more-about-virtue.qmd

# More About Virtue

Your letter roamed over several little problems, but finally dwelt upon this alone, asking for explanation: "How do we acquire a knowledge of that which is good and that which is honourable?"
In the opinion of other schools,[^120-1] these two qualities are distinct; among our followers, however, they are merely divided.

This is what I mean: Some believe the Good to be that which is useful; they accordingly bestow this title upon riches, horses, wine, and shoes; so cheaply do they view the Good, and to such base uses do they let it descend.
They regard as honourable that which agrees with the principle of right conduct -- such as taking dutiful care of an old father, relieving a friend's poverty, showing bravery on a campaign, and uttering prudent and well-balanced opinions.

We, however, do make the Good and the honourable two things, but we make them out of one: only the honourable can be good; also, the honourable is necessarily good.
I hold it superfluous to add the distinction between these two qualities, inasmuch as I have mentioned it so many times.[^120-2]
But I shall say this one thing -- that we regard nothing as good which can be put to wrong use by any person.
And you see for yourself to what wrong uses many men put their riches, their high position, or their physical powers.
To return to the matter on which you desire information: "How we first acquire the knowledge of that which is good and that which is honourable."

Nature could not teach us this directly; she has given us the seeds of knowledge, but not knowledge itself.
Some say that we merely happened upon this knowledge; but it is unbelievable that a vision of virtue could have presented itself to anyone by mere chance.
We believe that it is inference due to observation, a comparison of events that have occurred frequently; our school of philosophy hold that the honourable and the good have been comprehended by analogy.
Since the word "analogy"[^120-3] has been admitted to citizen rank by Latin scholars, I do not think that it ought to be condemned, but I do think it should be brought into the citizenship which it can justly claim.
I shall, therefore, make use of the word, not merely as admitted, but as established.

Now what this "analogy" is, I shall explain.
We understood what bodily health was: and from this basis we deduced the existence of a certain mental health also.
We knew, too, bodily strength, and from this basis we inferred the existence of mental sturdiness.
Kindly deeds, humane deeds, brave deeds, had at times amazed us; so we began to admire them as if they were perfect.
Underneath, however, there were many faults, hidden by the appearance and the brilliancy of certain conspicuous acts; to these we shut our eyes.
Nature bids us amplify praiseworthy things; everyone exalts renown beyond the truth.
And thus from such deeds we deduced the conception of some great good.

Fabricius rejected King Pyrrhus's gold, deeming it greater than a king's crown to be able to scorn a king's money.
Fabricius also, when the royal physician promised to give his master poison, warned Pyrrhus to beware of a plot.
The selfsame man had the resolution to refuse either to be won over by gold or to win by poison.
So we admired the hero, who could not be moved by the promises of the king or against the king, who held fast to a noble ideal, and who -- is anything more difficult? -- was in war sinless; for he believed that wrongs could be committed even against an enemy, and in that extreme poverty which he had made his glory, shrank from receiving riches as he shrank from using poison.
"Live," he cried, "O Pyrrhus, thanks to me, and rejoice, instead of grieving as you have done till now, that Fabricius cannot be bribed!"[^120-4]

Horatius Cocles[^120-5] blocked the narrow bridge alone, and ordered his retreat to be cut off, that the enemy's path might be destroyed; then he long withstood his assailants until the crash of the beams, as they collapsed with a huge fall, rang in his ears.
When he looked back and saw that his country, through his own danger, was free from danger, "Whoever," he cried, "wishes to pursue me this way, let him come!"[^120-6]
He plunged headlong, taking as great care to come out armed from the midst of the dashing river-channel as he did to come out unhurt; he returned, preserving the glory of his conquering weapons, as safely as if he had come back over the bridge.

