Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Enterprise packed attestation guidance #1954

Merged
merged 9 commits into from
Sep 24, 2024
14 changes: 13 additions & 1 deletion index.bs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -5801,7 +5801,7 @@ implementable by [=authenticators=] with limited resources (e.g., secure element
[=attestation trust path=].


### Packed Attestation Statement Certificate Requirements ### {#sctn-packed-attestation-cert-requirements}
### Certificate Requirements for Packed Attestation Statements ### {#sctn-packed-attestation-cert-requirements}

The attestation certificate MUST have the following fields/extensions:

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -5842,6 +5842,18 @@ The attestation certificate MUST have the following fields/extensions:
are both OPTIONAL as the status of many attestation certificates is available through authenticator metadata services.
See, for example, the FIDO Metadata Service [[FIDOMetadataService]].

### Certificate Requirements for Enterprise Packed Attestation Statements ### {#sctn-enterprise-packed-attestation-cert-requirements}
dwaite marked this conversation as resolved.
Show resolved Hide resolved

There are two potential sources for Enterprise Attestestations in Packed format:

1. From a hardware device which is manufactured with a device-specific attestation statement and key
dwaite marked this conversation as resolved.
Show resolved Hide resolved
2. Via a provisioned attestation statement, such as with a platform authenticator configured via managed policy

For attestation statements provisioned at manufacturing, the Extension OID `1.3.6.1.4.1.45724.1.1.2` (`id-fido-gen-ce-sernum`)
Copy link
Contributor

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

You enumerate two cases just above, but then only mention one here. Are provisioned enterprise attestations forbidden from using this extension? Or can either use them?

Copy link
Contributor Author

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

I'd raise to someone more familiar such as @ve7jtb

Copy link
Contributor Author

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

We are still pending guidance here on usage for MDM-provisioned EAs. Since these can be dynamic (reprovisioned by the MDM or by switching which software provides the credentials), I would lean toward either saying this should not be used, or that it must indicate a persistent device identifier (and not some software value).

Copy link
Contributor Author

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

will update to recommend against this for software-provisioned EAs

MUST be present, containing a unique serial number for the device as an OCTET STRING. The extension MUST NOT be marked as critical.
dwaite marked this conversation as resolved.
Show resolved Hide resolved

As enterprise attestations are normally consumed by [=[RPS]=] which are looking for particular authenticators,
there MAY be additional extensions used to convey information based on prior agreement.

## TPM Attestation Statement Format ## {#sctn-tpm-attestation}

Expand Down
Loading