enciphered</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.encmywork</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.encoderpass</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.encr</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.encryptedaes</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.encryptedrsa</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.encrypted </TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.encrypted</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.encryptedyourfiles</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.encrypt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.enc</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.enigma</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.epic</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.evillock</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.exotic</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.exx</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ezz</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.fantom</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.file0locked</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.filegofprencrp</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.fileiscryptedhard</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.filock</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.frtrss</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.fucked</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.fuck</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.fucku</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.fuckyourdata</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.fun</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.gefickt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.globe</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.goforhelp</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.good</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.grt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.gruzin@qq_com</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.gws</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.h3ll</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ha3</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.happenencedfiles</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.hb15</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.helpdecrypt@ukr.net</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.helpmeencedfiles</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.herbst</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.hnumkhotep</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.howcanihelpusir</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.hush</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.iaufkakfhsaraf</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.ifuckedyou</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.iloveworld</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.infected</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.info</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">-instruction.html</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.isis</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.iwanthelpuuu</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.iwishiyou</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.justbtcwillhelpyou</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">kb15</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.kernel_complete</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.kernel_pid</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.kernel_time</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.keybtc@inbox_com</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.keyh0les</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.keyz</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.kimcilware</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.kkk</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.korrektor</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.kostya</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.kraken</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">kraken</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.kratos</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.kyra</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.last_chance.txt</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.lcked</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.lechiffre</TargetFilename>
<TargetFilename condition="end with">.legion</TargetFilename>
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