These deeds and others of the same sort have revealed to us a picture of virtue.
I will add something which may perhaps astonish you: evil things have sometimes offered the appearance of what is honourable, and that which is best has been manifested through its opposite.
For there are, as you know, vices which are next-door to virtues; and even that which is lost and debased can resemble that which is upright.
So the spendthrift falsely imitates the liberal man -- although it matters a great deal whether a man knows how to give, or does not know how to save, his money.
I assure you, my dear Lucilius, there are many who do not give, but simply throw away; and I do not call a man liberal who is out of temper with his money.
Carelessness looks like ease, and rashness like bravery.

This resemblance has forced us to watch carefully and to distinguish between things which are by outward appearance closely connected, but which actually are very much at odds with one another; and in watching those who have become distinguished as a result of some noble effort, we have been forced to observe what persons have done some deed with noble spirit and lofty impulse, but have done it only once.
We have marked one man who is brave in war and cowardly in civil affairs, enduring poverty courageously and disgrace shamefacedly; we have praised the deed but we have despised the man.

Again, we have marked another man who is kind to his friends and restrained towards his enemies, who carries on his political and his personal business with scrupulous devotion, not lacking in longsuffering where there is anything that must be endured, and not lacking in prudence when action is to be taken.
We have marked him giving with lavish hand when it was his duty to make a payment, and, when he had to toil, striving resolutely and lightening his bodily weariness by his resolution.
Besides, he has always been the same, consistent in all his actions, not only sound in his judgment but trained by habit to such an extent that he not only can act rightly, but cannot help acting rightly.
We have formed the conception that in such a man perfect virtue exists.

We have separated this perfect virtue into its several parts.
The desires had to be reined in, fear to be suppressed, proper actions to be arranged, debts to be paid; we therefore included self-restraint, bravery, prudence, and justice -- assigning to each quality its special function.
How then have we formed the conception of virtue?
Virtue has been manifested to us by this man's order, propriety, steadfastness, absolute harmony of action, and a greatness of soul that rises superior to everything.
Thence has been derived our conception of the happy life, which flows along with steady course, completely under its own control.

How then did we discover this fact?
I will tell you: that perfect man, who has attained virtue, never cursed his luck, and never received the results of chance with dejection; he believed that he was citizen and soldier of the universe, accepting his tasks as if they were his orders.
Whatever happened, he did not spurn it as if it were evil and borne in upon him by hazard; he accepted it as if it were assigned to be his duty.
"Whatever this may be," he says, "it is my lot; it is rough and it is hard, but I must work diligently at the task."

Necessarily, therefore, the man has shown himself great who has never grieved in evil days and never bewailed his destiny; he has given a clear conception of himself to many men; he has shone forth like a light in the darkness and has turned towards himself the thoughts of all men, because he was gentle and calm and equally compliant with the orders of man and of God.

He possessed perfection of soul, developed to its highest capabilities, inferior only to the mind of God -- from whom a part flows down even into this heart of a mortal.
But this heart is never more divine than when it reflects upon its mortality, and understands that man was born for the purpose of fulfilling his life, and that the body is not a permanent dwelling, but a sort of inn (with a brief sojourn at that) which is to be left behind when one perceives that one is a burden to the host.

The greatest proof, as I maintain, my dear Lucilius, that the soul proceeds from loftier heights, is if it judges its present situation lowly and narrow, and is not afraid to depart.
For he who remembers whence he has come knows whither he is to depart.
Do we not see how many discomforts drive us wild, and how ill-assorted is our fellowship with the flesh?

We complain at one time of our headaches, at another of our bad digestions, at another of our hearts and our throats.
Sometimes the nerves trouble us, sometimes the feet; now it is diarrhoea, and again it is catarrh;[^120-7] we are at one time full-blooded, at another anaemic; now this thing troubles us, now that, and bids us move away: it is just what happens to those who dwell in the house of another.

But we, to whom such corruptible bodies have been allotted, nevertheless set eternity before our eyes, and in our hopes grasp at the utmost space of time to which the life of man can be extended, satisfied with no income and with no influence.
What can be more shameless or foolish than this?
Nothing is enough for us, though we must die some day, or rather, are already dying; for we stand daily nearer the brink, and every hour of time thrusts us on towards the precipice over which we must fall.

See how blind our minds are!
What I speak of as in the future is happening at this minute, and a large portion of it has already happened; for it consists of our past lives.
But we are mistaken in fearing the last day, seeing that each day, as it passes, counts just as much to the credit of death.[^120-8]
The failing step does not produce, it merely announces, weariness.
The last hour reaches, but every hour approaches, death.
Death wears us away, but does not whirl us away.

For this reason the noble soul, knowing its better nature, while taking care to conduct itself honourably and seriously at the post of duty where it is placed, counts none of these extraneous objects as its own, but uses them as if they were a loan, like a foreign visitor hastening on his way.

When we see a person of such steadfastness, how can we help being conscious of the image of a nature so unusual?
Particularly if, as I remarked, it was shown to be true greatness by its consistency.
It is indeed consistency that abides; false things do not last.
Some men are like Vatinius or like Cato by turns;[^120-9] at times they do not think even Curius stern enough, or Fabricius poor enough, or Tubero sufficiently frugal and contented with simple things; while at other times they vie with Licinus in wealth, with Apicius in banqueting, or with Maecenas in daintiness.

The greatest proof of an evil mind is unsteadiness, and continued wavering between pretence of virtue and love of vice.

> He'd have sometimes two hundred slaves at hand  
And sometimes ten. He'd speak of kings and grand  
Moguls and naught but greatness. Then he'd say:  
"Give me a three-legged table and a tray  
Of good clean salt, and just a coarse-wove gown  
To keep the cold out." If you paid him down  
(So sparing and content!) a million cool,  
In five short days he'd be a penceless fool.[^120-10]

The men I speak of are of this stamp; they are like the man whom Horatius Flaccus describes -- a man never the same, never even like himself; to such an extent does he wander off into opposites.
Did I say many are so?
It is the case with almost all.
Everyone changes his plans and prayers day by day.
Now he would have a wife, and now a mistress; now he would be king, and again he strives to conduct himself so that no slave is more cringing; now he puffs himself up until he becomes unpopular; again, he shrinks and contracts into greater humility than those who are really unassuming; at one time he scatters money, at another he steals it.

That is how a foolish mind is most clearly demonstrated: it shows first in this shape and then in that, and is never like itself -- which is, in my opinion, the most shameful of qualities.
Believe me, it is a great role -- to play the role of one man.
But nobody can be one person except the wise man; the rest of us often shift our masks.
At times you will think us thrifty and serious, at other times wasteful and idle.
We continually change our characters and play a part contrary to that which we have discarded.
You should therefore force yourself to maintain to the very end of life's drama the character which you assumed at the beginning.
See to it that men be able to praise you; if not, let them at least identify you.
Indeed, with regard to the man whom you saw but yesterday, the question may properly be asked: "Who is he?"
So great a change has there been!
Farewell.

[^120-1]: *i.e.*, the Peripatetic and Academic schools.

[^120-2]: *Cf.* *Ep.* cxviii. 10 and note.

[^120-3]: Consult Sandys, *Hist. Class. Schol.* i. pp. 148 and 175 f. Alexandrian "analogists" opposed Pergamene "anomalists" with reference to the rules affecting the forms of words. Out of the controversy arose the scientific study of grammar.

[^120-4]: The two stories refer to the years 280 and 279 B.C., during the campaigns of Pyrrhus in Italy.

[^120-5]: See Livy, ii. 10.

[^120-6]: Livy (*loc. cit.*) reports him as saying: "Tiberine pater, te sancte precor, haec arma et hunc militem propitio flumine accipias!" Macaulay in his ballad translates Livy's quotation almost literally.

[^120-7]: A chronic disease of Seneca himself. See the autobiographic fragment in *Ep.* lxxviii. 1 f.

[^120-8]: Seneca is here developing the thought sketched in *Ep.* xii. 6 *unus autem dies gradus vitae est*.

[^120-9]: For the same contrast *cf.* *Ep.* cxviii. 4 (and note). For the following names see Index of Proper Names.

[^120-10]: Horace, *Sat.* i. 3. 11-17.